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severe, irreversible climate change. As a result, our future is in doubt and, with
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Introduction
Lately the news about climate change hasn’t been good.
Once upon a time, not long ago, the scientific consensus held that
the northern polar ice cap, under the pressure of global warming, would
melt eventually—”in the latter part of the 21st century.”1 That estimate,
released in 2007, appeared around the same time as Al Gore’s documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, and reaffirmed a widespread sense that if we
did not act soon to curb our emissions of greenhouse gases, the worst
effects of climate change could be dire indeed—but would transpire
some decades into the future.2 The threat from that ice melt, and from
climate change more generally, was real but not absolutely imminent:
we had time to fight for change through the familiar processes of public debate, the gradual formation of public opinion, the eventual forging
of a coalition for Congressional action, and the patient negotiation of an
international treaty.
That estimate turned out to be much too optimistic. Only two years
later, new estimates suggested that the Arctic Ocean would be free of ice
in the summer as soon as 2030 or 2040.3 Thanks in part to the blistering pace with which global economies were emitting greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere, the climate was reacting far more quickly than most
researchers had previously projected. That shift in the forecast—along
with similar shifts all across climate science—had immense implications
for anyone who hoped to preserve the biosphere in anything like its present state into the future. The threat no longer loomed far off, near the end
of the century, but was only two or three decades away. In the wake of this
and other developments, those following the science on climate change
felt a greater sense of urgency, knowing the international community better act immediately to ward off severe changes to the global climate. That
imperative strained against the limits of national and international political traditions, raising difficult questions. How could scientists bring this
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news to bear on the thinking of leading politicians, who for the most part
still used the estimates and targets set in the early 1990s? Furthermore,
how could nations alter their fossil-fuel economies so dramatically in
such a short period? What could possibly break through the impasse?
But as it now appears, even that estimate has turned out to be too
optimistic in its turn. Three years later, the stunning melt of Arctic sea
ice in the summer of 2012 prompted scientists to rethink those earlier
studies and to propose instead that the Arctic might be ice-free in late
summer before 2020. Peter Wadhams, head of the Polar Ocean Physics
Group at the University of Cambridge, who researches the thickness of
Arctic sea ice, now estimates that the Arctic will become ice-free in the
summer well before the end of this decade, and perhaps as early as 2015
or 2016.4 So in five years, the threat of that dire event moved up from the
last half of the century to the latter part of this decade, almost obliterating
the opportunity for serious action. The year 2020, it seems, is the new
2100. So much for having time—even minimal time—to address this crisis. The questions instantly multiply: What are we supposed to do now?5
What political actions are even feasible? And how exactly are we to alter
our economic systems to meet this challenge in time?
The news about the Arctic sea ice is bad enough: it tells us that a massive transformation in the climate of the northern hemisphere is well on
its way. As the Arctic warms, the difference in temperature between the
far northern zone and the temperate regions decreases, causing changes
in the jet stream, which now moves more slowly and more often zigzags on its course to the east. As a result, it might swing over Texas, then
pull warm air straight north over the Dakotas, causing midwinter warm
spells all across the Midwest, or pull Arctic cold down into the Carolinas
or even Florida, freezing areas that in the past hardly experienced such
frigid weather. Furthermore, because it is moving more slowly, it can stall
over certain regions and cause them to be hit with weather over longer
periods—leading to longer spells of rain or snow and thus to more flooding or harsher winter storms. The same situation applies all across the
northern hemisphere. Such is the “new normal” of our time.6
But that is not all. Much worse news awaits. The melting of the Arctic
sea ice will lead to substantially higher temperatures in the sea itself,
high enough potentially to melt methane clathrates—frozen remains of
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organic life—deposited on the seabed on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf
and cause the resulting methane gas to escape through the sea and into
the open air. Scientists have long known about these submerged deposits of clathrates, but since most such deposits around the world rest far
beneath the ocean surface in cold waters, they were not overly concerned
that climate change would cause them to melt any time soon. But the situation on that Arctic continental shelf is different: it is so shallow—often
only around fifty meters below the surface—that the clathrates there
are vulnerable to rising temperatures on the ocean’s surface. So it is not
surprising that the warming in the Arctic has already triggered the initial
stages of this process.
In March 2010, a team of Russian scientists led by Igor Semiletov and
Natalia Shakhova published a study documenting a major clathrate melt
on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf, a melt that is releasing quantities “on
par with previous estimates of methane venting from the entire World
Ocean.”7 Because methane is around twenty-six times more potent as a
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, though much less short-lived in the
atmosphere, and because there are enormous deposits of frozen methane
crystals in that region of the sea, as in many of the world’s oceans, the
National Science Foundation issued a press release stating, “Release of
even a fraction of the methane stored in the shelf could trigger abrupt
climate warming.”8 On returning to that region of the Arctic in summer
2011, the research team found much larger “torch-like structures” of
escaping methane than before, some a kilometer across, suggesting that
they may have to raise their estimates of the volume of the clathrate melt;
the most recent rate of methane emissions astonished the very scientists
who have long been researching this phenomenon.9
But even that is not all the bad news. The Arctic ice melt is driven in
part by what scientists call a “positive feedback loop”: as the ice melts,
open water appears, absorbing sunlight; as a result, it warms up, causing
more ice to melt and repeating this process in a kind of death spiral. Now
that the Arctic Ocean is melting rapidly, that process will build on itself
no matter what we do. Such a vicious circle applies to the melting clathrates as well. The more clathrates melt, the more the global temperature
rises, causing further warming in the Arctic and more clathrates to melt.10
In the Arctic, one positive feedback loop (the melting of the ice) may
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eventually trigger another, and both, taken together, may trigger similar
vicious circles elsewhere on the planet. Once these processes kick in for
good, they will bring into play such powerful physical forces on such a
wide scale that nothing human beings can do will make much difference.
One can thus entirely understand why a group of scientists formed
the Arctic Methane Emergency Group to draw the world's attention to
this situation and its potentially catastrophic consequences. In the wake
of the huge ice melt in summer 2012, and Peter Wadhams’s new estimate
that a full summer melt will occur as soon as 2015, that group now states
openly that without a huge geoengineering project to increase Arctic ice,
global climate catastrophe is inevitable.11 So far this is a minority view,
albeit from those most directly involved in Arctic climate research. The
scientific community as a whole has not yet endorsed those findings.
Nevertheless, the fact that researchers closely attuned to this crucial
region of the planet have arrived at such dire conclusions is a good sign
that we’ve reached the final moments in which we might salvage a future
for the biosphere we know.
The news about the Arctic is so bad that we must all be forgiven for
asking two or three questions almost immediately.
Why didn’t anyone tell us this was happening? Major media outlets have
at times covered the astonishing ice melt in the Arctic, but they have seldom discussed its wider implications or its potential impact on the future
of the planet. But their relative silence in this regard is not surprising.
The national media in the United States, at least until the recent past, has
pretended that there are “two sides” to a “debate” as to whether climate
change is real and whether human activities are causing it—questions
that have been settled in the scientific community for over twenty years.
Their hesitant, half-hearted, and often inaccurate reporting on climate
change is so notorious it has led scientists to issue firm, even resounding statements on the subject, to ponder at length how they might get
the message out—and to throw up their hands in frustration that all their
efforts in this regard have gone for naught.
Why has the situation changed so fast? Isn’t climate change supposed to be
a gradual process? The response of the biosphere can take many forms, not
all of them gradual. But we could assume that at least our contributions to
the problem might increase at a steady pace. As it turns out, however, that
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assumption is wrong. A few years ago, we might reasonably have expected
global greenhouse gas emissions to rise at a gradual pace. But as it turns
out, those emissions have risen much more rapidly since the early 1990s
than anyone expected. Scientists have been warning us for a long time to
change our ways, but instead we have dramatically worsened the problem.
Why should we be surprised when the biosphere responds accordingly?
What are we supposed to do now? Do we have time left to do anything at
all? Anyone who tries to answer these questions is in a real dilemma. To
say that we do have time is to endorse what might be a false optimism,
supporting the belief that our usual approach to political problems—
the slow, incremental task of building support and crafting a coalition
for Congressional and international action—will work in time. Nothing
could be less sure. In fact, given our deplorable track record in recent
years and the enormity of the challenge, our chances for rising to this
challenge in time seem ridiculously small. On the other hand, saying that
we are truly out of time is to pretend to have a knowledge we don’t actually possess. Things are not looking good for planet Earth, but we cannot
yet be certain that all hope is lost. Our understanding of the clathrate melt
in the Arctic, for example, is still at its beginning stages, as further comments from the primary researchers on that topic suggest.12 Moreover,
the global climate is so complex that certain geophysical patterns might
be emerging of which we know even less. We can’t claim to have mastered
the situation. Without that mastery, it would be foolish to declare with
some fanfare that we are truly out of time.
For the last decade or two we have known that we live at the crossroads of history, charged with the task of deciding the fate of the Earth
and thus of humanity. So far we have been incapable of resolute action,
still caught within the tides of our traditions and habits, as if utterly disabled in the face of the task.
In the meantime, time is passing. The developments in the Arctic—
and elsewhere—suggest that we may have already made our choice, that
we are now venturing down the path of destruction. We can’t be sure this
event has taken place, but we certainly can’t proceed with the confidence
that we still have time. We are now caught in a surpassingly strange, horrific moment—a moment when we cannot help but think, is it too late?
Do we still have a future?
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Other books have described the physical realities of the climate.
Others have reviewed the host of things we could do to reduce our
greenhouse gas emissions and discontinue other practices that damage
the biosphere. Still others have explained very well our options for using
new technologies, converting to renewable energy, and adopting new
policies on the national and international scales for making those transformations possible. All of these books and others have urged us to take
action in time.
This book will take up those themes as well; it must do so to describe
the basics of our present situation. Without question, we must grasp the
essentials of the problem, the practical dimensions of the solution, and
the implications of both for what we should do.
But the emphasis of this book ultimately lies elsewhere. If we stick
only to the scientific, technical, and political questions, if we imagine
that we can face this challenge as knowing and planning creatures, we
neglect the implications of this moment for every level of our human
being. Moreover, if we urge action now, as we must, and then stop there,
we sidestep the wider implications of the possibility that, despite all
the warnings and efforts of the past couple of decades, we will not take
action in time. What if it is now too late? What if we now face a disappearing future?
Once we ask these questions, the entire conversation changes. We
have long known what is at stake; no one aware of climate change has
doubted that it threatens the viability of the world we know. Climate
change is not just a crisis for the biosphere; it is a crisis for our very significance and purpose as human beings. It represents a stunning change
in the climate of all human emotion. But now we face the possibility that
we will not be able to avoid passing the point of no return—of triggering
severe, irreversible climate change.
In the past those who have commented on climate change have
warned us to act before reaching this point, drawing on this dire threat
to motivate us. Nearly every book on climate change has ended on an
optimistic note, explaining how this crisis is ultimately an opportunity, a
chance to turn things around, to create an environmentally friendly economy and a newly responsible society. This way of thinking about the challenge corresponded well to the nature of the threat over most of the last
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two decades, when we still had confidence we had time to make a difference. Over that period, it made sense that we could scarcely confront the
dire realities of climate change without a certain optimism, without that
shift from horror to the possibility of transformation. As a result, we have
seldom if ever truly looked into the prospect of a disappearing future.
To some extent this way of thinking must still apply: after all, the
demand for urgent action is now greater than ever and has, if anything,
become a supreme ultimatum. Without question, we must do everything
humanly possible to change our society and to avoid triggering ultimate calamity.
But if we are honest, we must admit that the events of the past few
years undermine the prospects of a happy ending more than ever. Nearly
all of the time for action has slipped by. It is thus time for us to face this
crisis in a new way—not to abandon our efforts for change, not to forget
the range of excellent initiatives for shifting our economies onto a new
basis, but to contemplate, for the first time, what it means for us if we fail.
Doing so will be difficult; it will require new resources of honesty, new
capacities to endure dark thoughts, and new reserves of patience for the
intolerable. It may ask more of us than we have to give.
If we continue to insist that we have time in the face of increasing evidence that it is running out, we would be less than honest: sticking with
that familiar optimistic scenario to the exclusion of all else would commit
us to a form of repression, defensiveness, willful blindness—indeed, to a
version of denial itself.
This moment thus requires us to do something we seldom imagine: fighting for the planet even if it may be too late, sticking with all our
efforts—and increasing them—precisely when we begin to admit that
the cause may be lost. The developments of these recent years suggests
that our whole way of imagining the crisis must change: these days we
are stuck with the anguish of the last-ditch effort, the attempt to snatch
victory out of the jaws of defeat—with that minimal, desperate slogan:
never say die.
We cannot turn away from the new realities of this moment. We now
face questions not simply about the scientific, technological, economic,
or political dimensions of this crisis, although they remain crucial, but
also about its human significance. If we cannot face them, we will have
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lost something precious: our capacity to live with at least a minimal dose
of integrity and truth.
These questions are among the toughest we will ever have to face. In
some sense they are impossible to answer. But in this book, I will attempt
to face them nevertheless—not to answer them, not to give the illusion
we can truly know what we are doing under their pressure, but to explore
what it is like to dwell with them, to live under their weight and darkness:
What is the present for, if the future is on the verge of disappearing? How
are we to live if that future is in doubt?
Those questions are supremely tough in part because they come to us
in addition to the demands that our existing discussion of climate change
impose on us. Those demands are already considerable; they have been
so stark that we have scarcely been able to engage them well. Before taking up the core questions of this book, then, it may be wise to linger over
these latter demands, familiar as they are.
Why have we been so stuck? What has made it so hard for us to face
the current crisis as if we were actually sane and responsible people?
The honest answer, I think, is that this is an unprecedented crisis, posing challenges to us that we have never faced before and in response to
which we are utterly at a loss.
First of all, if we are to tackle the fundamental aspects of climate
change, nearly all of us are forced to examine realities well outside our
expertise, to read, learn, and judge scientific findings for which we often
have little preparation. Previous crises did not demand this task of us.
For most of the modern era, people could read the newspaper or speak
with friends to assess for themselves the state of public affairs; no special
expertise was necessary. Even in the nuclear era, citizens did not have to
learn the physics of the nuclear reaction to realize what had taken place
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki: those events were real and the devastating
effects of those weapons palpable.
In our era, however, we are asked to grapple with a phenomenon that
is not a singular event, not a known threat, but the context for possible
events—a context that we must learn about through the careful work of
hundreds of scientists. Moreover, it is never obvious whom we can trust
to mediate that work to us, to explain what the science has actually found:
since so many participants in the debate deny that there is a problem,
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or suggest that there is genuine disagreement between scientists about
whether climate change is real, we are not sure whom to believe. For no
previous crisis has a similar situation been the case.
Our hesitation in accepting the reality of the challenge arises as well
from the tendency to trust our own experience. If our lives and environments feel mostly familiar to us, it is hard for us to accept that something
is dramatically amiss. Intuitively, we hesitate to act on any claim that is
not evident to us in our own experience, not visible to the naked eye, not
confirmed by authorities we have already chosen. In this regard, climate
change is truly unprecedented: it touches us right where we live, calls us
to consider our moral responsibility to ourselves, to others, and to the
future—without offering us any obvious confirmation. It asks us for a
serious moral commitment without providing us with the foundations
we usually ask for when taking that kind of step.
But that is not all. If we do accept the reality of climate change, and
our responsibility for causing most of it, that realization is so wounding
that we may not wish to grapple with it any further. The prospect that
the planet’s future is in danger is most likely to fill us with anger, horror,
and desperate hope. Underneath all these responses lies a sense of great
dread. And we have almost nothing to help us live with that dread.
There is little or no precedent for that emotion. Even at the height of
the nuclear arms race, when people were forced to contemplate the possibility of global annihilation, at least they were aware that the conflagration could erupt from something other than the ordinary course of their
lives. A nuclear war would be a devastating interruption of the way things
were. Climate change is different: it threatens to transform our entire
world if we stick to our current habits, founded as they are on the extravagant use of fossil fuels. Our way of living threatens itself. No previous
generation of human beings has ever confronted that possibility—at least
not on the planetary scale.
This shift from a singular horror to everyday disaster is hard for us to
accept: somehow, a cataclysmic event is easier to understand than climate
change. After all, such an event isn’t that different from the thought of our
own deaths. Most of us are quite aware that our lives might go horribly
wrong at any moment. We know that a random accident could kill us,
disfigure us, or change our personalities before we have any warning at
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all. Even worse, a freak event could destroy all the people we love. That's
just the way things are.
But climate change is different. Nowadays, our everyday lives are the
source of the problem: everything we depend upon to live as we do—
the energy we use to get around, to heat or cool our homes, to power
the industry that produces the goods we use—is also pumping enough
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere that eventually our climate will
be transformed. The societies in which we live are causing events to
take place that could directly threaten how we live. It's not that there is a
chance something horrible might happen; this time, we know it will happen if we stay calm and carry on.
Even worse, once we decide to confront this pain and take action,
we realize that the task may be beyond our capacity. The most dire challenges of the past look easy in comparison to what we face. Consider the
long drive to abolish slavery in the United States. Abolitionists fought for
generations to eradicate that institution without success. Slaveholders,
however moved by moral appeal, often felt incapable of liberating their
slaves because in doing so they would lose too much “property”; to treat
their slaves as free human beings would simply cost them too much.
Most chose prudence over humanity, allowing financial considerations to
trump ethical principles. The same thing is happening today: we in the
developed nations are the equivalent of slaveholders, resting easy on the
fierce subordination of the world’s ecosystems (and more).
In the United States, it took a war to bring about abolition. That event
came at a great cost and nearly tore the republic apart. Yet that fight could
succeed in part because abolition sought to undo an institution that was
closely linked to one region of the nation. Today, climate change arises
from the actions of people throughout America and around the world.
No force will wage war against us to force us to change. As a result, we in
the United States and elsewhere will have to renounce our privilege voluntarily. We will have to call on all our ethical reserves to make a wholesale renunciation of privilege. There really is no historical precedent for
our doing anything of the sort.
The problem is not that we are uniquely corrupt, hopelessly selfish; it
is rather that history now confronts us with a challenge to which no prior
generation has ever arisen. We’re being asked to do the impossible.
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No wonder we’d rather do virtually anything to evade the task. None
of us really wants to believe it is happening. We almost automatically
put up great resistance to accepting it. Even those of us who react with
despair or anguish typically move on quite soon to the realities of ordinary life. On some level, all of us are in denial. Who would welcome the
thought of such a profound transformation? Facing the facts is the last
thing any of us might wish to do.
If that is the case, then the strangeness of our response to it begins
to make sense. The prospect of climate change is so unwelcome that the
widespread outcry against its reality seems virtually inevitable. Climate
change is nothing less than an assault on who we think we are: it exposes
the fact that the economies of the developed world are founded on a
lie, that our way of life takes for granted the eventual destruction of the
Earth, and that persisting with it makes us complicit in a great crime.
Nobody wants to accept those realities. It is thus remarkably satisfying
for many people to turn our instinctive denial into a full-fledged, explicit,
and articulate claim that nothing is amiss.
It is quite obvious that in doing so, we would cease to function as sane
and responsible adults. At this stage of the evidence, to embrace denial
is ultimately to choose the destruction of the Earth. But it does not follow that doing the opposite—choosing a sane response—is welcome to
us, for it asks us to transform the foundations of our lives. To overcome
denial requires us to accept that we have been living a lie for many generations, that our entire civilization is on the course toward committing
ecocide—a crime much greater than genocide, though intimately bound
up with it—and that our most intimate assumptions are monstrous
if not worse.
If we do manage to rise to this challenge, we will have accomplished
a feat virtually unique in human history. If we do not, our failure will be
understandable, even if it will make us uniquely horrific. Either way, our
generation will be the only of its kind in the history of the species. No
wonder this moment feels so strange.
But the difficulty of our situation is still greater. Even if we are entirely
persuaded we must do something and we attempt to do so on our own,
it’s not as if any one of us, or even a large social movement, has the power
to do enough. In our own lives, we might take many steps to do much less
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to harm the biosphere, but those individual actions can never be enough
as long as industrial and agricultural enterprises, and indeed entire
nations, continue on with business as usual. As a result, we are caught
in the contradiction between our willingness to act and the radical limits of our agency, between ethical principle and pragmatic reality. We
might fight hard to push beyond that contradiction, to force the nations
to change, but so far very little transformation has taken place; accordingly, we have little choice but to live within a social context still shaped
by a denial we may not share, still caught up in habits we wish to break.
Because we cannot produce the infrastructure of our society on our own,
or manufacture the goods we use, we may end up inhabiting an economic
system we deplore.
Faced with these seemingly impossible odds, we may resort to any
number of plausible responses. We might, for example, simply throw up
our hands in despair. In all bitterness, we may conclude that the task is
too huge, the cost too great, the resistance so formidable, that it is impossible to worry about climate change any further. After all, we might argue,
its worst effects won't happen until after we are dead: let later generations face them.
But here again, climate change won't let us pass it by. True enough,
the idea that those effects will take place well into the future is surprisingly familiar across the political spectrum. Many people evidently
assume that climate change will really come down hard on someone else,
probably their grandchildren. Even James Hansen, one of those who first
brought the concept of global warming to the attention of Congress and
an advocate for greatly decreasing our greenhouse gas emissions, titled
his recent book Storms of My Grandchildren. And James Garvey, in his
excellent book, The Ethics of Climate Change, bases his analysis on our
ethical obligation to others, especially to those in future generations.13
But do we really think that what happens to later generations is only
a matter of our ethical obligation to them? The attitude we display as we
carry out most of our activities tells us otherwise. If we build a city, don't
we want it to endure? If we enjoy our local traditions, don't we want them
to retain their charm? If we educate the young, don't we want them to
flourish? If we bring about a medical breakthrough, don't we want it to
help people live long and healthy lives? If we create a work of art, don't
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we want it to be enjoyed by posterity? If we write a book, don't we want
it to be read? If we cherish the great cultural and historical achievements
of the past, don't we want to pass them down to others after us? In short,
what actions do we take that do not imply a relation to the future? What
would be the point of our lives if the future were to disappear?
The future is never just for the people of the future; without that future,
what we do now loses its force. Without a future, there is no present and not
much of a past. Climate change isn't just about our obligation to others.
It's about our own lives, too.
If we give up on climate change, we cancel the present. We choose to
make all of our ordinary activities meaningless, as if we want to become
shadows of ourselves, or as if we want to float forever in a world without foundations. None of us would choose such a fate. Yet choosing the
opposite—a radical change in who we are—is immensely difficult as
well. One option is horrific, the other impossible. But no other options
are available.
At every turn, climate change puts us in new situations. It is truly
unprecedented, not just as a material reality, but in its impact on our ordinary lives, our ability to understand it, our willingness to face its implications, and our capacity to discuss those implications for our societies. If it
throws us off, if it inspires odd reactions in us or others, we shouldn't be
surprised. Climate change is intrusive, insidious, anonymous, implacable.
Yet it won't let us turn away. Endlessly, ruthlessly, climate change interrupts us, throws us off, and asks of us what we barely know how to give.
To take the full measure of that challenge, this book must of course
bring into view the practical realities of our time. But the purpose in
doing so is always to ponder their further dimensions, to think about
their implications for all that we are.
In the chapters that follow, the first key step is to assess our current situation as honestly as possible, confronting it without denial and without
reserve. Only on this basis can we begin to ponder the full implications of
our dilemma. The task is not simply to review the facts but to allow them
to sink in, to speak to us where we live, and to overcome our resistance to
their full implications. Accordingly, I will first go back to the basics and
grapple with climate change itself—to understand its impact on any one
of us where we live. The next step, equally essential, is to consider what

20

Introduction

we can do to remove the causes of climate change and to ask whether we
can take action in time to make a difference. The third step, key to any
understanding of our present dilemma, is to consider why we are so hesitant to take action on the scale required—and whether, given our enormous population as human beings on a small planet, doing so will finally
solve our environmental crisis. These initial steps will be the concerns of
chapters one through five.
After exploring the physical and political realities as directly as possible, the book will then take up its core challenge of thinking about the
human implications of the dilemma before us and to delve into their ultimate consequences. It will ask, what is it like to be alive at this strange
moment? What is the present for, if the future is disappearing? How
can we respond, if the point of our lives is dissolving, yet we live on? In
exploring these questions from chapters six through eight, the book will
bring forward the impact of the environmental crisis on our own lives,
sketching the outline of an intimate disarray we are now beginning to
experience in full force.
Having considered these tough, harrowing questions, the book will
then seek a way through that disarray to a basis for living with integrity
even in the midst of the ruins. What can anchor our actions on behalf
of others and for the sake of all living things if the damage to the Earth
is nearly irreversible, if the prospects for warding off disaster are dimming? How might we respond to natural forces with respect if they now
threaten us with greater violence than before? Here the book will propose that our best option is to own disaster, to accept responsibility for
what humanity has done to the biosphere, and thus commit ourselves to
making reparation—and on that basis, to take concrete ethical actions in
our own lives no matter what others may do. It will suggest as well that
we may greet the ferocity of the whirlwind with awe, accepting at last our
limited place within the biosphere and finding a renewed foundation for
enduring whatever may come.
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Chapter 1

Climate Change Will Happen to You
By now, many of us have some sense of the basics of climate change.
We've seen images of melting ice, stranded polar bears, and calving glaciers. We've examined the charts depicting the rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide or heard about them. We've surmised whether Hurricane
Katrina and various floods or droughts were caused by global warming.
Maybe we’ve seen An Inconvenient Truth or read books about climatology. In fact, if polls are to be believed, most Americans accept the basic
reality of climate change and would like the nation and the international
community to do something about it.
But many of us might also hesitate to accept aspects of the science
about climate change—whether it’s actually happening or whether
human activities are causing it. Since nothing I will say in the rest of
this book will make much sense unless readers grapple first with these
questions, if you are still cautious in these respects I recommend that
you turn now to the Appendix, where I discuss them, and then return to
this chapter.
Working through those concerns carefully is essential: if our decisions are to have a firm basis, if we are to live with real deliberation,
we should not skip over any stage of the process. It’s not likely we can
become fully conscious of our situation as human beings without having
paused to learn the fundamental physical facts of climate change. If you
have already done so, keep reading: this is the chapter for you.
As it turns out, recognizing the reality of climate change—and its
being caused by human beings—is only the start of a deep engagement
with what confronts us. The further we go and the more we recognize the
potential impact of climate change on our own lives, the more we may try
to protect ourselves from what we learn so that we can continue with our
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lives in good conscience. Often it is quite easy to do so. For good reason,
the typical discussion of global warming sticks close to the science; the
difficulty of the subject for lay readers and the need for an explanation
that can cut through the fog of rancorous debate require that the subject
be handled with as little fuss as possible. But as a result, even the best
presenters of the science write as if the facts will speak for themselves, as
if there are no obstacles in our lives that would interfere with a full acceptance of what they say. In fact, few of us are free of such obstacles; most of
us filter what we hear in some fashion or indulge a tendency to simplify
or deny, misconstrue or exaggerate, the full import of the facts—at least
in part, and perhaps unconsciously.
Delving further into climate change, in short, requires an increasingly direct confrontation with realities that we would rather ignore.
Accordingly, for nearly all of us, the chief task is to break through the
tendency to keep the entire problem at a distance from our actual lives.
The challenge is to identify and confront the most representative ways we
evade what the scientific research teaches us and thus to encounter the
truth as fully as we can.
So let’s begin with perhaps the first key objection one might make
to the notion that climate change is a serious and immediate threat
to humanity.
Yes, a voice protests, climate change is real and will have serious consequences, but not right away; we have plenty of time to figure out what we'll do
to keep its worst effects from taking place.
To some extent, my discussion of our current situation in the opening pages of this book may provide an adequate, if hasty, reply. But to
respond more fully to this objection, it may be valuable to slow down
here and outline the overall context of contemporary scientific thinking
on this question.
This objection relies on the scientific uncertainty with regard to exactly
how much harm greenhouse gas emissions will eventually have. The estimates in the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (henceforth IPCC), the international body that assembles and
summarizes the current state of scientific knowledge for the benefit of
the world’s governments (and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along
with Al Gore, in 2007), have indeed varied widely. More importantly,
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however, the sense that we have time to put together a response is also
implicit in the slow pace of negotiations over international agreements
about emissions—not to mention the even slower pace of compliance
with the cuts already specified in the Kyoto Protocol. (Very few nations
that signed those accords have begun to make substantial cuts in their
emissions, despite the publicity over their promise to do so.)14 The same
patience is evident in the fact that these negotiators either set modest
cuts in emissions (as at Kyoto) or distant dates for compliance.
The greatest virtue of this patient approach is its realism about the difficulty of finding agreement, changing our carbon-based culture, and cutting emissions deeply enough to make a difference. Anyone who reflects
on how difficult it will be to transform our societies to the necessary
degree must empathize with the bone-deep pragmatism of negotiators,
their acceptance of the political conditions we face and the necessity of
working within them to achieve anything that will matter.
But very little in the scientific research can justify such patience.
For one thing, a portion of the carbon dioxide we emit remains in the
atmosphere for a century or more. As a result, even if we soon curtail the
amount of carbon dioxide we produce, levels of that gas will remain high
throughout the rest of this century at least, forcing changes to the climate
throughout that long period. In effect, our actions long ago are being felt
today, and our actions today will be felt for many decades to come. The
longer we continue our current habits, the greater the difficulties future
generations will have to face. Unless we are fairly certain that today's
emissions will do no harm later on, we should do what we can today.
Moreover, although views differ about the effects that will follow from
our emissions, it would be foolish to assume that only the more optimistic projections are true. If the science is uncertain in this regard, we
should listen to the full spectrum of considered judgment before opting
for a slow-motion strategy. If we listen in this way, we will soon discover
that things may be substantially worse than we might think.
The major debate among climate change scientists today is not
whether climate change is real but whether it will have a more severe
effect on Earth's ecosystems in the future than we previously thought.
One element contributing to this debate is research into the problem
of positive feedback loops of the sort I mentioned at the beginning of
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this book. These vicious circles emerge when the warming temperature
causes the release of more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, which
cause a further increase in temperature, and on around again. Once these
vicious circles become strong enough, they constitute “tipping points”
that lead to an irreversible sequence of events and an unstoppable rise in
temperature. The more gases we emit and the longer we wait to change
our habits, the more likely we will cross these tipping points, making it
even more difficult to postpone the arrival of serious climate change with
all its consequences.
In his book on the subject, With Speed and Violence: Why Scientists
Fear Tipping Points in Climate Change, Fred Pearce reviews a wide array
of potential “positive feedback loops” that could arise in a number of
regions of the world. Some of these tipping points may indeed be decades
away. But we threaten to cross others in the fairly near future, if we have
not done so already.15
Several key examples of tipping points are those I explored at the
beginning of this book. As I mentioned there, the stunning melt of the
Arctic sea ice in the summer of 2012 suggests to many observers that this
process has now crossed the tipping point and become irreversible.
A second example, also related to the discussion in the introduction,
is the possibility that the methane clathrates on the seabeds around the
globe will begin to melt and release gas into the atmosphere.16 If this
feedback loop gets going on any large scale, we are in for big trouble, for
there are untold quantities of methane capable of being released in this
fashion. One estimate suggests that the methane in the clathrates in all
the world's oceans is around four thousand times the amount in today's
atmosphere.17
Researchers typically guess that such a clathrate melt will take place
only at much later stages of climate change. In 2008, Mark Lynas suggested that this potential clathrate melt might take place on an Earth
that had warmed 5° Centigrade over preindustrial temperatures.18 But
already, as I mentioned above, the clathrate melt is beginning on a shallow continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean. That relatively local event does
not suggest that the clathrates around the world are about to melt as well.
But because clathrates exist in such huge numbers, even a melt in only
a small fraction of their total bulk would be enough to shift the Earth’s
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climate severely. We are already seeing what might be the beginnings of
that event, in which case it is making itself felt at temperatures far lower
than we expected, and several decades earlier as well.
There is yet another worrisome instance looming not far from the arctic region. One of the most pressing instances of a possible tipping point
is the melting permafrost throughout the far North—in Siberia, Alaska,
and northern Canada. When it melts, it releases immense volumes of carbon dioxide and methane. Once the release of these gases hits a certain
point, it will cause so much further warming—and further melting of the
permafrost—that the results will be irreversible.
The tipping point for the permafrost is not far away. One study that
appeared in January 2011 strikingly predicts that the feedback loop in
the far North will cause the arctic permafrost to become a net source
(not sink) of carbon and methane after the mid-2020s and will be strong
enough to cancel between 42 and 88 percent of the planet’s land-based
capacity to absorb those emissions.19
These examples may imply that only the feedback loops of the far
North—the Arctic ice, the clathrates, the permafrost—are of concern.
But consider what is transpiring in the Amazon region. Rising temperatures and an associated decline in rainfall have led to the drying of the
Amazon rainforest, causing trees there to grow less and making them
more vulnerable to decay and to wildfires, as well as to the very serious
droughts of 2005 and 2010.20 This process has gone so far by now that by
some estimates this ecosystem now releases more carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere than it absorbs.21 Think about it: the Amazon, once famous for
being one of the Earth's best ecosystems for soaking up immense quantities of carbon dioxide—and for pumping huge quantities of oxygen into
the atmosphere—may already be helping to drive global warming rather
than alleviate it, and if not, is likely to do so very soon. Once we cross that
tipping point for good, an entire array of planetary systems that dominate
not far from the Equator will be transformed as well. That example suggests that the Earth’s systems in every region are vulnerable to severe disarray; no area of the biosphere is safe.
As realities like this suggest, if we ignore the causes that set these
vicious circles into motion, we will face an impossible challenge, for in
the following years, the results could wipe out any gains we might make
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in reducing our greenhouse gas emissions. The Arctic sea melt is already
irreversible. If any one of these other processes crosses the tipping point,
we are in for major trouble. Yet all of these tipping points are drawing
nearer every day. Our contribution to climate change right now is significant enough, but once very large ecosystems get into the game, they will
dwarf what we can do.
There you go again, another voice objects; you are sounding much too
loud an alarm. Climate change is real and is caused by human beings, but
don't make any reckless statements about its potential effects. Don't get carried
away; cut back on statements that go too far, that warn against all kinds of
horrible and devastating consequences. Some “skeptics” apply this advice to
nearly all discussions of climate change, advocating what they regard as a
“moderate” estimate of global warming's dangers; others, such as Claire
Parkinson, a clear-sighted scientist well within the mainstream who otherwise has a great deal to teach us, targets more narrow claims.22
No doubt it is best for all participants in the debate to stick as closely
as possible to demonstrable findings. But because this argument places
far more emphasis on curbing wild talk than the danger of the crisis itself,
it ultimately treats caution and politeness as more important than the
future of the planet. Such a preference reveals an excessive distaste for
the language of crisis. This kind of talk, some think, is always irresponsible, just a form of panic-mongering. Evidently, a responsible, sane person
should avoid speaking of an emergency or doing anything reckless, like
proposing that we consider modifying our way of life. But to focus on
excessive statements rather than the underlying threat of climate change
diverts attention from the most pressing concerns to relatively marginal
ones. It's as if these authors live in a house that is starting to burn down,
but would do anything rather than actually sound the alarm: that would
be noisy and rude!
This preference for understating the severity of the threat, as it turns
out, is shared not only by a handful of scientists but may characterize the
general tone of climate science overall. One recent study suggests that
“scientists are biased not toward alarmism but the reverse,” toward “erring on the side of less rather than more alarming predictions,” possibly
because researchers generally adhere to the “scientific norms of restraint,
objectivity, skepticism, rationality, dispassion, and moderation.” The
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authors of this study argue that climate scientists have more often understated the potential impact of climate change than the opposite, fearful of
coming across as alarmist or incautious in their findings.23
While in many contexts this bias toward caution may serve scientific
research well, in the arena of controversy over climate change it may reinforce our belief that the situation is not that dire after all. In short, it can
feed into our sense that things are all right and will work themselves out
in some fashion. Such a viewpoint is clearly a mode of denial, even if one
who espouses it is otherwise remarkably insightful. As Parkinson herself
admits late in her book, she is less concerned about the future than others because she believes that “surely” inventors will create new energy
alternatives that will make fossil fuels a thing of the past, and by implication will do so in time for us to avoid the ill effects of climate change.24
But it is naive to suggest that a solution will simply appear or that it even
if it does it will take effect immediately. Inventions take time to manufacture and even longer to produce on a massive scale that this occasion
requires. Only a supreme confidence, however unjustified—only a belief
in the secular equivalent of a miracle—can explain such a distaste for
talk of crisis.
All right, one might say, it's happening, we're causing it, and it may be
worse than we thought. But from what I see, it may not happen here. After
all, most of the images we associate with climate change depict what is
happening elsewhere—in the Arctic, for example, or around the distant
islands that will soon be swallowed by rising waters. Seldom do we see
images of the effects of climate change on us where we live. Of course, we
are aware that our summers are warmer than before, our growing seasons
longer, our climate more erratic and surprising. But so far very few of us
have been lost on melting sea ice or swamped by the rising tides.
Most of us are so used to thinking about climate change in this manner that it is very difficult for us to get beyond it. Perhaps only a brutal
restatement of our situation will get us out of the habit and help us focus
on what will happen to us in our own immediate surroundings. So here
it is: climate change is devastating, absolutely powerful, undismissible,
even if in our darker, most selfish moments we might want to say “damn
the ice caps” or “the hell with Tuvalu,” even if we might wish to mutter
so as no one can hear, “pfft to plankton” or “good riddance to the coral
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reefs.” Climate change won’t just harm others, forcing the Peruvians to
suffer from thirst or sweeping more Bangladeshis away in flooding seas;
on the contrary, we better pay serious attention, for our own way of life is
on the line.
For one thing, as I mentioned in the introduction, the changes in
the Arctic are already altering weather patterns over the northern hemisphere. Just consider the strange events in the United States in 2012: the
huge thunderstorm and tornado complex—the derecho—that swept
over central and eastern portions of the country starting on June 29;
the vast wildfires in the West beginning as early as April; the massive
drought in the Midwest, threatening food crops and on occasion closing
Mississippi River traffic; and Superstorm Sandy that wreaked havoc over
major parts of the Northeast in November. In that single year, the altered
climate caused significant harm to nearly every region of the country.
And that’s just 2012: the same pattern is borne out by the bizarre episodes—too many to list—in the seasons since then. Researchers now
state outright that there is a strong link between climate change and
these extreme weather patterns. According to the Environment America
Research & Policy Center, the frequency of extreme precipitation events
has increased by 30 percent from 1948 to 2011.25 Are you confident that
you will escape such events in the forthcoming years and decades?26
Climate change will be just as real where you live as anywhere else on
Earth. In the United States, it will raise average temperatures; increase the
amount of moisture in the air, making heavy precipitation events (of rain
or snow) more likely, thus causing an increase in flooding and landslides;
increase the number of blisteringly hot days in the summer; change the
water cycle and increase evaporation, in most regions resulting in a drier
landscape and more frequent droughts; and create the conditions for
more insect and waterborne diseases. It will force the migration of local
species into new habitats further north, as well as the absorption of species moving from the south, thus altering the balance between mutually
dependent forms of life within each local ecosystem. The changes to the
water cycle will alter the rivers, streams, and open landscapes throughout
the country and the fundamental character of each region. These changes,
and many more, are likely to have an adverse effect on food production,
outdoor activities, seasonal rituals, the physical structures we have built,
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public health, and local and regional economies. We may end up living in
natural systems that are not only rapidly changing, but also much weaker
and in some cases dying out altogether. We'll be far less comfortable right
where we live than we once were.27
At first changes of this kind may seem overstated. For example, the
fact that the zones with a particular average annual temperature will be
shifting northwards might not initially sound so bad. After all, one might
argue, ecosystems further south hang together quite well; wouldn't they
fare equally well if they moved to the north? But many species are less
able to compete with or displace species that already live in regions to
the north, to reproduce quickly and thus adjust to new living conditions,
and to move across miles of territory in a few years, suggesting that some
portions of an ecosystem will migrate successfully while others will not.
Some species might be mobile enough to move on, but if they did so,
would lose access to their sources of food or to the habitats (river valleys,
mountains) where they previously flourished. Forms of life that flourish in mountainous terrain may have only so far up the mountainside
to migrate before running out of room. Unlike animals or birds, plants
rooted in the soil might find it difficult to move quickly into new terrain.
Many species will adapt to new conditions, but many others will not.
Studies show that in the second half of the twentieth century, species on
average migrated toward the poles at the rate of four miles per decade,
while the zones in which they live—those defined by specific average
temperatures—have migrated far more quickly, about thirty-five miles
per decade.28 Over time, as warming continues, the species that can't
move very fast will find themselves within much warmer temperature
belts, will be unable to flourish within a climate too hot for them, and will
succumb to natural forces.
Such pressures can take many forms. Consider the changes taking
place in the pine forests of western North America, especially in British
Columbia. The pine beetle, a native insect in those regions, is now reproducing at a much greater rate than before; thanks to the warming winters,
the warmer summers, and the reduction in summer precipitation, it is
becoming a much more dominant species in those habitats than before.
As a result, it is killing millions of acres of trees, converting the boreal forest of British Columbia from a carbon sink to a net emitter of carbon.29
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Such vast damage in those forests, needless to say, will have profound
impacts in the entire ecosystem, changing the water cycle, the growth
patterns across the formerly wooded landscape, and much more. This
transformation is largely due to the activities of a single species and perfectly illustrates how the complex interactions between species in ecosystems make them terribly vulnerable to climate change.
But changes due to the expansion of single species throughout a
region are relatively subtle compared to the even broader transformations that every ecosystem will have to undergo. The effect of pine beetles
in western forests pales in comparison to the even more dramatic effects
of rising temperatures on the water cycle. The warming of the ecosystem
increases evaporation and causes the gradual drying of the land, killing trees even where they are not vulnerable to insects. Recent research
into the state of forests throughout the western United States shows that
they are already experiencing a demographic shift—an increase in the
number of trees dying and a decrease in the number of new trees growing per year—and that as a result they are approaching “thresholds for
abrupt dieback.” The drier conditions as well as the increasing activity of
various species of insects is leading to rising mortality in those forests.30
Evidently, climate change often works through several effects at once,
each compounding the impact of others, creating conditions that are
worse than any single process could bring about.
Similar changes are taking place in every region of the United States.
In the Northeast, for example, climate change will drive the maple forests further north, eventually depriving the region of the autumn colors
distinctive to the region, and the rising seas and increasing intensity of
storms will lead to greater storm surges, damages to wetlands, coastal
flooding, and erosion (as the stunning effects of Superstorm Sandy have
made abundantly clear). The Southeast will become so hot and dry that
its pine forests may disappear; oxygen depletion in the region's lakes will
kill off fish in lakes and streams; and more powerful tornadoes and hurricanes will damage inland regions and coastal areas alike. The Southwest
faces a dramatically altered future, one in which droughts will be longer
and more intense than they were in the past, causing rivers and lakes to
diminish and fires to spread more easily. The reduction in the snowpack
over the Sierra Nevada in eastern California will lead to severe water
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shortages in much of that state; in mid to late summer, people there may
turn on the tap and find no water coming out. Needless to say, these and
other changes will harm each region's food supply, sources of energy, distinctive landscape, and quality of life—if such a drab list of consequences
can possibly capture the scale and intensity of what will take place.31
It's not difficult to extrapolate this pattern to the rest of the planet.
Clearly, climate change will have severe consequences for ecosystems
around the world. Forests all across the world are in serious danger.32
Moreover, the stress on ecosystems is putting a fair portion of the planet’s species under terrific pressure. Although it boggles the mind to sum
up the possible effects on the Earth as a whole, some scientists have
attempted to do so: one often-cited study by scientists on several continents who examined 1000 species concluded that under a mid-range estimate of the severity of climate change—that is, with an increase of only
around 2° Celsius above preindustrial levels, and only 1.2° over current
temperatures—15 to 37 percent of Earth's land species could be “committed to extinction” by 2050, although a more recent study qualifies
those findings and provides a somewhat less pessimistic assessment.33
What about the sea? We often forget that climate change acidifies the
oceans, harming organisms that rely on calcium carbonate to form shells
or skeletons, including the coccolithophores, one of the most abundant
types of plankton. The prospect that the further absorption of carbon
dioxide into the oceans could damage the plankton, the first links of the
marine food chain, is especially chilling. Scientists do not understand the
potential effects of further acidification well, but given what we do know
already, we have little reason for optimism.34 One study states that the
oceans are acidifying at a rate ten times faster than they did 55 million
years ago during a period of mass extinction for marine life, and another
finds roughly a 1 percent decline per year in plankton since 1950 due to
warming temperatures at the ocean’s surface.35 A recent study conducted
by the International Programme on the State of the Ocean found far
greater declines in oceanic life than expected; Alex Rogers, its scientific
director, stated, “[A]lmost right across the board we're seeing changes
that are happening faster than we'd thought, or in ways that we didn't
expect to see for hundreds of years.”36
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So far I have emphasized how climate change will put nearly all ecosystems into severe disarray and force a good portion of the Earth’s species into extinction. But for human beings, these biological realities are
only part of the picture. For us, such vast damage will also deplete the
pleasure we take in natural beauty—in the blossoming of a tree, the cry
of a bird, the subtle coloring of a fish, the scent of bark, the interweaving of forms on a tangled bank. The devastation of Earth’s living forms
is also a traumatic blow to the beauty of the common day, the poetry of
everyday life.
So what, someone might respond; we've always had extinction, and
we always will; there is nothing here to be upset about. But this time we're
not talking about one species giving up its habitat to another over many
decades or being pushed out under ordinary processes of natural selection. We're talking about a volatile combination of factors: wiping out
the ecological niche of many species; making complex biological interrelations vulnerable to unforeseen interactions; and putting entire ecosystems under duress. In fact, extinction at this pace and at these numbers
deserves a stronger term; it is not just extinction, but the death or at least
decay of entire natural systems, if not of the Earth itself. Some previous
events in the planet's history caused a similar devastation—the impact of
meteors, for example—but do we really want to compete with meteors to
see which force can mess up the Earth the most?
All this is bad enough. But at the moment we are causing much more
than climate change. If you factor in everything else that advanced industrial civilization is doing to our local and regional ecosystems, the situation becomes even more difficult. All kinds of familiar practices on which
we in the United States rely today—monoculture agriculture; the depletion of water aquifers; the release of vast quantities of nitrogen into ecosystems from fertilizer; large-scale farming of chickens, pigs, and cows,
creating unprecedented quantities of manure effluent; the destruction
of wetlands; the expansion of cities, suburbs, and exurbs; strip mining,
mountaintop coal mining, and oil drilling in formerly protected areas;
the release of untold quantities of plastics into the world’s waterways
and oceans; overfishing; and the inadvertent importation of exotic species, to name a few—already place our ecosystems under duress. To add
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climate change, with all its consequences, to this pressure simply multiplies the danger.
All these factors make it clear that the transformations to ecosystems
will take place right in our own neighborhoods. If you need an image to
capture the relevance of climate change for you and yours, take a look
at the natural life that surrounds you wherever you live and imagine it
damaged or disappearing. Then remember for a moment that if climate
change decimates an ecosystem, it won't come back—at least not in the
form we know, and not for millennia. It will be gone for good.
Very well, someone might reply, that may be true for most regions, but
some areas will no doubt benefit from climate change: their growing seasons
will expand, more life will flourish there, and the winters will be more temperate. Isn't climate change good news for some people?
It's true that climate change models have suggested that some areas
may experience warming that will improve the growing season, for example, or reduce the discomforts of winter. But it's naive to imagine that
these changes are truly beneficial. As we've already seen, the warming
climate has devastated the boreal forest of British Columbia; the loss of
those cold winter nights, and of the shorter growing season, has not been
a benefit there. Any so-called benefit to other regions is likely to have
similar effects.
Nevertheless, it's worth taking this objection seriously and thinking
it through with another thought experiment. If we imagine that some
region would actually benefit, then what might follow? For one thing, can
we suppose that the people who live in the lucky region rely exclusively
for their well-being on what happens there? Or do they live in houses
built of imported materials, drive cars manufactured in other regions,
eat food grown elsewhere? Conversely, do they sell their own wares to
people who live elsewhere? What supports the economy of their region?
If ecosystems in other regions are suffering, so also will the economic
base in those regions, and the trading relationships will suffer as well. No
region can imagine that it would survive easily on its own.
But for a moment, let's take this experiment to a second level and
imagine that it could thrive all by itself. Perhaps people in a particular
region would be very good at creating a self-sustaining economy. Very
well. But if residents of other regions are suffering, doesn't it seem likely

36 Chapter 1

they would migrate to the areas that lucked out? As a result, wouldn't
those better-off areas be overwhelmed with people seeking a better life?
What's more, does it seem likely these migrants would have been able to
sell their homes at a good price? Would they always have secured jobs
that paid them as well? The people in the lucky zone might find themselves trying to accommodate an inflow of stressed-out, disadvantaged
people hoping to find a good place to live. If nonhuman species will have
to migrate, people will too. What’s more, they will often have to migrate
across national borders, leading to a whole range of crucial political questions. Once you factor in human mobility, you change the entire dynamic:
a region whose climate might not be bad will have to face a massive social
transformation, one that may stress out the region's ecosystem in turn.
So it simply isn't credible to suggest that climate change would benefit
anyone in the long term. Because of the intricate web of our economies
and the inevitability of migration, there are no guarantees. Perhaps if
those who lived in this hypothetical lucky region put together a self-sustaining economy—and declared political independence, surrounded the
entire zone with a thirty-foot fence to keep everyone else out, and taxed
themselves silly to create a state-of-the-art military that could defeat any
invaders—then they could live in relative abundance (if also in a state of
perpetual selfishness and paranoia). Does that sound like a good future?
All right, says one last voice, even if everything you say is true—even if
climate change will alter the ecosystems where I live or cause a massive social
transformation in my region, what difference does it really make to me? I
don't care about nature; if a lot of species go extinct, it's not going to affect me.
Ecosystems may come and go, but in the modern world, what does it matter?
I don't really object to social change in my neighborhood, either; by now we're
all used to new developments of that kind. As long as I have a job and can live
in my urban environment, with a car, a cell phone, a nice Internet connection,
good heating, a working air conditioner, and plenty of food at my local supermarket, everything's going to be fine.
The voice that speaks here is at last the distinctive, perhaps mostly
unconscious, voice of our own innate, indestructible narcissism. That
profound cluelessness arises in all of us at the prospect of our own mortality: though we acknowledge the reality of our eventual deaths on some
level, we don't often live in accordance with that insight. The same applies
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even more to the thought of what may happen to the Earth. Perhaps the
greatest help to our narcissism in the face of global warming is the air
conditioner: evidently, as long as we are assured we'll be able to live in
a relatively comfortable indoor temperature in perpetuity, we sense that
there is nothing much to worry about.
This version of the near future may seem surprisingly plausible.
Perhaps even if the seas rise, the planet warms, and vast portions of the
Earth are devastated by climate change, wealthy people living in some
places will live in circumstances not entirely different from what they are
used to. If they wish, they might well ignore the bad news arriving from
around the country and the world—at least for a while. They might even
dismiss the changes to the climate of their region, the dying forests on
nearby mountains, the shrinking local rivers, and the new vulnerability of
many plants, birds, and animals that live in their vicinity. But eventually
they will find it difficult to ignore the dust storms that may result from
the drying of vast regions; the dwindling water supply; the much harsher
snowstorms, rainstorms, tornadoes, hurricanes, or windstorms; the occasional severe floods (surprising, no doubt, given the general drying of the
landscape); or the landslides and avalanches in nearby terrain.
But natural disasters will only be part of the story. The slow devastation of ecosystems around the world will eventually take its toll. We are
not likely to welcome the consequences of stress to agricultural regions,
leading to rising food prices; nor of stress to the local water cycle, resulting in a lower water supply and perhaps water rationing; nor of global
warming itself, causing occasional summer days with brutally high temperatures. We will not be happy that climate change will cause long-term
difficulty for many industries, including fishing, forestry, tourism, and
outdoor recreation, and will impose immense costs on regions recovering from natural disasters. Nor will we be pleased when climate change
begins to eat away at the nation's economic growth rate—or more likely,
cause a perpetual negative growth rate, forcing us into a permanent and
devastating Climate Change Depression. It will be especially challenging
to deal with these and other difficulties while also helping an increasing
number of retirees meet their monthly expenses and pay for their medical care. Moreover, the consequences of international chaos on ordinary lives might be painful as well. When nations begin to enter severe
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domestic crises, endure new rounds of terrorist activity, or wage war
against each other over basic natural resources, food supplies, population
pressures, or rights of migration, one may find one’s own nation at war as
well—or suffering the economic or political consequences of that unrest
in other ways, even potentially within its own borders.
To imagine that we can shield ourselves from all these trends by
retreating to living spaces, turning on the air conditioner, and entertaining ourselves in some fashion simply ignores reality. In one way or
another, the transformation of the planet will seep through those walls.
We may find ourselves incensed at the result and might even mutter: why
didn't they tell me it would be like this?
There really is no evading it: climate change is well under way, caused
by human beings, and it will happen to you.
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Chapter 2

What We Could Do
So if climate change is taking place, will intensify further in the coming
years, and will hit us where we live, what can we do? If we accept the
findings of scientists about climate change, the path before us is clear:
since we human beings are contributing to the problem, we should do
as much as we can, as soon as we can, to reduce our contributions to climate change. We should do so on every level: as individuals, families,
businesses, industries, states, nations, and the international community.
We should use every technology already known to us to reduce our emissions; be inventive in finding, testing, and implementing new technologies; create smart and workable public policies and real-world arrangements to help smooth the transition to new practices; and handle the
many historical, cultural, social, economic, and political obstacles to this
transition with grace and sensitivity—while moving ahead as quickly as
is feasible.
The trouble is that we have not taken these steps with the clarity and
dispatch we need. In fact, we have done the opposite. Most nations have
continued with business as usual, delayed real action, perhaps taken partial steps at most, and waited for others to sign on before starting up a
serious effort. But the climate continues to change, and time is waning.
Even as scientists warn us that waiting further could be disastrous, we
persist in a resolute inertia.
At this late hour, then, we need to take a double approach to the challenge before us. On one level, we must examine carefully the entire range
of measures we could take for reducing the harm we do. To this end,
we could rely on those expert guides who explain how to use existing
sources of energy more efficiently; how to create, distribute, and use new,
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sustainable sources of energy; and how to reduce or end other practices
(outside of energy use) that contribute to climate change.37
But doing so is not enough. If we are to be honest about what we must
do, we need to take into account the obstacles that prevent us from taking
action. Even if we have a set of potential strategies in hand, they will not
do much good if they are too expensive, take too long to implement, or
harm the environment. Furthermore, what will it take to overcome political opposition, to change actual attitudes and behavior, and to inspire
action on the vast scale that is required? This aspect of the question is the
most crucial, because so far it has proved the toughest to solve.
Accordingly, we have little choice but to examine our potential course
of action taking all of the relevant factors into account. A thorough, comprehensive look at energy efficiency and technology, however necessary,
cannot take us far without an honest appraisal of our collective willingness to act and to change.
Let’s start with a basic principle: we simply must shift from our current heavy reliance on oil, coal, and gas to less destructive fuels. Some
might argue that the recent shift from oil or coal to the relatively less
harmful natural gas is at least a step in the right direction, but it turns
out that enough natural gas (or methane) escapes into the atmosphere
during the drilling process to cancel out any such benefit.38 We can’t fix
anything by shifting from one fossil fuel to another; our only real option
is to rely on renewable energy, if we must use energy at all. But at this
point we cannot rely very much on alternative sources of energy; a key
task is to figure out what technologies might work best and how soon we
can implement them.
Several sources of energy are very promising but may simply create
more problems than they might solve. Many experts suggest that nuclear
power is an excellent long-term option for providing energy at a comparatively small cost in injury to people, footprint on the landscape,
and the storage of waste, especially when compared to fossil fuels. But
it's clear that creating a new generation of nuclear power plants would
be extremely expensive and time-consuming; since few plants are currently in the process of being built and each plant takes roughly a decade
to come on line, nuclear power cannot help us right when we must take
huge strides toward cutting our emissions. Furthermore, because of the
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events at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, we all have serious questions about the safety and reliability of nuclear power. Even if
the engineering details make nuclear power intriguing, as a real-world
matter, implementing it raises too many questions and—even if it should
win public approval—would take far too long. It's not a viable option.
Geothermal energy has the great advantages of being inexhaustible,
creating no byproducts, remaining constant through time (unlike solar
or wind energy), interfering in no natural motion of the winds or tides,
and requiring no extraction from the Earth (a claim that not even nuclear
power can make, reliant as it is on the mining of uranium). But it, too,
requires us to intervene into the Earth's systems, for when we drill some
distance beneath the surface, we may risk triggering seismic disruptions,
even small earthquakes. A greater problem is that over much of the Earth,
bedrock of a sufficiently high temperature (300°) is found very far below
the surface; in most of the western half of the United States, for example,
geothermal engineers would have to drill down four miles or more, and
in most of the eastern half, over six miles.39 Drilling that deep on a large
scale is technically and financially difficult and will be feasible only after a
lot more research and testing.
This sort of problem applies not only to alternative forms of energy,
but to the possible transformation of our use of fossil fuel as well. Many
observers suggest that we cannot rely on renewable sources alone; we
will also have to burn coal and natural gas—not as we have done in the
past, releasing ruinous quantities of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere,
but by capturing and storing it deep in the ground. Although the process
of capture and storage will take up part of the energy the plants generate and will thus raise energy costs, at least it will not harm the atmosphere. The real problem in this case—and it's a big one—is that this
technology is largely untested; so far not a single coal plant has actually
tested carbon capture technology in any serious way. Moreover, just as
the Environmental Protection Agency is pondering whether to ban the
release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere from future coal-burning plants in an effort to force them to capture carbon, the low price of
increasingly available natural gas is removing incentives for utilities to
build such expensive plants at all.40 Nevertheless, Carbon Engineering
has created prototype carbon cleanup systems in Calgary, Alberta,
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and now hopes to market its techniques to oil companies and others.
Experimentation with this technique is still in its early stages; according
to one report, David Keith, the president of this company, “says he thinks
it may be possible to lower the cost of capture toward $100 a ton as the
company grows.”41 Because the study of this technology is at such an
early stage and its potential use so expensive, we cannot presume to rely
on it in a large scale in the near future. Yet in his mission to find out how
to create an energy system that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions
90 percent in the United Kingdom by 2030, George Monbiot suggests
that that nation get half of its power for electricity from plants that burn
natural gas (not coal) while using capture and storage technology. Think
about it: he's suggesting that half of the electricity come from a technology
that he admits is largely untested. Does that sound like a solid plan to you?
But what other choice does he have? Renewable energy of other kinds
won't supply enough power to keep Britain going. His dilemma is typical
of this entire discussion. We need technologies we do not have, and we
need them yesterday.42
Luckily, bad news of this sort is not the whole story. Other technologies at first do not seem promising but on a second look turn out to be
potentially helpful. Biofuels—fuels created from trees or plants—are
technologically viable, but creating an incentive for people to tear out
native ecosystems and grow crops to be sold for this purpose—especially
in Brazil, where their planting has helped destroy vital ecosystems—
undermines the whole purpose of this transition, which is to sustain and
enhance the ecosystems we still have.43 Removing crops for food and
replacing them with plants for biofuel can also lower the food supply and
raise food prices around the world.44 A more responsible and sustainable
practice of using only waste products or byproducts of farming or forest
management might work, if conducted very carefully, but would produce
only a fraction of the energy we need.
But a related alternative to biofuels has great promise. Burning the
methane emissions from public landfills, sewage plants, and farms
addresses two problems at once: it reduces those emissions and transforms them into a locally sustaining form of energy. The technology is
readily available; cattle and pig farmers use this technology to burn
manure to generate electricity for their own use or for sale back into the
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grid.45 Moreover, it is being used very effectively in Kristianstad, Sweden,
which burns biogas from a landfill, sewage ponds, wood waste, and tree
prunings, heating homes and businesses without relying on other renewable energies.46 This technology burns a bit of biofuel along with the gas
arising from garbage and waste and may thus provide a good alternative
to the more familiar version of biofuel. A municipal biogas plant has
the advantage of potentially being under local control: presumably you
wouldn't have to move heaven and earth to get a local biogas plant up and
running; you'd just have to create the necessary will in your own community. With enough initiative in cities and towns throughout the world,
this technology could be implemented widely.
An alternative to geothermal energy also has real merit. Without drilling deep into the Earth, we can still use its warmth as a source of energy.
Below five feet or so, the ground has a constant temperature; if you lay a
network of pipes in the ground below that depth and run water through
those pipes, you can draw the heat from the Earth, concentrate it, put it
through a heat exchanger, and use it to warm or cool your house.47 While
the initial cost is high, this source of energy pays for itself in a few years.
The largest obstacles to its widespread adoption are public ignorance,
the large initial cost, and the lack of trained technicians in many locations throughout the nation.48 Governments and utilities, however, provide incentives for homeowners to install these systems, and with greater
demand, more publicity, and a concerted public effort, people might be
able to use this technology throughout the country effectively.
What about solar and wind energy? These have the merit of being
familiar to us, but it will take a major effort to supply them in the abundance we require. Our use of these energies is rapidly increasing, their
cost continues to fall, and their advantages are becoming clearer to the
public as time goes by. But at current rates of implementation, they
will contribute only a fraction of energy needs even in a decade or two.
Furthermore, since the sun does not shine forever, nor does the wind
blow at all times, we can fully use their energies only when we've learned
how to store and release the power they provide on demand. A large shift
from gasoline-powered to electrical cars would help out in this regard,
since the car batteries would serve as an effective form of electrical storage. But for an effective system, we need to create stations to store the
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energy these sources provide and relay that energy to consumers on
demand. One solution is to pump water into a reservoir when the electricity supply is available, then release the water to flow downhill and
generate power when it is needed.49 These pumped storage facilities—or
better alternatives, when they become available—will be necessary components of the overall system. Moreover, to bring these energy sources
into a system of sustaining power, we need a smart grid, an updated, hightech electricity distribution network that can withstand the sudden variations in power provided by the sun or wind, connect all the points in the
system, and use the energy contributed by households (from small solar
units). In short, we need a lot more than solar panels or wind turbines:
we need a new, sophisticated, national grid.
But that is not all. Installing large solar plants will take up huge
amounts of open land in the nation's sunny places—land now used by
plants, animals, and human beings. Putting in industrial-sized wind turbines on mountaintops, for example, or in promising offshore locations
will directly intrude on relatively unharmed ecosystems or pristine vistas.
Furthermore, as it turns out, large wind turbines are noisy: they cause
a low-level vibration to be heard for a mile or more in the surrounding
vicinity. Despite their ability to harness sun and wind for human purposes, these technologies come at a real cost: if we really want to reduce
our carbon footprint, we will end up greatly expanding our physical footprint on the land and sea. The reality is that many people will resist these
intrusions: the opposition to wind farms around the nation, even from
local environmentalists, is substantial. The same will be true once we
begin to install industrial-sized solar power plants.
We could, however, decrease the footprint of immense solar power
plants by making the generation and use of solar energy an ordinary
feature in millions of ordinary households. David Crane and Robert F.
Kennedy, Jr., point out that the cost of solar panels has fallen by 80 percent over the past five years and now competes with the cost of the normal electricity supply in twenty states. But few people are choosing it over
electricity from the grid because of permitting requirements imposed by
state and local governments; complying with those requirements now
costs more than the solar equipment itself. If our governments changed
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the rules, as the federal government in Germany has done, it would be
much easier for people to shift their homes to solar energy.50
So how feasible is a large reliance on solar and wind energy? Clearly,
we have a lot of work to do. Just building a national smart grid is already
a massive infrastructure project; to get it done, we'll need a lot of money,
greater technical expertise, and several years of concerted effort. Building
a sufficient number of wind and solar farms will also require a lot of
advance research, time to put them in place, and a lengthy effort to win
public approval. We need key technological breakthroughs to make
energy storage cheap and viable. We also need to think carefully about
exactly how much of a physical footprint we want to impose on the land
and sea for these purposes. But the declining cost of solar energy and the
possibility of producing it on the household level may make aspects of
this transition easier. Ultimately, these forms of energy could be part of
the solution, but they may not be available on a sufficiently large scale
and with a truly workable infrastructure for many years.
Let's turn for a moment to another key aspect of the question, the
reduction in energy use. As it turns out, industrial electric motors use
more energy than highway vehicles. As one energy efficiency expert
argues, a wholesale turnover to new, much more efficient motors would
cut the energy these machines use in half and pay for the new machines
fairly quickly (between a few weeks and sixteen months).51 New methods of casting metal, new technology for industrial pumps, recycling, and
combined heat and power systems (CHP) can each have a major impact:
according to the Department of Energy, the widespread use of CHP systems, for example, which recovers otherwise wasted heat, would save the
“equivalent to the output of 40 percent of the coal-fired generating plants
now producing electricity in the United States.”52 Increasing energy efficiency in homes and buildings, in lighting and appliances, would also
save a large share of the energy we now consume.53 All these transitions
use existing technology, would pay for themselves soon, would decrease
costs, and are already being implemented by smart businessmen and
citizens. In short, this is a no-brainer: reducing energy use in these ways
alone would make a serious difference.
But reducing our greenhouse gas emissions involves much more
than changing our extraction and use of energy. According to the IPCC,
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forestry practices—primarily deforestation—causes just over 17 percent of all our greenhouse gas emissions.54 Deforestation damages the
Earth twice over: it directly releases carbon dioxide and damages a forest's long-term role as a carbon sink. Since forests around the world are
already under severe stress from climate change, as I discussed in chapter
one, slashing and burning forests, clear-cutting them, or replacing them
with farms or ranches only contributes to an already acute problem.
Deforestation will have to end if we are to have the slightest chance of
avoiding the worst consequences of climate change. But it is much easier
to envision this change than to carry it out. Even if we added the ending
of deforestation to the proposed international climate treaties, there is no
guarantee that the signatories would actually carry out their obligations.
This is a tough one: somehow, we need to create new strategies that will
truly stop deforestation.
Most of us intuitively know how we could meet this challenge. We
in the developed nations should protect our own forests, of course, but
should also pay less wealthy nations for protecting theirs, help them create effective environmental agencies to monitor those ecosystems, and
start buying out local farmers and ranchers on the periphery of forests
to return recently cleared land to its prior use. In short, we need serious international initiative, political and financial, to make this happen
in a way that will matter. The problem, of course, is that funding these
measures will require the adoption of an international treaty on climate
change, a goal that continues to be elusive, as well as the consent of a
majority of voters in developed countries. In some nations, especially the
United States, there may not yet be a majority in favor of sending real
money overseas to address climate change. It will take many years of
hard work to put the necessary agreements in place and to pass the key
legislation.
Our use of soils, while the focus of much less public attention, is also
crucial. Since the soil contains three or four times as much carbon as
plants and trees, tilling the soil—all by itself—can contribute substantially to global warming, for it releases that carbon through erosion and
dust. Over most of human history, plowing the land has contributed
more carbon to the atmosphere than the burning of fossil fuels; by one
estimate, the latter surpassed plowing as a source only in the 1970s.55 The

What We Could Do

49

mechanization of agriculture, of course, alters the picture; by now, the
manufacture of fertilizer and herbicides, the use of fossil fuels to power
farm machines, and the release of methane and nitrous oxide into the
atmosphere, especially from the application of nitrogen-based fertilizers,
makes the situation even worse. The 2007 IPCC assessment estimates
that today agriculture contributes around 13.5 percent of greenhouse
gas emissions worldwide. Luckily, we already know the basics of how to
reverse these practices; according to one study, with smart soil management, the greater use of cover crops, no-till agriculture, manuring, and
agro-forestry, we could sequester between 5 and 15 percent of the world's
annual fossil-fuel emissions in the soil, transforming a contributor of carbon into a major carbon sink.56
But making this shift will require a wholesale transformation in agriculture. In the United States, that's not an industry that yields easily to
public pressure, nor is it a political constituency that accepts the urgency
of action to save the climate. How exactly are we to bring about the necessary change of attitudes and practices to make a difference? Certainly
the federal government could impose new regulations on farm practices
or new taxes on certain goods. But farmers could block new rules by litigation or delay new legislation through political pressure. Finding a solution on this one is difficult.
Several patterns emerge from this brief discussion of these questions.
For one thing, there are only a few technologies that are ready to go, that
can be implemented without difficulty, and that we can build on a sufficient scale to make a real difference. For the most part, new techniques
require skills we don't yet have, infrastructure that isn't built, or public
approval that will be difficult to gain. As Fred Krupp, President of the
Environmental Defense Fund, and Miriam Horn argue, entrepreneurs
and inventors are busy creating next-generation technologies that may
soon provide solutions to many of our energy needs, but only political
intervention to increase the cost of generating greenhouse gases (through
the mechanism, for example, of a cap-and-trade system, possibly of the
sort that California is now launching) would make it possible for these
innovators to generate energy on the scale we require.57 In a similar vein,
Thomas L. Friedman urges the United States to forge into the lead on creating new energy technologies, demanding that our government produce
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an “ecosystem for energy innovation” by developing “an intelligently
designed system of policies, tax incentives and disincentives, and regulations …”58 But so far, no such system is in place, and as a result the new
energy economy has not yet taken off. Some new technologies are available, and in those cases, we should move without delay—to build biogas
plants, for example, to shift to a new generation of industrial engines, and
to improve efficiencies in our households. But to surmount the difficulty
on a vast scale will require enormous political will. Even that is an understatement, since that political will can come from only one place, a huge
upwelling of popular support for these changes.
Everything in this discussion thus comes down to the political situation in nations around the world, but especially in America, still the
world’s dominant economy and one of the leading contributors to climate change, where taking action has proved especially difficult. Yes,
the American public believes that human beings are causing climate
change by huge margins. But it clearly hates any increase in taxes, even
if a tax is meant to forestall climate change. According to Jon Krosnick,
in a poll conducted in early 2009 which found that around 74 percent
of the American public thought that global warming was taking place
and that it was caused by human activity, majorities of 78 percent and
72 percent, respectively, opposed federal taxes on electricity and gasoline
to reduce consumption. But majorities of 80 to 84 percent favored tax
breaks of various kinds to encourage renewable energy and energy efficiency.59 The poll unsurprisingly reflects the public distaste for taxes and
love of tax breaks that has been familiar in American politics since the
late 1970s. But by sticking with that preference in this case, most citizens
choose incremental, piecemeal changes over anything more systematic.
They seem to believe that if we improve technology, encourage industries
to increase efficiency, and invite people to insulate their homes, we'll be
doing fine. Unfortunately, that belief is simply untrue.
We have failed to make progress in shifting to a new energy economy
over the last decade because most of us make our decisions according to the laws of the marketplace. We want cheap energy: oil, coal, and
gas. The only effective way to change our practice across the board is to
tax all the sources of greenhouse gas, impose a cap-and-trade system on
those sources (as Congress debated in 2009–2010), or create a rationing
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system that would supply each citizen with a tradeable set of credits to be
used in purchasing fuel in a given year (as proposed by Monbiot).60
These ideas are a tough sell to a public that hates taxes. We need an
alternative. And luckily, there is one. Several observers have proposed
what Steven Stoft calls the carbon “untax”—a tax whose proceeds would
be refunded in full and equally to every citizen of the United States. This
idea has the support of people across the political spectrum, from James
Hansen, the leading climate scientist, to N. Gregory Mankiw, who served
as George W. Bush's chief economist. It resembles the system in Alaska,
whose government returns the state's portion of the proceeds from the
sale of oil to every citizen.61 Other advocates tweak this proposal a bit by
suggesting that a portion (perhaps a fourth) of the money raised through
the tax be spent funding research and development of renewable technologies. Bill McKibben, a leading environmental writer, likes this proposal; it also served as the basis for the bill sponsored by Senators Maria
Cantwell (D-Washington) and Susan Collins (R-Maine) in the 2009–
2010 session.
Each of these proposals has strengths and weaknesses. But it is not
necessary to consider them at length here. Even with the large majority
of Democrats in the first two years of Obama's presidency, the Senate
could not act on climate change. Republicans were virtually unanimous
in opposition to the cap-and-trade bill, and enough Democrats resisted
it in the name of protecting the interests of constituents (such as those
in West Virginia, a true coal state) that the bill may never even have had
majority support, much less the sixty votes required for passage. That
bill was already so riddled with exceptions and special favors, so obviously a series of compromises with the demands of resistant industries,
that it may not have been worth passing. But all that is ancient history
by now. The “tea party” revolt, the shift in power toward “skeptical” or
hesitant Republicans in the 2010 elections, and the enduring resistance
of many Democrats make it clear that the necessary political action will
not emerge from the U.S. Congress any time soon. In fact, the political
realities are and will remain dire. Because the substantial bloc of the public that still repudiates the science of climate change constitutes the base
of the Republican party, that party will for many years be held captive by
a dogmatic “skepticism,” as the 2012 Republican presidential primaries
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demonstrated at length. Barring a stunning change in Senate rules, that
body will continue to require a supermajority of sixty votes to pass legislation, giving Republicans and resistant Democrats an effective veto
on any serious action. There is little cause to hope that the American
Congress will ever approve of workable solutions in the absence of a fundamental political realignment of the sort that is highly unlikely to take
place anytime soon.62 The Obama administration, assessing the situation
in Congress well, has scaled back its attempts to address climate change
in any forceful way and has made clear its preference for fairly modest
measures, even after Superstorm Sandy brought renewed attention to
climate concerns in the waning days of the 2012 election campaign. Its
plans to take action within existing law, through the President’s executive
authority or the powers of the Environmental Protection Agency, while
welcome, can only chip away at the problem rather than bring about the
necessary widespread transformation.63
That's just the domestic political situation. Things aren't much better internationally. As everyone knows, developing nations refuse to sign
on to a climate change treaty without a much more sophisticated understanding of their dilemma, especially of their desire to continue on the
path of economic growth and industrial development and their longing to
join in the abundance on full display among the wealthy nations.64 Their
hope, in short, is somehow to combine development and greenhouse-gas
austerity. Doing so will happen only if wealthy nations help them leapfrog
over outdated technologies and adopt the most recent, least damaging
alternatives—and to preserve their ecosystems as well.
This demand for subsidies, of course, does not go down easy in the
developed West. But that is only part of the problem. Most commentators point out that we cannot blame China for its intransigence on climate change, because historically the developed nations have put far
more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than China and because the
per capita carbon footprint in China remains far below that in the West.
All these points are true. But it does not follow that China's resistance
deserves sympathy. For one thing, emitting greenhouse gases into the
atmosphere in total ignorance of the consequences, as developed nations
have done for a century or two, is quite different from emitting them now,
when we know what those consequences are. We would not countenance
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any nation accepting the enslavement of its citizens and justifying the
practice by arguing that America once accepted slavery. It is simply unacceptable to use past ignorance to justify present stupidity. Moreover, we
should not use the fact that China's per capita carbon footprint remains
small to explain why it might be resistant to action: if we do so, we
endorse the idea that in all fairness, this footprint should become larger—
as if developing nations somehow have the right to spew huge quantities
of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, simply because we have been
stupid enough to do so for generations. We can sympathize with their
longing for economic growth, but we should not submit to liberal guilt. If
the rest of the world demands the opportunity to live through the history
we have enjoyed, the planet will be toast in short order.
We have to translate China's demands into terms that are just both
across nations and to the planet. And justice demands something we may
not be able to tolerate: a radical and instant renunciation of what we can
now see as extravagant, monstrous stupidity, our willingness to eat the
Earth for our own benefit. The point is not to invite the Earth's nations
into our greenhouse gas insanity, but to stop our insanity and to discover
a way of living that is truly sustainable. We should not only make this shift
ourselves but also enable developing nations to enter an alternative, more
viable modernity as well.
This discussion of the international political scene, of course, takes us
right back to the domestic context. Needless to say, the American public
has little inkling that such a renunciation is necessary or should even be
discussed. The politics of climate change in the United States typically
revolves around what we must do domestically to change our practices
and whether or how to secure international agreement. But since a workable solution will have to provide substantial subsidies to developing
nations, it will also require at least a minimal generosity from American
taxpayers on top of whatever costs we must pay to transform our own
energy practices.
It might be plausible to imagine that in a period of robust abundance,
Americans could accept both domestic transformation and international
generosity at once. But it's hard to imagine that sort of acceptance today.
The lingering effects of the Great Recession make aggressive action politically impossible. With high federal debt, state governments recovering
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from crisis, and elevated unemployment, the public appetite for renouncing our dependence on fossil fuels is virtually nonexistent. The focus on
recession or debt will drown out other priorities for many years—at least
until the recovery has brought the country well out of the housing crisis
and greatly reduced the unemployment rate. Never mind that the actual
costs of the transition for an average citizen would not be very large; with
the carbon untax, for example, such a citizen would probably come out
ahead. Never mind that a substantial subsidy to the developing world
wouldn't impose a large burden on the ordinary taxpayer. The problem
here is not practical, but psychological; it arises from the difficulty of
thinking about distant nations, and a presumably distant future, while in
the midst of hard times. In a highly polarized political context, actions
that are rather inexpensive can take on huge symbolic significance, for
taking those actions requires that we accept a new and perhaps unpalatable view of the world and of our place in it.
For some observers, it may be quite easy to denounce the widespread
denial of climate change as well as the overwhelming reluctance to act.
But it just won't do to blame others. Those who are often the most passionate about climate change—relatively well-off, educated, and literate citizens—are part of the problem, too. Take the question of airplane
travel. Let's say an exemplary citizen recycles scrupulously, drives a fuelefficient car, eats organic food, and votes for enlightened politicians—
but takes three plane trips a year (to see parents in California, to vacation in the Caribbean, or to see friends in New York). It's quite possible
that just one of those plane trips will have as great a carbon footprint as
driving that fuel-efficient car for an entire year. Everybody knows, or
should know, that plane travel is a serious indulgence, that it cancels out
any environmental responsibility that citizens might otherwise display.65
But everybody in the middle class or above indulges in it anyway. David
MacKay brilliantly juxtaposes two quotations from Tony Blair. In the
first, Blair says, “Unless we act now, not some time distant but now, these
consequences, disastrous as they are, will be irreversible. So there is nothing more serious, more urgent or more demanding of leadership.” Two
months later, “responding to the suggestion that he should show leadership by not flying to Barbados for holidays,” Blair says that this idea is “a
bit impractical actually …”66
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I think most people in the relevant classes can sympathize: nearly
everyone who understands what is at stake and can afford to travel really
can't imagine renouncing the convenience of flying. Let's not point fingers at those other idiots; with few exceptions, we’re idiots, too. Blair's
reluctance to give up his vacation in Barbados demonstrates quite clearly
that political inaction only expresses a reluctance that all of us feel to
transform our lives fundamentally. However much our minds may be
persuaded of the need to act, on a gut level we just can't do it—or can't
do it nearly as quickly and thoroughly as the occasion demands. Our
experts have long since outlined what we could do to face the present
challenge. Slowly and with infinite reluctance, we may be starting to take
up the task. But do we have time to spare?
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Chapter 3

Time's Up
Many observers, long used to the slow pace of political transformation,
might agree with everything I've said so far but insist that we need not
worry too much: given time, our economy will recover, the supermajority of Americans will prevail, our political system will work, and we
will see real action on climate change. With enough persistence, over the
next decade or so we will help forge a genuinely effective international
agreement. The research into new technologies will begin to see fruitful
results, we'll create the new energy economy, and we'll be on a secure
footing at last.
But in the case of this particular transformation, unlike most others,
we just don't have the time to let things play out. While we proceed at
our usual deliberative pace, climate change speeds ahead. The mismatch
is stark and growing. If we're going to get anything done, we should do it
now, and preferably yesterday. As Rajendra Pachauri, the scientist who
headed the IPCC in 2007, remarked in that year, “If there's no action
before 2012, that's too late… . What we do in the next two or three years
will determine our future. This is the defining moment.”67
We're not used to thinking about acting so quickly in part because we
tend to accept the pace of political change. The international negotiations
for a climate change treaty, building on that premise, takes for granted
that we have some time: the proposed agreement sets the target of an 80
percent reduction in the emission of carbon dioxide by 2050. That year is
indeed some distance away. But if we take a good look at the most recent
information, it's clear that we will have to make the cuts much deeper and
sooner than we thought.
But wait a minute, many voices say; why do you keep insisting that
everything has to happen now? Why not let the country recover economically
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before asking for change? Why not bring everybody on board before rushing
into action?
There are eight good reasons why time is up.
First of all, the target—cutting emissions 80 percent by 2050—was
chosen for political reasons, not on the basis of the science. 2050 is far
enough away to make deep cuts politically palatable. Whenever people suggest that we have to make these cuts earlier, others resist—not
because of the science, but because they fear the political consequences.
Unfortunately, the change in Earth's climate doesn't particularly care
about what is palatable to us. The goals we once set are too far away; if we
are honest, we must acknowledge that we must act much sooner.
Second, the science itself has changed since the international negotiations began. Over the past twenty years or so, scientists have been asking
what would happen if we doubled the preindustrial level of atmospheric
carbon dioxide—around 275 parts per million—to around 550 ppm.
This number, chosen in part as a convenient signpost, has determined
the shape of countless investigations of climate change as well as much
of the discussion of potential future scenarios in the IPCC assessments.
As a result, for many years we did not have a sure sense of how much
change might take place at lower levels. In a rather different vein, those
seeking international agreements initially chose 450 ppm as a target in
part because it once seemed that with concerted effort the international
community might be able to meet it.
But in the last four or five years, further research suggests that these
numbers are too high. One paper (authored by James Hansen and many
others) published in September 2009 argues that previous models failed
to take into account the effect of positive feedback loops. Models once
predicted that a doubling in carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere would lead to a temperature increase of around 3° Centigrade
(with a range of from 2 to 4.5°). But current models that include the
effects of positive feedback loops estimate that the same carbon dioxide concentration will lead to an increase of around 6° Centigrade (with
a range of from 4 to 8°). The implication of this argument is that the
widely known and cited estimates of the IPCC are too optimistic—and
that in fact we have already gone beyond what the planet can tolerate. If
Rajendra Pachauri thought we have until 2012, these researchers imply
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that we should have acted long before even that year. They estimate that
the boundary for carbon dioxide concentration is 350 ppm; at the time
of that article’s publication, the concentration was 387 ppm and rising—
and was forcing an exit from the Holocene, the stable environment we
have enjoyed over the past 10,000 years.68 Persuaded by this argument,
Bill McKibben and many others have formed the group 350.org, which
advocates for concerted action to meet that lower target.
Third, although the international community set 450 ppm as its target
many years ago, the continuing rise in emissions from most developed
nations in the intervening years, together with the huge increase from
developing countries like China, has made that target totally unrealistic.
In the Kyoto Protocol, most of the world's nations promised to reduce
greenhouse emissions by about 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2012. But
instead, global carbon dioxide emissions increased by 38 percent from
1990 to 2009.69 Very few observers now believe that we will be able to
stabilize carbon dioxide levels at that threshold. In August 2004, Stephen
Pacala and Robert Socolow introduced the idea of “stabilization wedges.”
In their definition, a wedge is the shape on a graph whose top (ascending) line depicts a gradual increase in carbon dioxide emissions and
whose bottom (straight or descending) line depicts a potential decrease
in those emissions if we adopt new practices. In short, a wedge is a chunk
of unemitted carbon dioxide. Pacala and Socolow proposed fifteen possible wedges drawing on existing or nearly existing technologies and
suggested that achieving seven of these wedges over the next fifty years
would be enough to stabilize those concentrations at 500 ppm, a target
they thought plausible.70 But in September 2010, Martin Hoffert pointed
out that because our emissions have been rising much more quickly than
Pacala and Socolow envisioned, we would now need to achieve eighteen
of these wedges just to reach stabilization and twenty-five to phase out
fossil fuels altogether.71
Think about it: in six years, the world went from needing to achieve
seven wedges to eighteen. We're going in the wrong direction, and going
fast: we're adding to our challenge by nearly two wedges per year, making
the task of reversing the effects of these emissions even more difficult.
It's true that during the recession, the usage of electricity and gas fell,
slowing down the increase in our greenhouse gas emissions. But usage
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fell because of hardship, not from any shift in our fundamental habits. In
the midst of the downturn, it was easy to predict that once the recovery
began, people would rush back to the behavior they know best. In fact,
that is exactly what happened. Researchers found that global emissions
of carbon dioxide increased by 5.9 percent in 2010, more than making up
for a slight decrease in 2009, the year in which the recession had the most
impact.72 Clearly, the recession did not slow down the steady increase in
greenhouse gas emissions.
Fourth, even this discussion does not face the full measure of the challenge, for the simple reason that carbon dioxide is not the only greenhouse gas. George Monbiot points out that according to the Potsdam
Institute for Climate Impact Research, we should aim to stabilize “greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at or below the equivalent of 440 parts of
carbon dioxide per million.” When the carbon dioxide concentration was
around 380 ppm, “the other greenhouse gases raise[d] this to an equivalent of 440 or 450.”73 But in late 2013, the global monthly mean of carbon dioxide approached 400 ppm, so that the overall concentration of
greenhouse gases is now well above the equivalent of 450 ppm.74 We have
already exceeded the upper limit for our contribution to the greenhouse
effect we set some years ago.
Fifth, we must take another factor into account as well. As time goes
by and we emit more carbon dioxide, the less the biosphere can absorb;
by one estimate, it will absorb fully one-third less as much by 2030.75 As
a result, emitting a certain quantity of carbon dioxide a decade from now
will impose a greater burden on the biosphere than emitting it today—
and what is more, reducing our output will only keep up with the Earth’s
capacity to absorb less. In effect, we will have to cut back our footprint an
extra portion just to take that fact into account.
Sixth, much as these estimates for how deep we must cut have to
be revised, the guess as to how soon we should achieve our target must
change as well. Monbiot’s already severe estimate—that the United
Kingdom would have to cut its emissions 80 percent by 2030—was based
on a guess as to when our emissions would be so great that they would
trigger positive feedback loops and thus irreversible climate change. But
Monbiot relies on an estimate in a paper published back in 2003.76 It's
already clear that in the intervening years we've emitted far more than
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scientists in 2003 would have guessed. If they thought that business as
usual might trigger irreversible global warming around 2030, twentyseven years later, the reckless emission of greenhouse gases over the last
ten years has undoubtedly moved up the date much closer to the present.
These physical facts alone are dire. We have over twice the reductions
to achieve as we did only a few years ago and far less time in which to
achieve them. Very soon, the present in which we live and the future in
which we would cross the tipping point will coincide—and we'll discover we've already passed the point at which those positive feedback
loops kick in.
Doing some arithmetic based on these facts may help clarify our situation. In 2003 it once seemed we'd meet our goals by 2030, but we've managed to waste ten years or so. If we once needed to achieve seven wedges,
we now need to achieve eighteen—plus a further increment to hit a target
not of 500 ppm, but of 350. Since we are already above the equivalent
of 450 ppm, if we wish not to go too far beyond that level we will have
to try to eliminate fossil-fuel use entirely, and thus to achieve twenty-five
wedges, as Hoffert suggests. But to do so now, after several years since his
study have gone by, we’d most likely need to hit around thirty wedges. Yet
we’d need to add a further increment to take into account the fact that the
biosphere will absorb less of what we emit in the coming years. A backof-the envelope calculation suggests that if we acted today we would need
to reduce our emissions by at least thirty-two wedges. Moreover, thanks
to our profligacy in recent years, as well as our sense that we must hit a
lower target, it's also likely we would need to achieve these cuts many
years earlier.
Other ways of estimating the challenge confirm these figures. At the
Copenhagen summit on climate change in 2010, a majority of nations
endorsed a target of raising the Earth's temperatures no more than 1.5°
Centigrade above preindustrial levels. But since we've already raised the
average temperature by 0.8°, and the temperature will rise another 0.6°
due to the inertia of the world's climate, 1.4 of those 1.5° are already inevitable, leaving us virtually without hope of reaching the target.77 Even if
we acted today to eliminate our greenhouse gas emissions entirely, we'd
still barely meet our goal. And there is simply no chance we can eliminate
all those emissions so quickly.
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Let's take more than the purely physical facts into account here as
well. It will take us a few years to pass the necessary legislation and sign
the key international agreements, as I suggested above, and a few years
after that to research and implement an array of new technologies, build
the solar and wind plants, create a new energy infrastructure, convert our
transportation system, and fund the protection of forests. If we're lucky,
perhaps we will begin to see steep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in about a decade. By then, however, we will have emitted so much
more carbon dioxide that we'll have much further to go to meet our targets. How far is impossible to say—but clearly we'd need to achieve many
more than the thirty-two wedges I mentioned a moment ago.
From these estimates it seems that if we acted now, our change in policy would finally begin to take effect roughly ten years from now, somewhere in the early 2020s. But the severity of our situation is clear if we
take into account the seventh reason—the fact that, as I’ve said above,
2020 is the new 2100. As recent research indicates, we’ve already crossed
one tipping point with the melting of the Arctic sea ice and may cross one
or two more by the mid 2020s. Nearly all the above estimates take as their
fundamental principle the overriding task of not crossing through those
tipping points; once we reach them, we need not work our way through
all those calculations but can sense our situation immediately from the
state of those tipping points. We're now witnessing the very events we
were trying to avoid, and all this talk of targets, all this arithmetic, however useful it may have once seemed, ultimately distracts us from what
is right in front of us. And from the evidence of the melting sea ice, the
exploding methane clathrates, the morphing permafrost, and the crackling Amazon rainforest, the essential story is becoming increasingly clear.
So it seems that even under the best case scenario, even if we acted today
our efforts might take effect in the mid 2020s—just as we may be triggering severe and irreversible climate change. Fortune may smile upon
us and allow us a few years of grace to hit our target, but if so, we really
must achieve everything in a ridiculously tiny span of time. It is far more
likely that we will be in the position of taking action after the feedback
loops have already begun—making ourselves poster children for defiant
foolishness. We are more than flirting with disaster; we're inviting it. It's
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almost impossible not to think that all is lost, that even if we act, it will be
too late.78
These realities undermine the premise of a major activist enterprise
of our moment—Bill McKibben’s drive to encourage many public institutions to disinvest in fossil-fuel companies and thus help prevent the
United States from pushing the biosphere beyond the limits of its tolerance. In the Rolling Stone article in which he lays out his case, McKibben
first explains that the 2° threshold on which international negotiators
rely is too high, but then invokes on a specific “carbon budget” derived
from that threshold to argue we have time to make a difference through
the strategy of divestment.79 His effort, praiseworthy as it is, relies on a
contradiction between his knowledge that we’ve already virtually met the
limit of what the Earth can tolerate and his description of what a certain
kind of activism can still accomplish.
Given all these factors, we can no longer assume that our efforts
will bear fruit, that the civilizations of the Holocene will survive in anything like their present form. An honest look at the task ahead and the
time remaining should disabuse us of our unspoken confidence that the
world we know will endure in something of its current form for the rest
of our lives.
But hold on, someone might say, what if we lower our emissions after
that target date? Wouldn't the Earth's temperatures eventually decline as well,
getting back down to a level that would not cause extensive climate change?
Even if we've been very slow and don't meet the target of 450 ppm, isn't there
hope that we can eventually hit that or a lower target, and all will be well?
In this question, I hear the voice of the last optimists speaking—the
voice of those who hope that, however stupid and cowardly we all are,
however slow to act, however likely to botch the entire task for a few
more years, we might still have a chance. The activists at 350.org, acting
on something of this premise, are organizing efforts to reduce our carbon
dioxide emissions to that lower number in the long term, hinting that if
we can do so, we will avert the onset of serious climate change.
But it simply isn't so. The eighth reason we have so little time is that
once we warm the planet up to a certain point, it will not cool down again
for a very long time. A recent paper showed that “the climate change that
takes place due to increases in carbon dioxide concentration is largely
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irreversible for 1,000 years after emissions stop.” If we did manage to stop
emitting carbon dioxide, “radiative forcing”—or what we usually call the
greenhouse effect—would indeed decline, but that decline would be
“largely compensated by slower loss of heat to the ocean.”80
This finding means that even if we manage to cut our output of carbon
dioxide, Earth’s temperatures will go up and stay up. But wait a minute: as
I mentioned above, the rise in temperature lags behind the rise in carbon
dioxide concentrations by many years, so that even after we stop emitting
carbon dioxide, the temperature would rise another 0.6° Centigrade or
so—a time lag that all the above estimates take into account. So the reality is that even after we cut our greenhouse gas output, the temperature
level would continue to rise—and then eventually level off and stay at that
higher level.
Unfortunately, then, the physics of the climate will not let us reverse
the effects of our misbehavior now. If we push temperatures up, they
are going to stay there. We have no second chance. And the first one is
already slipping away.
It would be nice to pause here and suggest that it is not yet absolutely
certain that those vicious circles are under way in full force and for good.
That hesitation might have been plausible a year or two ago. But by now,
the dire state of the Arctic feedback loop and our sense of its consequences for the entire global climate leave us little room for doubt.
Is there no basis for hope left to us? One last consideration remains,
one final bedrock for hope: our general humility in the face of the vast
complexity of Earth’s dynamic systems. Only the sense that our knowledge is limited, that something may be taking place and might still appear
of which we have little inkling, stands between us and a frank acknowledgment that all is lost.
Many others seem to have come to a similar conclusion. Some of
them show their awareness of our situation by introducing an entirely
new angle on the problem, suggesting forms of geoengineering to address
our plight; the Arctic Methane Emergency Group I mentioned in the
introduction is a good case in point. But almost invariably such suggestions threaten to harm the planet in their own way. One idea is to inject
aerosols into the atmosphere to dim the sun and lower the temperature.
But doing so would ultimately cause serious ground-level pollution and
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could help deplete the ozone layer. What about a shield placed in outer
space to lower the amount of sunlight hitting the earth? It would need
to be around 4.5 million square kilometers in size—and thus cost a huge
amount of money to build and maintain (perhaps as much as 6 percent
of the world's GNP, every year). Maybe putting white plastic sheeting
over various deserts and reflecting the sunlight back into space would
help. But doing so would prevent the circulation of dust, which has a vital
role in providing iron and phosphorous to other regions and in supplying nutrients to plankton. What about placing that white reflective plastic
over a vast area of the ocean? The objections to that idea are fairly obvious: vast quantities of plastic would cut off sunlight to organisms in the
sea, would easily be transported by wind and storm, and could affect
coastal ecosystems if the plastic were blown ashore.81 These and other
suggestions speak more about our current desperation than about any
genuine attempt to address our dilemma.
Other suggestions seem quite sane. The leading climate scientist
Wallace Broecker has concluded that there is no realistic chance we'll be
able to replace fossil fuels with renewable sources in time. Accordingly, he
proposes that we fix the climate by withdrawing carbon dioxide directly
from the open air and injecting it deep into the earth. As I mentioned
in chapter two, Carbon Engineering is putting similar ideas to work and
is hoping to market its technology soon. But here again, there won't be
enough of a commercial incentive to do so on a sufficient scale until there
is a carbon tax (or untax)—until there is political action to make fossil
fuels more expensive.82 Sound familiar? We need political action before
we get the new technology—and in this case, the technology is in a very
preliminary stage.
Other observers, seeing our dilemma, do not imagine we can find
a technological fix. They turn in a different direction, encouraging
us to adapt to the massive transformations that are coming our way.
Bill McKibben, for example, took a big step when he entitled his book
Eaarth: in his view, we're no longer living on the planet Earth, for thanks
to climate change, we find ourselves on another planet, one we're not
used to at all. Earlier writers, like Al Gore or Monbiot, who discussed our
dilemma in 2006 and 2007, still had reason to be optimistic. McKibben,
writing in 2010, abandons the attempt to tell us how to avoid a dire fate.
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Instead, he prepares us for that new planet and gives us advice about
how we might live there. This shift in itself is a signal of how far we've
come. Unfortunately, even his advice about adaptation cannot do justice
to what we face. In the last half of his book, he suggests that we should
create strong small communities, produce food locally, and rely on the
resourcefulness and creativity of towns rather than the nation as a whole.
These suggestions are remarkably sane. But doing so would hardly enable
us to survive the events he describes so well in the first half of the book.
How well will local communities raise their own food in many regions,
when rain falls less regularly, the landscape retains water less well, and the
plants may not have the chance to mature? How will towns flourish in the
midst of dying forests and drying streams? Where exactly will these small
communities succeed?
Not long ago, people who studied climate change could emphasize
the possibility of transforming our fossil-fuel economy. A few years later,
the tone has shifted: now they emphasize the prospect of engineering the
Earth or offering up a localist ethic as a counterbalance. As I have suggested, I do not think these suggestions provide actual solutions. But
they do have the merit of pointing out the problem. The challenge, then,
is to face that problem without looking away, without escaping to increasingly less credible responses. A crucial shift has taken place in the last few
years, and yet for the most part we avoid it; we hasten to move on, to
find some pretext for optimism. There must still be comfort available to
us, wherever it may be. But these responses fail to take into account the
real implications of what is before us.
I do not discount the need for us to begin assessing the task of adapting to a changed Earth. Here again, the IPCC reports perform a valuable
service. The 2007 assessment takes great care to describe the potential
effects of various levels of warming on ecologies and societies around the
world—and on how they might adapt. Because of our increasingly dire
situation, many observers now treat these sections of the report more
seriously than they did in the past. But as the focus shifts toward adaptation, we should pause and think about the implications of that change
in emphasis.
For one thing, “adaptation” is a misleadingly gentle term for the task
before us. “Adaptation” suggests that we can adjust some of our practices,
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rethink how our ecosystems and economies will survive, and find a “new
normal” in which to live. But this implication is simply too optimistic.
Unless we make severe, thorough, and uncompromising changes soon,
temperatures will climb to a high level. The longer they remain at that
level, as they will, the more likely they are to trigger positive feedback
loops—and thus create a further round of warming, with a further series
of harsh consequences for the climate. These possibilities were not incorporated into the projections of climate change provided in the IPCC
report in 2007, nor were they a factor in the scenarios of adaptation
sketched there. The reality we face, then, is somewhat tougher than we
thought a few years ago. The most likely scenario we face is that changes
to Earth's climate systems will accelerate and get steadily worse, step by
lurching step, for decades—as various feedback loops kick in and impose
devastating effects. The release of methane gas from the permafrost in the
far North, for example, if it takes effect on a large scale, will lead to a rapid
round of global warming, which in turn could trigger a wholesale collapse of the Amazonian ecosystem, with all its consequences for weather
in the Americas, and a general increase in carbon concentrations in the
atmosphere, which could in turn trigger feedback loops elsewhere. Once
we pass the first tipping point, we cannot have confidence we will escape
others and still others. What we face, in short, is perpetual adaptation—
the task of making a wholesale adjustment to our reality, then doing it
again … then doing it yet again. It would be better if we admitted that if
we make the necessary changes too late, we will have to adjust radically,
and at uneven and unpredictable intervals, for as long as we can imagine.
That prospect is quite dire. But we should not therefore leap to the
popular image of a planetary catastrophe. The future we face is not as
simple as a full-out, planetary disaster that will simply defeat us. If that
were the case, it would indeed make all our efforts vain, all our best strategies hopeless. But climate change is not a single, devastating event, like
a nuclear holocaust. If irreversible, devastating climate change takes
place, in the long term it will displace many societies, change the ethos
of our cultures profoundly, cause untold suffering to millions of people,
and reduce the Earth's population by a major fraction. It will do so over
generations, altering the world decade by decade, allowing us to accommodate certain changes and be defeated by others. As a result, it will not
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allow us to relax into any particular mode of response. It may proceed at
an incremental pace for many years but at other times strike quickly.83 It
will be an ongoing horror unlike any we have faced before. Planetary in
scale, unfolding over a long span of time, it will at times give us room to
change and at others interrupt our projects without mercy. It will allow
us to have the illusion we are adapting successfully, then undercut our
efforts with further ecological transformations. We cannot assume these
events will necessarily finish us off soon, but neither should we pretend
we can master them or survive them unscathed. Climate change, in short,
will never quite allow us total hope or utter despair: we will be caught
endlessly between conflicting possibilities.
In realizing that this is our most likely future, in turning from the hope
we might ward it off to accepting the task of adapting to it, we are taking
no small step. In doing so, we concede that our future will consist of living in a worsening world—a world that may get incrementally, steadily
less habitable as time goes by.
This change will be much tougher on all of us than the most likely
consequences of severe climate change, such as storms and floods, rising
food prices and disappearing water supplies, economic distress and wars.
Modern life has always been premised on the notion of progress—on
democratization, economic growth, increasing cultural interchange, and
improvements in the lives of ordinary people. America as a nation, borrowing on the promise of the Enlightenment it shares with many other
traditions, has always looked ahead, building its identity on the promise
of eventual liberation for its citizens and for the people of the world. For
many generations, parents in modern societies have assumed that they
were making better lives for their children, confident that their hard work
and sacrifice would benefit their offspring. Even in dark times, at the
depths of the Depression or in the midst of war, Americans have kept this
hope alive. Participants in movements for social and economic justice
have always cast their eyes far ahead, knowing that activism might pay off
only decades into the future. All these hopes, in turn, have tacitly relied
on the promise of economic growth, a promise that all advanced capitalist nations now rely on for their legitimacy—the hope that over time, all
incomes would rise, and everyone would eventually flourish.
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To give up the dream of progress and accept the prospect of a perpetually worsening world would be an immense loss for all of us. Without the
promise of better lives for everyone, few of the attitudes of modern life
survive intact. Facing the reality of our present moment, then, requires
much more than an assessment of how we are doing in reducing our
greenhouse gas emissions. It requires nothing less than a wholesale reexamination of the progressive attitude we inherit from the Enlightenment,
a rethinking of the most basic attitudes we take for granted about our
relation to the future.
Looking at our present moment in this way does not force us to give
up our fight to ward it off in the first place. Nevertheless, as people begin
to admit more and more that we have come to the final years in our effort
to avoid irreversible climate change, as the emphasis falls ever more on
adaptation, the question of how to be honest about our situation without giving up on the battle becomes more pressing. Al Gore once commented that “an astonishing number of people go straight from denial
to despair, without pausing on the intermediate step of saying, 'We can
do something about this!'”84 He's absolutely right. I would only add that
despair can be a form of denial: it, too, allows us to dismiss the problem,
to assume we're not responsible. Since nobody can do a thing, we're
off the hook.
But what if we have been dedicated to doing something about it—and
nothing happens? What if we do what we can, join an activist community
such as Repower America, the group Gore founded to agitate for political
action, encourage the nation to shift to renewable sources by the end of
the decade, and help individuals to take voluntary actions to reduce their
carbon footprint—but ultimately realize the necessarily big shift will not
take place in time? What then?
That question is what this book is about. Here we are now, fully aware
of climate change and what it can bring, well aware of what we can do,
but thwarted from real action. We're stuck in a holding pattern, as if we
must simply accept our fate. It would be the height of foolishness at this
key moment simply to give up and abandon the effort. It's devastatingly
clear that our first task is to intensify the effort. After all, we are talking
about the world's greatest crime, ecocide, an assault on our entire planet's ecology. It far outweighs genocide, the destruction of a people, for it
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threatens to ruin the support system for all living things, and along the
way displace, impoverish, or destroy a major portion of the human race.
It undercuts our hopes for the future. It alters our understanding of the
religious, cultural, and political traditions we inherit, for the future on
which their validity relies threatens to disappear. We simply must fight on.
But as we do so, we should begin to confront the possibility that whatever the results of our efforts, the future we have always taken for granted
is in danger of disappearing. We could once rely on the notion that the
basic ecosystems of the Earth would still be present and flourishing for
decades and centuries into the future. We can do so no longer.
As I mentioned in the introduction, the best thinking about our current situation almost always hesitates to acknowledge this fact. Inevitably,
with only one or two exceptions, those who tell the truth about the
dimensions of the challenge and the lateness of the hour lay great emphasis on the steps we can still take to alleviate the crisis or the best strategies we might use to survive the changes in the biosphere when they
come. Providing a note of optimism is key; thanks to that gesture, we can
handle an honest assessment of our situation much more productively. I
too would emphasize that not all is lost, that we can still take action—if
we do so immediately and on a vast scale. But anyone who stops there is
not telling the whole story. In actual fact, given the slow pace of political change and the immense inertia of our economies, the probability we
will do what is necessary in time is extremely low.
To face our situation without evasion, then, we must do the apparently impossible, break a very strong taboo, and begin to ponder what it
would be like to live in a world undergoing severe climate change. None
of us would ever seek out thoughts of this kind. Nevertheless, to block
them out is ultimately another form of denial, another way to protect
ourselves from the realities of climate change. Any such defense ultimately contributes to our complacency, our willingness on some level
to accept things as they are. In contrast, the sanest, most humane, most
transformative course of action is to face our situation as fully as we can.
Doing so will not undercut a commitment to changing our societies;
on the contrary, it will help us understand the real stakes of the current
fight. The goal is not only to safeguard the future of the biosphere; it is
also to preserve our idea of the future, on which so much of our lives and
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traditions are based. We are battling to preserve not only the ecosystems
in which we live, but the hope for an expansive and joyous life for ourselves and others—the very hope on which we ultimately stake nearly
everything we do. Let us face the abyss together, then, in the coming
chapters, knowing that in doing so, we may be catching a glimpse of our
actual future—or perhaps learning so much from that glimpse that we
will fight even harder to keep it at bay.
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Chapter 4

The Impossible Revolution
So far I have been arguing that climate change is real and that its irreversible form is virtually upon us. The moral imperative to act is overwhelming. Yet we do not. Why are we in the United States incapable of
acting even under this immense imperative? If we are to understand this
crossroads in time, we must grapple with whatever in our collective habits makes it so difficult for us to face this moment with genuine foresight
and sanity. At first glance, it is not all that clear why we are so stuck, why
we seem incapable of addressing a threat that has such enormous consequences for us all. What features of this crisis have led us to such an
impasse? What attributes of our political culture might explain our hesitation? And what does our inability suggest about our overall dilemma
and its consequences?
The practical steps we could take to address our crisis seem rather
simple. We just need to raise the price of fossil fuels—as well as the cost
of generating greenhouse gases through the poor management of farmland and forest—so that the market reflects the physical realities in which
we live. If we do so, we will all have a practical incentive to shift to new
and less destructive practices. If we increase these prices in further steps
over the ensuing years, we would change our practices even further, eventually reaching the point where we would not be contributing to the
planet's warming at all. We should also fund research into developing and
implementing new technologies so that solar, wind, tide, wave, and geothermal energy can become readily available; the mechanisms for capturing and storing carbon dioxide can be installed on a large scale; and our
agricultural and forestry practices can become ecologically sustainable.
These ideas of raising the cost of unsustainable practices and funding
new research are fairly straightforward and by now thoroughly familiar to
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climate change scientists, technicians, policy experts, and legislators; we
just need to carry them out and do so soon.
To make these changes, however, is not so simple. Imagining a course
of action is much easier than actually pursuing it. For those of us living in
the United States, taking these key steps will require a fundamental reorientation of our attitudes and practices all across the nation. That change
will have to operate on many levels if it is to work at all. It will require
a shift in our understanding of our place in the world, a willingness to
endorse unprecedented public policies, a revision of our industrial and
agricultural practices, and a change in our individual daily habits. It will
have to be ideological and legislative, technical and financial, large-scale
and individual, all at once. To ward off the prospect of severe climate
change requires us not only to change our thinking but also to participate
in an everyday, detailed endeavor that will often seem utterly tedious and
banal; at every turn, we will have to overcome our comfort with things as
they are, our resistance to inconvenient interruptions, our preference for
cheap living, and our ignorance of alternatives.
How best might this transformation come about? Only something
very powerful, systemic, and persuasive could possibly succeed—something like climate change itself, except within the political domain. The
challenge is to translate the reality of climate change into terms our culture can understand and accept. But doing so is no simple matter. Most
policy experts take for granted that introducing any radical new principle is bound to fail, at least at first. Doing so, they argue, forces one to
advocate for positions that are not politically viable. In their view, we
must be more strategic, more circumspect; we must find means of subtle
encouragement that nudge people toward more responsible behavior. An
outright intervention would simply provoke a repudiation of the entire
effort. After all, as Aristotle said, politics is the art of the possible; if you
demand too much, you won't get a thing. One version of this attitude is
voiced by Mike Hulme, who reviews the various reasons why people disagree about climate change and suggests that we will make headway only
when we can reconcile our divergent beliefs.85
But climate change does not compromise. For us to ward off severe
disturbances to our ecosystems, we cannot compromise either. But without compromise it is virtually impossible to change democratic societies.
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It takes several generations for social movements in the United States
to achieve their primary goals; activists in this nation have always been
forced to accept small gains over many years until the prize is won. So far
the debate over climate change is following this pattern. Activists point
out what must be done, “skeptics” refuse to act, and the nation edges forward, slowly and cautiously, toward the goal.
This time around, however, the slow and steady approach will not do.
We do not have the luxury of awaiting the reconciliation of beliefs that
Hulme envisions. Because climate change proceeds apace, we must act
as soon as we possibly can. Hesitating to act in this case seems foolish.
Although all of us by now have a healthy respect for the ponderous rate at
which political change comes in modern democracies, we also know that
in this particular case, the problem gets worse with each passing year.
Is it possible that something is wrong with the best solutions proposed
to this point? Are they simply too much to take? If so, what about them
seems to go too far? As I have suggested, the basic approach is straightforward enough: raising the price of emitting greenhouse gases would do
the trick, especially through the mechanism of a greenhouse tax or untax.
(As I mentioned in chapter two, following the usage of Steven Stoft, an
untax is a tax whose entire proceeds are distributed equally to all taxpaying citizens.) But to be fair, even this relatively simple approach would
require an important transformation in our political culture.
In the United States, we tend to place great faith in the rationality and
efficiency of the market. We interfere, if at all, by making certain transactions illegal, imposing regulations on business practices, and encouraging various endeavors with tax breaks. But for the most part, we allow
the market to set its own priorities. We regard any widespread attempt to
shape market forces with suspicion, having decided many decades ago,
at least by the time of the Cold War, that any collective control over the
market constituted socialism and therefore (in a major leap) totalitarianism. For us, it seems, the liberty of the market is as sacred as any other
freedom, no matter what the consequences. But as a result, we tend to let
many abuses fester for generations; even though we can see that the market creates a wide array of social problems, we refuse to consider many
ways to fix them out of the fear that intervening would look like socialism. Ironically, of course, through our government we have subsidized
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the extraction of fossil fuels, interfering into the market to lower their
cost, creating as we so often do a kind of warped socialism, stretching
out a helping hand to the staggeringly wealthy. The first thing we need
to do, then, is to eliminate these subsidies entirely. But that step in itself
would simply restore the market to its own equilibrium and would fail to
address the problem at its core.
A greenhouse gas untax cuts through this impasse. Ordinarily, the low
cost of fossil fuels makes them the default source of energy; as long as
these sources remain cheap, the market will forever reinforce our current
fossil-fuel habits. By raising the price of sources of energy that contribute to climate change, an untax modifies this dynamic entirely. Because
it incorporates the collective good into the pricing mechanism, it enables
us to bring about a massive shift in our practices simply by following the
laws of the market. Once fossil fuels become more expensive than renewable alternatives, we'll all have the incentive to power our industries, heat
our homes, and fuel our cars with sustainable sources of energy.
The result will be an explosion of technological innovations to create a
new energy economy. When this untax raises the cost of agricultural and
forestry practices that produce greenhouse gases, it will also drive widespread innovations in managing the land. No doubt public investment in
technology research will also be needed. But rather than transforming
public behavior exclusively through law or regulation, this measure uses
the market to counteract the harm it previously reinforced. Furthermore,
if it truly is an untax, rather than a tax—if the federal government distributes all of the proceeds equally among the nation's taxpayers—then it
innovates in a further way: it makes protecting the future into collective
property, giving each taxpayer a stake in social change. The more citizens
get attached to their share of the money, the more they will identify their
self-interest with the good of the whole.86
This proposal thus represents an important innovation in the
American understanding of the market. On one level, the untax apparently accepts without question the market's dominion over the Earth,
creating that strange beast, the notion of profit-driven ecological change.
But in fact, by using the terms of the market, this solution subordinates
the market's workings to a common goal. It suggests that even if the market is a set of mechanisms that usually create cheapness and efficiency,
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the public can appropriate it for a collective purpose, turning it into a
straightforward, low-maintenance, and effective means to create a greenhouse-free economy. In effect, this strategy makes market society into
a transformative machine that would generate incredible momentum
toward undoing the causes of climate change. When that common goal
finds expression within the terms of the market, individual choice can
do the rest. The result would be neither capitalism nor socialism, strictly
speaking, for it would rely on an alternative to both, using an aspect of
capitalism to achieve a socially designated purpose.
This strategy accords well with other aspects of an innovative solution. The shift to sustainable energy technologies, as well as ecologically sound management of farmlands and forests, will rely heavily on
scientific research, experimentation, and know-how. This approach thus
hopes to use science to reconfigure the fossil-fuel-driven world it has
created over the past two centuries. Here again the proposed measures
would make possible a fusion of apparently opposed political traditions;
it would blend technological innovation with environmental responsibility, making good use of engineering skills to ecological ends. Just as we
can use the market to transform itself, we can rely on science to do the
same—to find ways of sustaining our lives that are far less destructive
than those it has provided so far.
In effect, this measure ultimately proposes a Grand Compromise
between free-market ideology and an inescapable environmental imperative. It accepts the bedrock American love of economic freedom and
uses it for a cause in which the vast majority of Americans also believe.
The nation has used a roughly similar approach on previous occasions,
as Social Security and Medicare demonstrate. Those measures blended
economic individualism and public protection in ways that were initially attacked as socialist but that eventually received nearly unanimous
public support, suggesting that hybrid solutions of this kind are possible in America.
Nevertheless, this proposal has not yet been adopted by our legislative bodies. (In 2010, the Senate rejected a bill without a vote, perhaps
because the cap-and-trade mechanism in the bill was riddled with flaws,
but more likely because it would have indirectly raised the price of fossil
fuel.)87 It does not seem likely that any legislation increasing the cost of
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fossil fuel, whether through a cap-and-trade mechanism, a tax, an untax,
or a rationing system, will ever receive Congressional blessing—at least
not in the foreseeable future. Those opposed to action insist either that
climate change does not exist or that the government should not intrude
into the market in this way. The first objection is tacitly a stand-in for the
second; it signals the fear that if climate change happens to be true, it will
give the government an excuse to take too much control over our lives.
The ultimate basis for these objections is the belief that each person
has the right to do whatever he or she pleases—as long as such action
does not harm the interest of another. This belief is the core of “liberal”
philosophy, that is, the strand of political philosophy that places its highest priority on safeguarding individual liberty. (Here our terminology has
it exactly backwards; those who place liberty above our future are “liberals,” strictly speaking, while those who wish to sustain the biosphere into
the future are in a key sense “conservatives.”)
The problem with this objection is that it falls flat, right on its face.
When we decide to use fossil fuels, we are harming each other, as well
as the biosphere and all future generations. If there were ever a public imperative that passed this test better, I'd like to know what it is. All
governments have the right to protect the viability of the biosphere
for future generations; otherwise, it's not clear why we bother to let
such governments exist. Our Constitution recognizes this right in its
Preamble, which states that the purpose of government is to “promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity.” Take note: its purpose is to secure liberty for us and posterity, too. Since emitting greenhouse gases today will lead to more severe
climate change, which will in turn seriously hamper the liberties of our
descendants, the only way to safeguard the rights of posterity is to change
our own practices today. The liberal tradition is absolutely on the side of
changing our society, and doing so now. The trick is to find a solution to
the problem that also respects the liberal tradition, that draws on individual decision-making, foresight, and creativity. The greenhouse gas untax
fits the bill, for it creates the market incentives for all of us to bring about
the changes we need.
The obstacle, then, is not present in any feature of the proposed solution, which accords well with our Constitution and our respect for the
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free market. We can only conclude that the opposition stems from an
objection that has no legitimacy and cannot even be spoken: the belief
that no possible public good can justify an intrusion of this kind into individual liberty, that in protecting freedom we should not take the interest
even of posterity into account. Such a belief objects to the very idea of a
greater good or a collective purpose. Ever since the “Reagan revolution,”
many Republicans have strongly resisted the notion that the government
is capable of solving any social problem, for by definition government
itself is the greatest problem of all. In consequence, since that “revolution,” these Republicans—by no means all—tend to vilify progressive
uses of government as socialist, communist, or fascist, and on occasion,
as all three. In the new version of the free-market ideology, it seems, nothing can ever be more important than the market itself.
In practical terms, then, the nation's response to climate change must
now be debated on entirely different grounds, that of “energy independence”—the goal of weaning America from dependency on “foreign
oil.” But any legislation adopted on these premises will not be enough.
Funding research into new energy technologies is essential, but this step
will not in itself make those technologies attractive to individual consumers. Giving tax breaks to help people convert to renewable energy is good,
too, but it will be insufficient, since the vast majority of the public will
have little incentive to give up cheap fossil fuel. Perhaps the only event
that will truly change individual habits is a dramatic hike in the price of
oil. In that case, the free market might do what the government cannot,
inspiring us all to use new sources of energy as soon as we can. One possible scenario is that the government will pass legislation to generate a
new round of technological innovation, and a global economic recovery will push the price of oil so high that we'll all begin shifting to a new
energy economy on our own. But such developments will still leave too
many gaps: they will leave in place the hope that oil prices will decline
again, preventing businesses from making the necessary long-term investments; they will keep alive the popular bias for cheap energy, as well as an
immense transfer of funds to oil-producing nations; and they won't cover
the management of farmland or forest, create a smart grid, or help reduce
the cost of electrical cars. Moreover, they will make it very difficult for
the United States to accept a binding target for lowering emissions in
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international negotiations, hindering truly effective worldwide action. In
short, this “solution” simply will not do.
The doctrinaire opposition to effective action has more than purely
practical consequences. It will force us to adopt half-measures, to be
sure. But it's worth contemplating why we must resort to them at all. It's
about time we faced the consequences of the “Reagan revolution”—the
notion that protecting the free market is more important than any other
consideration. If that dogma is true, then creating a business-friendly
environment trumps preserving the Earth. Capitalism matters more
than the biosphere. No doubt capitalism might have difficulty flourishing if the biosphere begins to suffer; any sane businessperson should
be able to admit to that fact. But free-market dogmatists will not do so,
because they will not concede that the biosphere is in danger in the first
place. Their resistance to action is more subtle: in their view, capitalism is
more real than the biosphere. The conditions for business are real, as are
taxes and government funding, but in their view scientific assessments
of climate change are still so speculative and so dependent on unproven
models that they do not yet describe reality. Assessments of the business
environment, of course, also depend on models and estimates, but at least
they refer to modes of behavior that we understand. In this view, climate
change, if it exists, arises from physical processes we still don't fully comprehend. Adam Smith is good as gold, but the IPCC is still a bit fishy.
There is no need to change until the science is more solid—but even
then, how could it ever be as solid as the myth of Adam Smith?88
This description of market fundamentalism might sound a bit
extreme. But in fact the entire public sphere accepts the principle that no
political measure can be justified unless it is consistent with the laws of
the market. (The only exceptions allowed these days are national security, a handful of moral norms—such as those that forbid selling people,
body parts, or sex—and a few government programs too popular to
touch.) We've long since gotten used to obeying this principle: it seems
we can't truly face any significant public problem (from elevated highschool dropout rates, drug abuse, and worker safety to disaster relief and
the protection of endangered species) without considering its impact on
the economy and whether it would be cost-efficient to address it. Our
ultimate reality is the economy; any other factor that matters to us must
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make its peace with that principle or be eliminated altogether. In the
United States, at least, human beings must abide by the rules of the market, not vice versa. Here, we all live within the free-market bubble; nothing makes it inside that doesn't submit to the logic of the market.
The consequences of living in this bubble are stark. Quickly now,
answer this. What's harder for you to imagine: the end of free-market
capitalism, or the end of nature? By now, imagining a devastated biosphere comes fairly easily to us all. Imagining life after the end of the market? That's almost impossible. For all of us in this society, the market is
more real than nature.89
But is this the core problem? After all, the greenhouse untax translates a shared priority into monetary terms, working with the rules of the
market to achieve a common purpose. It respects the rule that no public
good in this nation can be accepted until it speaks in the language of cost
incentives. But evidently, this gesture is not enough. The untax relies on
the principle that the market must serve something outside itself, must ultimately not endanger the biosphere and thus our future. In doing so, it says
that nature is more real than the market. It declares its loyalty to the Earth,
not to economic growth. In attempting to dislodge our dependence on
cheap energy, it tries to bring about systemic, radical change to our entire
frame of mind. In doing so, it violates a basic taboo; it bursts the bubble.
In practical terms, the greenhouse untax (or its alternative versions)
is a fairly innocuous proposal. It would raise the cost of energy, leading
to a host of further changes, but it otherwise respects our traditions and
habits in every way. Nevertheless, it represents an immense symbolic shift.
If the “Reagan revolution” sought to limit the government's right to intervene into the market, this shift constitutes an ecological revolution, one
that limits the market's right to intervene into nature. Addressing climate
change, it seems, requires nothing less than a radical transformation—
one akin to the industrial revolution, the sexual revolution, the Reagan
revolution, or all three, for it calls for a transformation in specific aspects
of our understanding of government, our physical infrastructure, and our
daily life all at once. Its effects are so widespread, in fact, that it may be
the most consequential revolution of them all.
Why does such a simple measure have such big consequences? In
the past, American movements for social change have taken two paths:
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at times they have inspired Constitutional amendments, Supreme Court
decisions, new legal protections, and other revisions in our basic understanding of individual rights, and at other moments they have led to the
creation of public agencies to oversee and enforce protections for workers, previous targets of discrimination, or aspects of the environment.
Although passing Social Security and Medicare required fighting back
against charges of socialism, even those battles pale in comparison to
what is required today. Seldom have we attempted to change our society
by intervening so directly into the market itself, by changing the price of
goods necessary to all categories of economic activity for the sake of a
collective purpose. The last time we did anything on this order of magnitude, we removed an entire category of goods from the market—namely,
human beings—and it took a Civil War to do so. In this country, whenever injustice is woven into the fabric of our economy, change is very difficult indeed, and the current case is no different.
One sign of how much this revolution will require of us may be found
in what it shares with “deep ecology,” which argued around three decades
ago that because the Earth is not here to serve human purposes, we need
to repudiate modest protections for the environment and change our
societies far more radically.90 Deep ecology has never become a mainstream movement; it has been regarded, and has regarded itself, as a marginal if fierce presence. But today, climate change is making its central
point more clearly than ever: by now, it's crystal clear that we cannot use
the Earth in whatever way we see fit, for if we do so, we endanger our own
future. We are a part of the Earth, rather than the other way around.
But this insight in itself is not enough. Deep ecology uses misleading terms; by using the term “deep,” it implies that depth of awareness
on these matters is its own reward, that seeing past gradualist measures
is sufficient. That view distracts us from a much more crucial contrast,
embedded in nineteenth-century radical traditions, between reform and
revolution. At its heart, by opposing reformist measures, deep ecology is
revolutionary ecology. In that case, merely thinking through a critique of
modern society is only the first step. Much more crucial is the task of figuring out how to change modern society so that it will no longer destroy
the biosphere. Climate change forces us to convert this particular strand
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of ecological thinking into a political force that can advocate for actual
legislation and practical, real-world solutions.
And how, exactly, might we do so? So far, the major activist strategies
have not worked. Popularizing climate change science only goes so far,
since a good share of the public is dogmatically committed to a “skeptical” stance. A more overt attempt to educate the public would only be
perceived as condescending or worse. Direct political action on climate
change has tended to follow the two tracks familiar within American
activist traditions: either it uses the tactics of reformist pressure politics, which ultimately relies on fundraising and lobbying Congress, or of
decentralized, community-centered activism. But both of these efforts
have failed and will continue to fail. Lobbying Congress has gradually
built support for action, but not enough to get a strong bill through a
Democratic House, much less a Democratic Senate. Many activists, having given up on federal leadership, have put their energy into organizing
local efforts; such efforts have led to good results, especially in city, state,
and regional compacts to reduce emissions. But ultimately none of these
local efforts is enough; without concerted, tough federal action, we will
simply not reduce our emissions as greatly as we must.
What political strategy is available to us that we have not tried?
Perhaps it is worth mentioning in passing that the moral case for violent
intervention is strong. If we can justify a nationalist revolt for liberty,
as our ancestors did, or a war to defeat fascism, we can easily defend an
intervention to save the life of the entire biosphere, whose decline represents a threat on a far greater scale than any crisis in the past. The murder
of tens of millions of people during World War II pales in comparison to
the potential harm to more than seven billion people on the planet in the
coming decades.91
Yet even discussing the possibility of resorting to violence seems to go
too far; by now, in developed countries the mere hint of violent revolution is enough to delegitimize any movement for change. As a result, in
the postwar era, the United States has evolved a gentler alternative to violent social change, one that fits the gradualist pace of American politics:
the massive, nonviolent rally in Washington to make specific demands
for action. Perhaps the key event in this regard is the civil rights march
in August, 1963, when Martin Luther King, Jr., gave his famous “I have

The Impossible Revolution

85

a dream” speech. That rally has served as the template for virtually every
later rally in the nation's capital, each of which has implicitly invoked the
civil rights movement as the model of its own seriousness.
But because such rallies are symbolic—because they express certain
demands without forcing immediate action—they hit their mark only
if the government is willing to listen, only if pressure reaches an official
audience that accepts the legitimacy of popular demands. When officials
believe that they have already responded to those demands or that the
new moral claims are illegitimate, the mass rally does not make a great
deal of difference; the crowd will assemble and disband, the press will give
it passing attention, and the life of the nation will go on, relatively undisturbed. In that case, the rally ultimately constitutes a feel-good occasion,
a day for collective self-expression that has no real consequence. This
much, at least, is true of rallies concerning ecology and climate change;
the various rallies, protest marches, and other events in recent years have
not budged Congressional sentiment a single inch.
What about the strategies tried by the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations beginning in the autumn of 2011? Would the more aggressive
attempt not just to demonstrate but to occupy public space have a greater
impact? For better or worse, however, that protest movement, while
addressing real concerns, did not provide a list of demands to which
those in power might respond. The movement succeeded in putting certain ideas into the overall political debate and changing the dynamic in
the nation's capital and elsewhere, but it did not have a powerful, immediate impact.
Would it be possible for activism to pursue a more courageous, creative tactic to break out of this impasse? Many nations have undergone
nonviolent revolutions over the past several decades when vast numbers of ordinary citizens took over public space, demanded a change in
government, and succeeded. The actions of immense, persistent, disciplined crowds in the Philippines and Indonesia, Berlin and the Ukraine,
Tunisia and Egypt—and elsewhere in the Arab Spring—are excellent
cases in point, even if the transformations they helped bring about have
not necessarily endured. Could such an event take place in the United
States, though for a different purpose? Could an immense rally in the
public spaces of the nation's capital—a rally that begins on the premise
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that it will not cease until its specific demands regarding climate change are
met—transform our political idiom, crack open our encrusted collective
discourse, and force a decision of some kind on climate change, whatever
it might be?
The answer, I think, is no. Activists have not attempted to organize a
protest on this basis, or even considered it, for several reasons. For one
thing, doing so does not respect the principle that political demands in
this country must be moderate, respectful, and measured—that even if
voices for change may not be heard at first, they will be listened to eventually. A massive crowd that demands change before it disbands implies that
the duly elected government is so neglectful of the collective interest that
it cannot be trusted to act on that interest in its own good time. That crowd,
in short, would attempt to usurp the popular legitimacy of the government itself. Such a tactic cuts deeply against the American grain; at least
over the past century, we have accepted the notion that a constitutionally
legitimate government is legitimate in other ways as well, that in the end
it will serve the common good. To suggest otherwise would come across
as the height of arrogance, for it would seem to attack democracy itself.
As a result, no one who believes in the urgency of action contemplates
a tough, uncompromising rally of this kind; we all in practice accept
the authority of this government, come what may—even if its policies
endorse market activities that are destroying the Earth.
But the consequences of that loyalty are stark. In effect, we put the
viability of our political system above the viability of the biosphere; our
political systems are more real to us than the Earth itself. In effect, we live in
a political, as well as an economic, bubble. If climate change increasingly
reveals that our policies do not make sense, we still accept the authority
of this government and continue to pursue a moderate kind of activism,
as if the biosphere can wait while our officials dither.
As a nation, then, we have two overpowering reasons why we have not
acted. First, we do not wish to burst the free-market bubble, our belief
that the Earth is here to sustain economic growth. Giving up this belief is
very difficult for a good portion of the American public. But even those
who give it up accept the habits of moderate protest because they do not
wish to burst the political bubble, the nearly unanimous belief that this
government will in time represent the best interests of us all. Even if the
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climate transforms before our very eyes, we will hesitate to act, because
for virtually all of us, our ultimate homeland, the domain that counts as
real for us, is not the Earth, but the political and social traditions in which
we live. No natural events are strong enough by themselves to dislodge
our unthinking loyalties.
Why can climate change not get us to budge out of these fidelities?
What about the ecological revolution of our time simply does not compute? The answer can only be that it goes against the nation's traditions
so directly that it can hardly be understood in familiar terms. As a truly
ecological revolution, it creates a number of unprecedented challenges.
For one thing, every previous revolution in the classic sense (such
as the Puritan Revolution, the American Revolution, or the French
Revolution) has promised some degree of liberation—from a monarchy or aristocracy, a foreign government, or a system of exploitation or
enslavement. In all these cases, people fought hoping that victory would
give them much greater liberty and happiness. An ecological revolution
promises no such reward. It seeks the liberation of the Earth's ecosystems, and ultimately of human beings as well, from climate change. But
it undoubtedly goes against the stream of modern culture. It requires
us to renounce what we thought we had gained from those previous successes. It tells us that we do not have certain rights—that we live within
an intricate web of mutual relations that are not subject to our control.
Rather than promising us a wonderful expansion of our lives, it offers
us something altogether more subtle: it tells us that if we give up a certain kind of abundance, or a certain way of securing it, we will safeguard
what we thought we could take for granted, our opportunity to have a
livable future.
Similar reflections apply to a social change that, unlike violent revolution, follows the rules of American political culture—a change that
takes place through compromise, over many generations. For most of
the history of this nation, the great movements for emancipation have
taken place within the context of economic growth, industrialization,
increasing population, and a greatly expanding use of natural resources.
Expanding individual rights is difficult—it has taken generations and is
still ongoing—yet it is somewhat easier when economic growth holds
out the promise that if relatively privileged groups recognize the rights
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of others, their own future happiness will not be harmed. Furthermore,
this expansion of rights is only one element within the wider effect of
industrialization itself, which liberated people from the endless drudgery
of preindustrial labor. Released in this way, people had time for education and leisure activities, money for a vast range of consumer items, and
an opportunity to extend to their fellow citizens a chance for happiness
like their own.
An ecological movement does not follow these rules: it forces us to
consider whether economic growth, which inevitably involves a greater
use of natural resources, is even viable in the long term, and if so, what
it might look like;92 it demands that we reconstruct our entire industrial
infrastructure and potentially deindustrialize many of our practices; it
forces us to give up our assumption that we can continue to “develop”
previously undisturbed natural spaces; and as a result, it asks us to relinquish, or at least consider relinquishing, the idea that our collective abundance will forever increase. To demand change without the promise of
greater plenty would require making an appeal on pure principle. Few
previous attempts of this kind have succeeded; as I mentioned in the
introduction, the movement to abolish slavery was fought on the same
basis, came up against the realities of an entire economic system, and did
not succeed until the nation endured a Civil War. Needless to say, that is
not a good precedent. Even worse, such an appeal would go further than
merely doing without the help of the trends in production, population,
and settlement that, broadly speaking, enabled previous movements to
gain general acceptance; it would potentially argue against them. An ecological movement worth its salt asks for more, and seems to offer less,
than any previous social cause—even if its ultimate purpose is to safeguard the happiness of human beings. Here again, the demands of the
Earth and of our own better selves conflict with our traditions.
The revolution of our time cuts against the grain in these ways in
part because it does not have what most people would recognize as an
immediate human constituency. Every previous revolution had a discernible protagonist, a group of people who would truly benefit from social
change. This time, the immediate constituency is the Earth itself, all its
ecosystems, and the human race as a whole. But it turns out that getting
the concerns of that constituency recognized within our political system
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is no easy task. Those parties have no direct political representatives; no
one speaks for them other than those who volunteer to do so. But the
public treats those volunteers with suspicion: who are they to represent
the natural world or to speak for the human race? Is their knowledge of
climate change thorough and sound? Is their demand to put the viability of the biosphere above immediate human satisfaction acceptable? Yet
without such representation, we would hardly be able to take the environmental consequences of our actions into account. No one gives ecosystems the vote, nor can the dying coral reefs or melting permafrost make
political demands. Of course, inhabitants of islands that are about to be
submerged can raise their voices. But they are so few, and their lands so
distant, that people in the developed world act as if they do not exist.
The result is an impasse that marks out as clearly as possible the limitations of our political institutions. They take for granted that all matters
that pertain to human affairs must arise from within the human community and can be resolved within that domain. But it turns out that some
matters, at least, are relevant to all American citizens, even if none of us
is seeking relief from an oppression that immediately afflicts us. Taking
action to prevent severe climate change is indeed in the interest of us all.
But to make the natural world feature in our calculation of our own interest is unusual, and on this scale unprecedented: our institutions simply
do not know how to respond.
This impasse may also stem from the fact that this potential revolution necessarily sustains an unusual relation to the future. Social movements have typically fought to create a better future; the revolution of our
time, however, fights to prevent the arrival of a devastating one. Previous
revolutions could attempt to shatter tradition, cut off the relationship to
the past, and invent an entirely new world; the French Revolution even
created a new calendar, attempting to start time over again. Since the
Enlightenment, modern societies have taken this link between revolution
and radicalism for granted. But our time is different. The quintessential
aim of radicalism—the utopian hope for a transformed future—now
requires that we first attempt to conserve as much of the Earth's environment as possible before trying to reconstruct our societies in any other
way. Today, radicalism must first be conservative: even if its ultimate aim is
to open up an entirely new era, it must first make possible a sustainable,
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ecologically responsible continuity over many generations, a continuity without which it could not even fight for further social and political
transformation. This conservatism, of course, also requires radical change
to our energy economies, but in the name of making it possible for the
biosphere, and thus our societies themselves, to survive.
Because the focus of this movement is to sustain the biosphere, it differs sharply from prior revolutions in yet another way. Climate change
waits for no one: if we do not transform our practices today, we will
feel the heat in years to come. Never before has there been a deadline
for revolution, a claim on us to bring about social change before it's too
late. No doubt previous revolutionaries seized opportunities that would
never again arise, certain that it was impossible to endure oppression for
another moment. In that sense, they too felt a supreme urgency. But that
urgency arose from within the historical situation itself, from the interplay of social and political forces. Now the imperative emerges from the
purely physical consequences of actions that a short time ago we may
not have considered politically significant. Suddenly, material reality
obtrudes into our history, making felt an absolutely urgent demand that
we cannot ignore.
There is no mistake about it: we must act, and we must act now. Some
might argue that the urgency of the challenge will at last motivate us all to
participate in a movement that will transform the world in which we live.
But any sense that acknowledging the potentially catastrophic dimensions of what we face will in itself help create an ecological revolution is
almost certain to fail.93 The contrary possibility is much more likely to
come true. The revolution we must bring about goes against our traditions again and again. It is endlessly inconvenient: it has no constituency,
promises no liberation for us, and imposes its own timeline. It intrudes
into our history implacably, utterly indifferent to the normal political calculations. It demands that we change our material practices immediately,
whatever our apparent interests at the moment might be.
Because the obstacles to action are formidable, indeed overwhelming, the odds are very strong that we as a nation will not act in time.
As I suggested in the previous chapter, the current political realities in
Washington make it almost impossible for our government to take the
necessary steps in the coming few years—during the crucial interval
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when we must act. In this situation, what should sane and responsible
citizens do?
Should we simply give up and go with the flow? Should we accept
an intolerable reality because it is so difficult to fight against it, and
more strangely, because even a victory would come too late? Not at all.
Looking back at the era of slavery, how tolerant are we of a hypothetical slaveholder who argued that because liberating his slaves wouldn't
change the system overall, there would be no point in doing so? Or looking back at Nazi Germany, would we accept the plea of a citizen who
claimed she cooperated with the policy of extermination because it was
not in her power to buck the system? Do we accept excuses like this? No,
we don't. The American refusal of the Nuremberg defense during the war
trials shortly after World War II says it all: evil action, even when committed under orders, is not acceptable.
Our thoughts in this regard say a lot about what we value. We affirm
the necessity to act justly even if doing so requires us to risk our lives.
We also affirm that we must do so even if there are no guarantees that
our action will lead to the results we desire. The same is especially true
in a situation of dire extremity, when the future of civilization seems to
be at stake, when nobody knows whether the future for which we sacrifice ourselves will even come to pass. Judging by our response in these
examples, it's clear that for us, just action is never about calculating the
consequences, but about doing the right thing, just because it is right.
If that is the case, we don't really follow Aristotle at all. For us, politics
is really the art of the impossible. If we do not wish to use the equivalent of the Nuremberg defense, we have to admit that even if a revolution
against the current system seems to be impossible, we must fight for it anyway. We must act, and we must act now. We owe the Earth and future generations far too much to pursue only reasonable actions, only strategies
that have a high probability of success. Instead of complying with conventional wisdom, we must transform it, reconceiving as well of familiar
understandings of self-interest. The crisis of our time is unprecedented; our
response must be so too. We must have the courage to break our society's
taboos, to crack open the conventions of our political life, to expose the
fundamental illegitimacy of any government that belittles the future of
the biosphere. If this demand requires us to gather in vast crowds to hold
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our nations hostage, thereby defying the complacent assumptions of
modern democracies, so be it: only through this or any similarly forceful gesture will we at last place the biosphere above our belief in familiar
political traditions. Even if we fail miserably, even if the conventions of
public debate are too rigid to accept our intervention, we should not hold
back. We will never again face a crisis in which more is at stake; we have
no excuse but to salvage at least the possibility of future action. We have
no choice but to redefine what is politically feasible—even if it is too late.94
For us, only the impossible is worthwhile.
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Chapter 5

The Stolen Future
Because our economy and political traditions are more real to us than the
biosphere itself, the ecological revolution we need is not likely to take
place until climate change itself becomes much more persuasive, until
the biosphere tells us in unmistakable terms that it will truly decimate
us if we don't change. At that point we will finally understand what it
requires of us and will modify our societies in ways still possible for us.
The fact that a damaged biosphere will eventually coerce us into action
tells us that we face a basic choice: either we carry out an ecological revolution today in a manner that conserves what we know best—or climate
change will devastate our society later on and force us to adapt to conditions we did not choose. Here again, our situation is unprecedented: the
necessary ecological revolution, however inconvenient, is the product of
a forced choice, a decision to prevent a later, much more intrusive and
chaotic event.
If we do act too late, it won't be for the first time. Many observers
would point out that in this respect, the ecological crisis of our day parallels many others we have already experienced. Hunters on the American
high plains decimated millions of buffalo and nearly eradicated the species without much of a public outcry; only a few small herds remained
after the great slaughter. Developed nations injected DDT into the food
chain long enough for that molecule to drive some species to near extinction before Rachel Carson's call to action finally led to a ban on the product in the United States. In the 1970s, trawlers on the high seas wiped
out a substantial share of desirable fish populations by the time nations
finally took action. We could add almost indefinitely to this list, each item
of which would demonstrate very clearly that in countless cases, we act
after the damage has been done.

This time around, however, acting too late will be even worse, thanks
to yet another strange aspect of our present dilemma. Because the carbon
dioxide we emit today will endure in the atmosphere for over a century,
and our actions today will have consequences over generations, a failure
to act will perpetually undermine and possibly erase any future action to
address climate change. Modern history is rife with revolutions that led
to counter-revolutions, movements to restore the prior state of things.
Today, our own inaction would constitute a perpetual counter-revolution,
a heavy hand destroying the inventiveness of future generations. It's as if
the minutemen of the future would endlessly be defeated by King George
III, no matter how resourcefully they fought on.
If that is so, we are simultaneously harming the future of the biosphere
and deliberately stealing from future humanity's ability to respond effectively
to that fact. Our emissions are not only harming the biosphere; they are
destroying the future history of humanity and the biosphere both. Carbon
dioxide, it turns out, is not only a molecule that can persist well into the
future, contributing to global warming for generations; it is also a historical pollutant, fogging up the future with past events, smothering potential brilliance with the stupidity of earlier generations. It's as if our own
moment, by some strange wrinkle in time, will come after the generation
that follows us. The more carbon dioxide we emit, the more contempt we
show for the agency of our own descendants. In giving birth to them and
raising them, we may to some degree be showing them love and care, but
at the same time we hand down to them an inheritance of future disaster,
a legacy of the ashes to come.
Our situation is thus utterly bizarre. We have no real clue how to act
in time, yet our inaction will severely restrict the benefit of action when it
finally does take place. The revolution is not only going to come too late;
when it comes, it will be defeated in advance. Thanks to us, it will be far less
effective than it should be, even when it does come. We are the thieves of
the future.
Faced with this haunting realization, we might be inclined to pause
and listen to a viewpoint steeped in a cynical acceptance of human folly
and ecological destruction. Some people might remark, for example, that
our present inaction is nothing to lament. In their view, if we act against
our own long-term self-interest we will bear the consequences, as we so
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often have in the past. Nothing in human affairs guarantees wisdom or
foresight; our failure to act in the present case is no exception. What is
there to regret? After all, they might go on to argue, the value we give to
the natural world is not intrinsic within it; it speaks of what we as human
beings enjoy and love. Nature itself has no consciousness of harm; it will
not protest if we destroy it. In wounding nature, we only wound what we
project onto it and no more—unless we harm ourselves, in which case
we will ultimately learn our lesson and apply it as well as we can. There is
no need for anyone to try to speak for the biosphere; what happens to it
matters only insofar as it bears on humankind in a manner evident to all.
This attitude cannot withstand a quick reality check. Do we really
believe that the world's ecosystems exist only for us—simply because we
possess a certain kind of consciousness? If so, we value the power to know
above the power to exist. Yet in one account of our formation as human
beings, our ability to know results from God's creating us in his image, in
which case we are responsible for preserving his creation. In another, that
ability came about through our evolution within specific ecosystems, in
competition with other species and in response to many environmental
pressures; it links us directly to thousands of other forms of life. In either
version, we owe whatever ability we have to something outside ourselves.
Moreover, our ability to “know” is limited; we have mastered very
little about our own existence, much less about the lives of other creatures, and even less about their possible forms of consciousness. Rather
than making us the sole arbiter of value, this ability speaks of a fallible
echo of divine powers or emerges from a particular mode of evolutionary
adaptation. Human consciousness is remarkable, to be sure, but it is not
a feature that gives us unlimited sovereignty to do what we wish with the
biosphere. Few of us, I dare say, would accept existence merely as forms
of consciousness without the pleasures of embodied life. We would not
wish to sacrifice our existence as natural beings and become purely mental entities. But in that case, we are natural creatures among the rest, and
our wish to live well reflects the basic drive of all life to do the same. If
we respect these dimensions of human existence, we must respect other
forms of life as well and do what we can not to destroy them.
Nevertheless, this objection does have one great merit: it makes
explicit the profound anthropocentrism on which all our institutions are
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based. That attitude, as I have argued, is quite visible in our economic
systems, which take for granted that ecosystems are “natural resources”
for human beings to use. It is inherent in our political traditions as well,
which find it difficult to take a perspective other than the human into
account. In fact, it speaks for nearly every dimension of modern, industrial society, which everywhere takes human sovereignty for granted.
Climate change refutes that attitude, and it refutes it for good. Because
we regard nature merely as the backdrop for human activities and continue to live as we please, we threaten the conditions of life as we know it
and thus undermine modern society itself. We are in the process of demonstrating, once and for all, that without a flourishing biosphere, human
life on its own cannot flourish in the least.
But if that is so, climate change tells us that much more is amiss than
climate change alone. It is only one consequence of a broad array of
anthropocentric activities, each of which threatens the biosphere. From
an ecological perspective, we have already intruded into countless landscapes to make space for our own activities, spewed pollutants into innumerable ecosystems on land and sea, and driven a vast number of species to extinction. In the last three or four decades, we have begun to take
steps to curb these practices, but we have far to go.
All these problems, including climate change, arise from the enormous increase of productive power that came with advanced industrialization. Drawing on the energy provided by fossil fuels, industry could
produce goods more cheaply and abundantly than ever before and generate chemical fertilizers that allowed modern agriculture to be much
more productive. Together, the industry and agriculture powered in this
fashion sustained a much greater population. That population, with its
highly developed way of life, now expects a similar standard of living in
the future, as do in some measure the people living in the developing
world. Although advanced societies are getting better at producing goods
and services with less energy each passing year, providing an advanced
standard of living for all the world's people would still require using far
more resources than are available on this planet. There is not even the
shadow of a chance that the developed way of life under existing energy
technology can be shared with all or even most of the world's people.
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Nevertheless, in these and many other ways, we continue to treat the biosphere as if it is an inexhaustible resource for human beings.
How much would we change this situation if we managed to convert to entirely renewable sources of energy? It's worth trying another
thought experiment: suppose that we did decide to do whatever we could
to change our energy economy as soon as possible. What would follow?
David MacKay's book on what it would take to energize the island of
Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) without emitting any greenhouse
gases provides an excellent starting point. Late in his book, MacKay provides several different ways to achieve that goal, leaving the choice to the
reader. One scenario relies heavily on nuclear power; others use clean
coal; still others avoid both of those sources and rely heavily on wind
power. When he puts a representative plan on the map of the island, the
real implications of such a shift become clear. Major swaths of the countryside are converted into biofuel or wood-generating systems; eleven
nuclear power plants spring up around the nation; several wave and tide
farms appear off the coasts; waste incinerators appear all over the map
near populated areas; wind farms arise in likely locations around the
island's periphery; large quantities of energy from solar power, derived
from installations located in the Sahara Desert, arrive through long-distance power lines; and a few clean coal mines appear as well.95
MacKay's exemplary work applies indirectly to any other densely
populated nation or region, including a good portion of the United
States. If we starkly reduce our use of fossil fuels, we will have to intrude
into our environment in other ways. We'll need to install wind turbines
wherever there is enough wind to justify the expense, put in thousands of
square miles of solar panels in sun-friendly locations, gather the energy of
wave and tide wherever feasible, harvest every bit of the energy of plants
and trees we can on a sustainable basis, and much more. In short, we'll
need to exploit the Earth in every way we can imagine except by emitting
the exhaust from fossil fuels into the atmosphere. Ironically, taking our
lesson to heart and trying to ward off climate change would force us to
shift our exploitation of the Earth's systems from one mode to another,
causing us to increase our imprint on the visible surface of the land and
sea by a good margin.
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This thought experiment suggests that our energy-dependent large
populations require so much energy we cannot supply them without a
huge imprint on the planet of some kind. We now borrow from the previous history of life by burning fossilized creatures—in the form of oil,
coal, or gas. We mine uranium, refine it, and use its radiative energy in
nuclear power stations, but that process leaves behind nuclear waste,
whose half-life is on the scale of thousands of years. It seems we must
either colonize the planet's past or its future. If we wish to avoid these
options, we could set up millions of energy farms on land and sea to
extract the energy of sun, wind, and wave, of grasslands and forests. But
doing so will inevitably intrude into all those ecosystems in ways we do
not yet fully understand. How much of the deserts of the Southwest do
we wish to cover in solar panels if we respect the ecosystems there? What
happens to the Earth's dynamic flows if we harvest a good share of the
movement of wind and tide for our benefit? In effect, we would end up
colonizing the Earth's present in a style that would be novel even for us.
One innovation might be an exception to this pattern: we could try
to capture and store carbon dioxide underground. In that case, we would
appropriate relatively hidden and unused parts of the Earth, though we'd
have to make sure that the stored gas would not escape someday far into
the future and do its damage then. Outside this single instance, it seems
that our sheer numbers make it necessary to colonize the Earth, and time
itself, for our own benefit.
The simple fact is that if we look at the present situation from a nonanthropocentric viewpoint, there are too many of us. If we wished to
avoid sucking up the resources of the planet on this scale, we would have
to reduce our population by a serious fraction—perhaps to preindustrial
levels. The single greatest legacy of the era of unlimited growth is very close
to home: it is us. No doubt the rate of population increase in industrialized nations has greatly declined over the past few decades. But that fact
does not cancel out the reality that the process of modernization since
the mid-eighteenth century has made possible a staggering increase
in human lives. We have by now far surpassed what William R. Catton,
Jr., described several generations ago as the planet's “carrying capacity,”
the number of people that the Earth’s ecosystems could credibly support.96 The fact that modern agriculture can feed the billions only by
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using immense quantities of fossil fuel, overusing the available water, and
befouling the groundwater and seas with the effluent of nitrogen fertilizers tells us that under sustainable methods it would be much more difficult to keep us all alive. Like climate change, we ourselves are symptoms
of an immense excess that has been going on for generations.
If that is so, then we, too, live in a future created by a particular past.
We did not choose to exist in these numbers; we are in our own bodies
the heirs of decisions not our own. Furthermore, the very fact of our presence in these numbers is a huge constraint on our action today. Much as
we are stealing the future from our descendants, our own present actions
are seriously undercut by the actions of our ancestors.
But it hardly works to suggest that in retrospect, we would repudiate their decisions—for if we did so, we'd be choosing not to exist.
We're caught in a tragic contradiction between our own love of life and
an awareness of what that life costs the biosphere. We are the agents
of a new future and a danger to it at the same time. This contradiction
appears as well in our relation to the modern, industrial era: we are grateful for past revolutions, happy to have been liberated in more ways than
we can remember, amazed at the abundance of knowledge and enjoyment that have been made available to us. Whatever we may say, we are
inevitably the products of the modern world. But we also know that this
world is killing the biosphere and cannot continue. The modern way of
life is our life, our own breath and blood, yet if we stick with it, we will
destroy the Earth.
Insofar as our dilemma comes from our sheer numbers, we cannot
help but realize that our future, too, has been stolen from us. We already
overtax the Earth, whatever we do. Even now, the revolution is far past its
time. From an ecological perspective, that event should have taken place
long ago—simultaneous with the adoption of large quantities of fossil fuels to power the modern economy. In liberating us from an ancient
scarcity, the coming of cheap fossil fuels also set into motion the ecological destruction to which we must now respond. Our task is thus in part
to bring about a transformation that is long overdue. Yet in doing so we
cannot denounce our ancestors; they could not have known the ultimate
consequences of their actions. They stole the future from us without
meaning to do so in the least. We are immersed in an immense historical
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irony, whereby the actions of our ancestors, meant to liberate us, have
without their intention also cursed us.
It is no wonder, then, that we find it so difficult to face the current
crisis. Inheritors of a vast abundance, and in our vast numbers an instance
of that abundance, we cannot easily undo the legacy of generations. In
the previous chapter I listed a series of reasons why the ecological revolution of our time has gone missing. Here I can add a further reason to that
list: in the end, that revolution asks us to undo certain consequences of
a demographic explosion that has lasted for several centuries. It demands
that we catch up with an event that should have happened long ago—and
that, thanks to our ignorance, could not happen at its proper time. We
were born too late and are emerging from our stupidity later yet. We are
only beginning to grasp our situation now, at this far edge of time, awakening as it were after our own end.
Where are we, then, in this strange moment on this planet, which is
not quite, or not yet, our real home? As I argued in the previous chapter,
this hour cries out for a revolution—but one that promises us no familiar liberation, no release. We must act, yet we will not; we must reply to
something greater than we are, yet we can barely hear its voice. Now,
when we work within our political traditions, they thwart our actions,
rather than enabling them. In doing what we must, we discover that we
are also asked to give what we do not have. The measures we could take
to forestall the coming horror are relatively simple, their purpose clear,
yet enacting them seems impossibly difficult.
Yet as I have been suggesting in this chapter, if we did so, we would
discover that despite our best efforts, we would still be using the planet
for our own purposes. Even as we attempt to forestall the coming crisis,
we must recognize that we ourselves, in our great numbers and excessive demands, are already a crisis too great for the planet to bear. We are
lost where we are found, ignorant in our knowledge, poor in our wealth,
inheriting a blessing that curses us. Here at the crossroads, we are already
beyond them, already inhabiting a future we did not choose. Stealing the
future from our descendants, we also discover that in some degree ours is
missing as well. In retrospect, we might conclude that the whole history
of the modern world is shadowed by another future that is not to be—
one promised by an ecological revolution that, whenever it takes place,
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will come too late. We are the heirs, in short, of a tragic contradiction,
an impasse no one chose. The challenge of our time is not only to fight
against this impasse, to bring about that necessary, impossible revolution;
it is also to discover how to live in a world with a disappearing future. To
this last, devastating challenge, we now turn.
Notes
95. For the five energy plans, see MacKay, Sustainable Energy, 203–213; for the
map illustrating one plan, see 215.
96. William R. Catton, Jr., Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982).

Chapter 6

The Ruins to Come
If we face the reality of climate change honestly, taking into account how
urgent a task lies before us and how dim is any hope we will act in time,
we must acknowledge that a great shadow darkens our present moment.
The biosphere changes apace; the land dries, the ice cap melts, the forests
burn; those who lead our public institutions debate, stutter, and go silent;
the prospect on which we rely throughout our daily activities erodes
and falters; and the hope that inspires our political lives flickers and goes
dark. We have always taken for granted that a livable future lies before us,
that whatever happens to us now, tomorrow is another day. But we can
no longer be so sure.
Human societies have always had a strong image of the future.
Traditional societies have assumed that the future will be much like the
present—that the tribe, kingdom, or nation will continue to replicate
itself, generation by generation, sustaining the link to the gods, the legacy
of the ancestors, and the fundamental human ways in perpetuity. Modern
societies, in contrast, have held forth the image of the general liberation
of the human race, so that at some point in the future no oppression or
poverty, no ignorance or violence would afflict the Earth.
These images of the future, however, have relied on the even more
basic assumption, never previously called into question, that the planet's
ecosystems would remain intact and flourishing forever. The seemingly
indestructible continuity of the living systems that surround us has made
all our imaginings possible. But what happens if that continuity is in
question—when we begin to realize that the Earth's ecosystems are vulnerable to destruction or decay?
Our first task in confronting this question is simply to absorb the
significance of putting that continuity in doubt. How do our most basic
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assumptions change when we begin to imagine the future differently?
What, for example, takes place when we take the scenarios of general climate change, social dislocation, and perpetual adaptation seriously?
When scientists imagine what the world might look like in a century
if we continue with business as usual or alter our energy economies a few
years from now (and thus too late), providing details about changes to
familiar landscapes and the consequences for the places we know best,
they ultimately depict for us the ruins of our own culture. The best science available to us requires us to imagine an America with damaged
coastlines, decaying forests, and drying soils, with countless trees, plants,
and animals under severe distress—and to envision parts of coastal cities
standing in the water of elevated seas, as well as the cities of the heartland
crouching beneath the dust storms rising from parched fields.
These images capture for us the ruins of our own future. If we continue to live in the way we do today, we will eventually find ourselves in
strange, almost unrecognizable places. Our own lives will change as well:
because they will be at once something like what we know today and very
different, with major elements missing and other elements adapted to
new conditions, they too will be in ruins.
To think of ruins in this way provokes a new emotion. We are all familiar with images of ruins—of human structures, built long ago, that have
survived the disappearance of the cultures that created them, have fallen
into partial decay, and remain in the landscape as reminders of a distant
era and as symbols of what time will inevitably do to all human enterprise. In the presence of the ruin, whatever it may be—from the Roman
Colosseum to an abandoned farm down the road—one contemplates
not merely one's own mortality but the mortality of cultures or historical
eras; one senses a great gap between the intensity with which we pursue
our goals and the indifferent flow of time.
But now, we contemplate the prospect of future ruins, conceiving of
a cultural decline that has not yet taken place. Indeed, the thought of
these ruins is so fascinating to us that we have long enjoyed depicting
them fictionally in science fiction stories and movies. (Think Planet of the
Apes or Waterworld.) More recently, however, those fictional scenarios
have given way to sober forecasts of what will take place if we continue
to live as we do. Reading the IPCC reports, we can find utterly serious,
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detailed analyses of what is likely to happen if greenhouse gas emissions
rise to a certain level. We no longer need science fiction to help us imagine future ruins: a generation of scientists is now analyzing our prospects
while attempting to remove every trace of fiction from its scrupulous estimates. We can now absorb professional assessments of how dry central
Africa and eastern Australia will become, how much the water levels in
the Great Lakes will recede, how much of Bangladesh or Florida will be
submerged, how much of the grain of northern China or the American
Midwest will die under the greater heat of the sun. As we begin to think
of adapting to these and other possibilities, what was once science fiction has become the reality of our world, the ruins in which we must prepare to live.
Those ruins are not terribly picturesque. Contemplating the remains
of Mayan temples, we might take pleasure in the surviving structures of a
distant culture. Contemplating the ruins of our own cities and landscapes
is entirely different, if only because we still live in them. While we take in
a fictional scenario, we might enjoy putting ourselves in a distant future
to look back at the present with wonder or regret. But in reality, we take
the ongoing viability of our lives for granted. To think about our future
ruins, then, is ultimately to confront the fact that the world in which we
now live is about to transform into something else—something we may
not wish to live through at all. Those future ruins, in short, bear upon our
present, casting a shadow over who we are.
Those future ruins are strange in another respect. In them, the idea of
ruins will extend from buildings to landscapes, from landscapes to continents and seas, and then to the Earth itself. Today we can easily imagine that an observer a century hence, viewing a pine forest in Colorado,
will see a good share of its trees browned and dying, others already fallen
and in decay. Such an observer, having experienced part of the previous
century and having learned about the rest, will see in that landscape the
ruins of a forest. To think in this way of an ecosystem in ruins also provokes a new emotion. Where a visitor to the Colosseum might ponder
the decline and fall of Rome, and thus the mortality even of the mightiest
empires, this observer of the pines will contemplate something quite different. The inevitable mortality of nature? Not exactly: those pines stood
there for millennia and presumably could have stood much longer. The
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end of a civilization? Not quite: that civilization will no doubt be enduring in some form nearby, most likely in the observer herself. What, then,
will these ruins speak of? The power of fossil-fuel civilization to put that
forest into irreversible decline.
It might work, then, to say that the forest speaks of the ruins of a civilization. In that scene, then, a cultural disaster will be made visible in a
wounded ecosystem. But even that unusual feature does not fully capture
the strangeness of our future ruins. Normally when we think of ruins, we
do not imagine that the people who built them still live on in them; those
sites are abandoned and empty. No Caesars visit the Colosseum today
to witness gladiatorial contests; somewhere along the way, the inhabitants of Rome gave up such spectacles and failed to maintain that ancient
structure. No soldiers now patrol along Hadrian's Wall; it lost its original function, fell into disuse, and some of its stones were plundered for
other purposes. A certain cultural continuity was lost, but the physical
object remained. In contrast, we must imagine ourselves or our descendants actually living in the ruins of the cities we built—or perhaps in
the less difficult regions nearby. In some sense, then, those future ruins
will be the opposite of the picturesque ruins of the past: we will outlive
the environments we have destroyed. The buildings we use will still serve
important cultural functions, we will still live in their vicinity, and yet
we face the prospect that eventually our use of them will no longer be
tenable. We would like to stay in our cities; we would hope to maintain
our traditions—yet our way of life will erode nevertheless. Strangely, that
way of life, thanks to the ecological consequences of its very “success,”
will end up interrupting itself, making itself unlivable and obsolete. After
we realize as much, however, we or those who follow us will still live on,
scrounging in the shadows of those ruins for habitation and sustenance.
We will be part of the ruins, eking out a damaged way of life.
No doubt others in the past have lived through something like this
experience. When enemies took over a city, burned it, and destroyed its
sacred places, those who lived there know they witnessed the passing of
their way of life. But they never doubted that the lives at least of their enemies would go on. When civilizations exhausted their surrounding environments, outliving the resources available to them—whether in ancient
Mesopotamia or the Yucatan—people certainly lamented the passing
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of their civilizations, but they could still assume that they might survive
elsewhere and that they or their progeny could build anew.97 The passing
of a civilization, however enormous an event, is never definitive; everybody knows that something else will happen, another round of history
will begin. And all these changes are paltry in comparison to the endurance of the natural environment that human beings take for granted.
Rome falls, the Holocene endures, and thus Rome can be built again.
Not anymore. If anything, Rome still flourishes, only more successfully than ever. No previous generations have experienced anything
approaching the abundance of modern life. Modern, industrial civilization is being replicated around the world, “developing” nations seek to
join the club of wealthy countries, and the reckless consumption of the
Earth goes on unchecked. Yet that fossil-fuel abundance is threatening
the Holocene, the complex, relatively stable state of the Earth we have
enjoyed over the last 10,000 years. Now, Rome flourishes so extravagantly that the Holocene will fall—and as a result, so too will Rome. We
cannot be confident that other societies will flourish in place of our own;
what will befall us will happen in some other way to all the world's cultures. Nor can we assume we will build anew. We may not yet know how
to build anything that will endure on this transformed Earth; finding a
way to do so will be a perpetual challenge. At least in one respect, the
eclipse of our future will be definitive: it admits of no escape, for it will
apply to the human species as a whole.
A defeat on this scale may still place us in a dilemma that others have
faced. Other societies, after all, have been faced with even bleaker prospects, barred from sustaining their former traditions on their own terms.
Consider the aboriginal Tasmanians. After they were colonized on their
native island, decimated by disease and violence, and imprisoned by their
European masters on a small portion of their former land, they found
themselves so spiritually destroyed that they merely waited for death
and within a few years disappeared entirely.98 A less devastating version
of this defeat happened in the recent past, not long after the fall of the
Berlin wall. When capitalism swept over the Soviet Union, shattering the
remnants of communism's promises, the life expectancy among men dramatically declined, as if the loss of that society's foundations gave them
little reason to go on.99 Neither society was especially heartened that
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another culture would endure, for the world that mattered to them, the
world that supplied them with their core system of beliefs and concerns,
had vanished.
Our dilemma is a little like theirs: eventually, when we realize that no
one can escape the future we have created, we too will have to doubt our
core system of beliefs. But this time, no one will have defeated us; we will
not be imprisoned, nor will we be the losers of the Cold War. We will
have defeated ourselves. That event will at once distress us, since we will
indeed be stuck on an Earth we never hoped to see, but it will also give
us some hope, since as the agents of our own undoing, we would still presumably have the chance to do something about it. At once perpetrators
and victims, we'll endure a crisis, to be sure, but we will still be confident
we can face the crisis on our own terms, find means of adaptation, or discover some style of living on.
But too much confidence in this respect will be illusory. Until this
point in our histories, we could take for granted that if we foresaw a danger to our collective lives, we could take action and ward it off. If we did
something, we would see results. But if our societies fail to act soon and
those positive feedback loops kick in, we will enter a truly bizarre condition. At that moment, if it has not already taken place, we will discover
that the future we dread will arrive no matter what we do in the present. In
that strange hour, the future will become at once inevitable and alien; it
will bring about devastating events even if we attempt to prevent them.
Where we could once shape the future in some fashion, in that
moment we will discover that the future has become estranged: that
future, as well, will be in ruins. Of course, our actions even in that
moment will continue to have an effect: they might prevent an even more
devastating future from taking place or might save various aspects of the
planet for later generations. But they will be too little and too late to prevent a wrenching change for all the world's cultures.
The possibility that we might cross those tipping points without
knowing it makes our situation uncanny. If we do make that transition, it
will take place silently, without notice—as if we are on board a ship that
has been struck and will eventually sink even though we heard nothing of
that blow and the band plays on. In a case like that, the events determining the future will have arrived already, while we carried on, oblivious.
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Although our cultures will already be stricken, we will continue to participate in them as if they still thrive. Several recent movies imagine that
ghosts are dead people who have not yet learned that they are dead; they
haunt the living because they are ignorant of their true condition.100 In a
similar fashion, the world's societies, unaware of their actual state, may
soon become phantoms, enduring in a posthumous condition.
But this depiction of ghostly cultures may still not do justice to our
dilemma. For the most part, we tend to place these ruins in the future,
whether we are enjoying fictional tales or pondering scientific assessments. We mostly assume that the major cultural dislocations caused
by climate change are yet to come. But in fact those changes are already
taking place. Some observers suggest that the dryer, hotter conditions in
the Darfur region of the Sudan helped create the conditions for conflict
and crimes against humanity there.101 Alaskan towns built on permafrost
are tilting, their foundations cracking.102 Countless farmers around the
world, including in the United States, are discovering that the seasonal
rhythms on which they once relied are being suspended.
We are already living in a ruined future, already enduring changes in
the biosphere for which we are not prepared. But why are we not ready?
Why should the arrival of this future surprise us? Evidently, even though
we are highly entertained with the thought of strange futures, projecting them endlessly in our fictions, we do not ultimately expect them to
arrive: when they do, they seem premature, catching us by surprise. The
very category of the future, it seems, floats in the distance; even if we
are oriented to it as the basis of our present actions, we keep it on the
other side of a conceptual wall, safeguarding the present from its arrival.
The same is true of the scientific study of what climate change might do:
while we may absorb what researchers tell us, their findings often remain
mere information to us, not a vivid reality in our ordinary lives. Even if
we know that climate change is happening and may devastate our homes,
we might not truly acknowledge this fact to ourselves. The arrival of that
future deprives us of the security and pleasure we take in contemplating
it in the distance, throwing the conceptual map of our lives into disarray.
When it arrives, it short-circuits what we thought we understood. Never
having lived through such a change before, we cannot know what it will
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be like to experience it. We are inevitably unprepared for this event; it can
only take place when we are unaware.
Our tendency to keep the ruined future at a distance forces us into
a contradiction: if its arrival has not taken place, then evidently we still
have time (to argue about it in Congress, to negotiate new treaties, to prepare to alter our technologies), as if it is still years away; if it has occurred,
then it's too late, and we need do nothing. Either way, we believe we
don't really have to do a thing. Perhaps here again we live in the ruins
of the future: modern culture has long since prided itself on its capacity
to control its conditions, to plan for contingencies, to predict trends, to
provide for long-term safety and security. The future, you could say, was
its specialty. But this time around, those who manage the future are in
over their heads. The future has been their specialty, just not this future.
This version, it seems, is by definition too much to handle: we caused it,
yet it eludes us, primarily because it contradicts our basic assumptions.
We've been making life much better, not worse; the thought of a devastated future profoundly conflicts with everything we've been trying to
do. If the future is in ruins, so also is our expertise in the future. But then
the most basic premises of modern culture are in ruins as well.
At first glance, our way of enduring the prospect of these future ruins
may share much with how we respond to our own mortality. We cannot
know when our deaths may arrive; we might know that they will take
place eventually without taking that prospect seriously; we might even
have contracted a terminal disease without suspecting a thing. But does
it follow that pondering the ruins is something like contemplating our
own deaths? Are these meditations on dire events to come in some ways
the same? In an older religious tradition, believers once meditated on the
memento mori, a reminder of death such as a skull, to teach themselves
that they would die, that all their passionate attachments and fierce longings would pass, that everything melts away, so as to set their sights on
eternity instead. More recently, philosophers such as Martin Heidegger
argued that the most authentic mode of being for us is being-towarddeath, the direct encounter with our mortality.103
But this analogy ultimately fails. Climate change is absolutely vaster
than any individual's passing—even one's own. It is of another order of
business entirely. We all know that individuals will die in the ordinary
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course of things. But for a species to die is another matter altogether. An
individual's death arises from the same process as its birth, its participation in reproduction, its maintaining a certain adaptive behavior within
a particular ecological niche. Similarly, in the context of the biosphere's
dynamic life, the passing of a species arises from the same process as its
emergence, its flourishing, and its participation in the relationships of
symbiosis or competition. Its extinction fits within the pattern of a wonderfully complex but coherent interaction. What we face, however, is not
extinction of this kind, but the murder of species, ecosystems, oceans—
purely as a result of the biologically unnecessary indulgence of our species. This is not death, nor even extinction, but a destructive intervention
into the web of life.
Climate change, in short, does far more than mortality could ever do:
it harms the lifeworld that sustains our species, and in consequence damages the societies in which our deaths have meaning, the cultural context
for our own aspirations and achievements. It imposes an extra level of
difficulty on each species, each society, each life—one that none previously had to bear. As a result, all will face something more than mortality,
something altogether unanticipated and more strange.
This bizarre future differs from mortality in yet another way. Two
centuries ago, in one passage of his elegy to John Keats, Adonais, Percy
Bysshe Shelley wrote that when nature revives in the spring and the dead
do not return, we are reminded that the circle of the year differs sharply
from the shape of an individual human life. Spring cannot bring back the
dead; ultimately, then, it cannot console us but instead revives our grief.
He concludes this portion of the poem with these lines: “As long as skies
are blue, and fields are green / Evening must usher night, night urge the
morrow, / Month follow month with woe, and year wake year to sorrow.”104 For the speaker of these words, human beings pass while nature
endures. Today, however, we face virtually the opposite emotion. Under
climate change, you, or I, or a friend may live on beyond the death of a
local forest, the silencing of a nearby stream, or the browning of a neighboring green. The years will return, no doubt, and night will still urge the
morrow, but whether nature will revive is another question. Where we
once thought we would die and nature endure, we may instead survive
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after the passing of an ecosystem we know. Our response to the landscapes surrounding us alters irreversibly.
In that case, our relationship to many other aspects of experience
changes as well. Even in a nation as industrialized as the United States,
the movement of the seasons serves as the basis of the ritual year, anchoring Easter and Christmas, Passover and Yom Kippur, Independence Day
and Thanksgiving; as the seasons drift to new regions of the calendar,
plants blossom or decay at other times, and the natural world becomes
more confused, the significance of these ritual events changes too, speaking less of the deep turning of the world and more of sheer convention.
Our association of youth with spring, of age with fall, begins to falter if
spring comes too soon, if fall extends into winter; our metaphors start
to melt away, even though youth and age remain to us. Our lives are cut
adrift from the seasons, our span of time knocked askew from nature's
rhythms, our mythic associations made threadbare.
We may in consequence find ourselves grieving more for the vulnerability of the biosphere than for our own. That emotion might lead us
also to grieve for our excessive invulnerability, our capacity in these latter, hi-tech days to defeat disease, master the body's ills, and generally
ward off aging and death—and for that matter to protect ourselves from
cold or heat, reduce hunger and thirst, shrink every distance, and master
further reaches of the unknown. We may end up wishing for a return of
greater vulnerability, a more open acceptance of weakness and mortality,
for only with that return might we release other forms of life from the
devastating effects of our dominance.
Such thoughts, however, will ultimately demonstrate that our own
mortality fades in comparison to something altogether more harrowing—the possible mortality of our societies, the natural systems we know,
and to some extent the biosphere itself. In our world, the temporal coherence of a future into which our individual lives vanish—the coherence,
in short, of mortality itself—is falling into decay. What once served as an
instance of the ultimate contemplation is now dwarfed by a much more
difficult thought, the prospect that our very metaphor of what endures
and what is timeless has itself fallen into ruin.
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Chapter 7

The Broken Present
Many of us contemplating these possibilities might answer quite simply,
“Why should I care? The events you describe, if they take place at all, will
change human life on Earth after I am gone. Besides, the problem is so
vast, and the actions we must take are so difficult, that I can make very
little difference on my own. I'll just live out my life in the best way I can
and let history take its course.”
There is a kind of sanity in this response: in many circumstances of
life, repression may be a fine thing indeed. But is it truly possible to set
aside the reality of what might take place to us all in the future? Can we
simply divorce our present actions from their consequences?
If, as I suggested in the previous chapter, every human society has cultivated a strong image of the future, it has done so because such an image
is necessary to justify its activities in the present. Some kind of future,
some orientation to a goal or destination, is intrinsic to all of our intentional activity as individuals and as members of groups. Whether or not
we care in a deep or heartfelt way about what will take place to our society, or for that matter about the human race or the Earth itself, some kind
of investment in the future is implicit in our situation as human beings.
Even if we repudiate the significance of that future for us on a conscious
level, the fact that we are purpose-driven beings implies that our actions
will betray us, endlessly demonstrating that in fact we do care, that we are
everywhere and always invested in creating a livable future.
So there is no way for us to evade some difficult questions. If that
kind of future is in store for us, what happens to the goals we have set
for ourselves and that we seek through our various efforts? Everything
we do in our ordinary lives is based on the assumption that we will have
a future—that our houses will remain standing, that we will continue
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to have a home in the nations in which we live, that the skills we have
acquired will be useful in some fashion, that we will be able to participate
in the cultural activities we care about, and that we will have some chance
to achieve our goals. Our businesses run on credit, borrowing their very
capital from the financial resources of the future; our governments staff
and equip standing armies to defend against attacks that may come to
pass; and we insure our properties, bodies, and lives against harm that
may befall us. Many of our daily activities are directly oriented toward
ensuring that the future will be livable. Sustaining our loving and erotic
relationships, cultivating our family ties and our friendships, raising children, giving or getting an education, giving or getting preventative and
acute medical care, and building and maintaining the physical structures
in which we live and work: all these, and countless further activities,
reveal how greatly we wish to sustain the lives we already know, to hand
them down to further generations, and to maintain something like our
current level of abundance and happiness. Our orientation to the future,
in short, provides the very pith and substance of our present.
Individual lives take for granted that they are shaped by narratives
with a past, present, and future—that they are oriented to satisfactions,
achievements, or realizations that will reward lifelong commitments.
Only through such narratives can we live our lives ethically, for only
through them can we establish a context for intentional action, whatever
it may be, in relation to everyone and everything that matters to us.105
Such narratives also shape the collective life of families, communities,
and nations, as well as political groups, commercial enterprises, and religious faiths. Without such narratives, it is hard to imagine that modern,
democratic societies could legitimate themselves at all, for from the start
they are founded on the principles of liberation and progress. This orientation is so deeply embedded in our activities that even an outright nihilist who repudiates all notions of a collective good nevertheless assumes
he will be able to sustain that identity and share that perspective in the
future. Merely speaking of that viewpoint to others takes for granted the
timeline of persuasion, the long-term contexts of argument and debate.
At times, of course, people sacrifice too much of their present lives
for the sake of the future: they too eagerly practice the well-known art
of deferred gratification, working so hard in the present that they almost
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forget what all the effort is for. We often tell such people that they should
stop living for the future and enjoy the present. No doubt we are giving
them good advice. But we should not assume that it is truly possible to
live only for the present. Even the most dedicated contrarian, one who
rejects a job and ignores her friends, will still turn off the water after taking a shower, knowing it would be nice not to flood the bathroom. Our
practical actions constantly speak of our knowledge that the next hour
and next day will come, even if at times and for specific purposes we
might not wish to emphasize that fact.
But what happens when, in reviewing the narratives of our lives, looking ahead to the futures we hope to have, we realize that climate change
will damage our world in ways that will directly and permanently affect
us? What happens to our orientation to the future when its livability is
cast into doubt and begins to dissolve? What if the place we choose for
our abode becomes unlivable, the profession for which we have been
trained is no longer needed, or the income we hoped would support us
threatens to disappear? What if we realize that the life we wanted to lead
is ecologically outrageous, that the children we've been raising have no
chance to live as well as we have, and that the political causes for which
we've been fighting may never succeed?
The answer, I think, is clear: all our practical activities, our human
relationships, our professions and goals, are harmed in their very substance. The value of our ordinary activities begins to fray, and the entire
framework of our lives becomes suspect. Climate change does not just
melt the ice caps and glaciers; it melts the narrative in which we still participate, the purpose of the present day. In this sense, too, we are already
living in the ruins of the future.106
Climate change devastates the future and the present alike. But that is
not all. Most of us hope to transmit to new generations something of the
values, achievements, and joys we inherited from our forebears. When
our future is cast into doubt, so also is the transmission of that past. In
much the same way, the memory of our own pasts, which we may still
regard as strongly continuous with our present, shifts more emphatically
into the past tense, as if it now speaks clearly of something that is gone.
At certain moments, perhaps, we might almost sense that our very present should be rendered in the past tense—as if, like those on board the
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ship I mentioned above, we live in a society that is already dead without knowing it.
This bizarre possibility extends well beyond the framework of our
own lives. We live in cultures that have long and storied histories, that
have produced and been shaped by the deeds of monarchs and rebels,
the achievements of statesmen and engineers, the thoughts of theologians and philosophers, the works of poets, playwrights, and intellectuals, and the discoveries of scientists. But without a future, these heritages,
while still crucial and precious, subtly change, as if they endure after
their foundations have disappeared. Suddenly, all these legacies belong
to a planetary era that is passing away, for they were built on the security
of ecological foundations that have collapsed. When the future goes, so
do the present and the past. The entire framework of human time tilts,
decays, disappears.
Does our situation leave us without hope? On one level, it does: we
can no longer hope that the civilization we inherited will thrive or that
future political changes will give all human beings a chance to participate in the abundance we have known. If that hope came true, the Earth
would perish very quickly. As Robert Jensen says, hope of that kind is
lazy, and the traditions it relies on are dead.107 As long as we stick within
the framework of what we have known, we will no longer envision great
things, only the prevention of the worst. We will imagine no utopia, only
the best dystopia we can get.
But if we change our perspective and abandon the premises of fossilfuel culture, another kind of hope may be given to us: we could hope for
a post-carbon culture that could thrive even on a greatly wounded Earth.
That kind of hope, however, is far more than the bare emotion, for it
can arise only out of the activity of reinventing who we are and becoming uncharacteristically honest about the difficulty we face. Yet even that
hope cannot come without its shadow: as I argued earlier, converting
to renewable energy sources for everyone on this overpopulated planet
would still do great harm. The hope we now have, it seems, will always be
mixed with a certain dread. Rebecca Solnit, writing about the challenges
that will always face political activism, calls this “hope in the dark.” In our
moment, that darkness is darker yet.108 In our broken present, however,
this may be the best we can do.
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I have been suggesting that an awareness of our future ruins harms
the very substance of our present activities. Does it follow that we should
simply give up, abandon all our efforts, renounce the world, and live in
a kind of catatonic despair? Why not just stop all our labors and lie passively on the sofa? That would hardly be a solution; before long, the guy
on the sofa would wonder how to get food to eat, how to keep the roof
over his head, and how to satisfy other basic physical needs. If he truly
gave up taking care of himself, eventually his friends would have to do so
for him. He'd become a pain to everybody he knew. However great our
awareness of what may come, the basic imperatives of life demand that
we carry on. In fact, the more we deny those imperatives, the more we
tacitly acknowledge them: you can't deliberately ignore something unless
you already know it is there. Even the guy on the sofa has to acknowledge
that life goes on.
Would it work, then, to embrace our everyday lives with a vengeance,
as if to escape our knowledge in doing so? Why not respond to our
dilemma by saying, “I'll just keep working until the waters rise up and
carry me away”? But if a person makes this declaration, she would show
that she values activity for its own sake, not for any purpose it might
serve. She might hope to prove that she will not submit, that she can conquer any despair. While such a choice reveals a certain courage, it too is
ultimately desperate, for rather than truly responding to the conditions
around her and adjusting her life accordingly, she would attempt to value
what she knows is futile. Although ignoring climate change might seem
to protect her from it, the uselessness of her efforts would necessarily
strike her from time to time, especially when she relaxes from her heroic
strain, and since she had not created a viable response to it other than
sheer stubborn effort, it would hit her with special force. Pure stubbornness is no better a response than passive despair.
The difficulty of our situation only becomes clear if we realize that the
future is in ruins and that life goes on. As a result, even if we are aware
that the blow has been struck, even if we live in knowledge instead of
ignorance, we find ourselves having to live on as if nothing has changed:
that knowledge, it seems, does not alter the basic challenges of everyday
life, the ordinary tasks of doing our work, taking care of our loved ones,
and planning for the future. The contradiction is stark, inconquerable.
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Our orientation to the future inevitably remains, but for us it is directed
toward what is no longer entirely there. We are caught between two
imperatives: we must lead our lives, but we must also recognize that our
life narratives are no longer credible. Neither renunciation nor stubbornness, neither reckless grief nor furious assertion, can finally erase the
eerie quality of persisting within a narrative whose conclusion is slowly
being erased. No plausible course of action is open to us. The ruined
future forces us to endure in a broken present.
Is it even possible to live in full awareness of this contradiction? Can
we at once perform our ordinary activities and be conscious that the narrative they imply may be in ruins? Our first option is to do everything
we can to prevent entering this contradiction at all: the prospect of life
in these terms should be enough to motivate our unreserved participation in a movement to change our societies and to change them now.
But as I have been suggesting, the time available for action is so short it
has virtually disappeared. We may have little choice, then, but to live in
a mode that might seem impossible for us, to endure a life that will go
on, even though it has been damaged fundamentally. We who are alive at
this strange moment may end up having to reckon with its strangeness by
enduring in this impossibility. If the Earth passes the turning point and
we still endure, we will discover that the ruins of the future have thrown
us off the track of our personal narratives and disjoined us from who we
think we are. In that moment, if we are sane and aware, we will be offkilter, out of balance.
The ruins of the future inevitably undo any coherent way to live. If
events force us to construct new strategies for surviving in an altered
world, we will also have to face this more intimate challenge: how
to endure this incoherence, how to live on in the ruins of the lives we
thought we would lead, in the ruins of who we thought we might be. All
our basic emotions will be up for grabs, for none will remain unchanged:
desire and grief, joy and sorrow, hope and despair. Living in the physical
ruins of the Earth will be tough. But doing so will also symbolize living in
the ruins of another sort, the broken language of the heart.
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Chapter 8

A Slow and Endless Horror
So far I have been suggesting that our situation of facing the consequences of climate change for our future is unprecedented. We've never
before contemplated the possibility that the life we know might be altered
beyond recognition in quite this way. But it's worth pausing to consider
whether this relation to the future is really all that new. Are we in fact
experiencing as strange a moment as all that? Aren't people in modern
cultures used to facing these kinds of uncertainties as a matter of course
by now? What is really new in our current situation?
We are, after all, the heirs of a long history of devastation. Over the
past several centuries our societies have engendered and endured systemic, irreversible transformation in its various forms, including those
in which expansion and liberation evolved into devastation and genocide. For half a millennium we have had to accept the possibility that the
invasive power of modern economic and political regimes could destroy
entire traditions, cultures, and peoples. This history is so long, difficult,
and bloody—and so convenient to ignore—that it may be useful to
review it for a moment.
The European encounter with the New World led to an era of colonization on nearly every continent, a pattern that in turn frequently decimated native populations and drew upon the murderous enslavement of
Africans to provide labor for the new world. The scientific and industrial
revolutions, in their turn, made possible the creation of modern industrial
capitalism, which superseded traditional trades and handicrafts, forced
a long demographic shift from the countryside to the city, and subordinated national economies to global trade and financial networks, forever
altering the preindustrial way of life. At times, that process had brutal
effects. The British application of a particular theory of the free market in
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countries across its far-flung empire led to the Irish famine of the 1840s,
the devastating famines in India in the late 1800s, and ultimately to what
Mike Davis has called the “making of the Third World.”109 Eventually, the
bureaucratic power of the modern state, coupled with military and imperial ambitions, nationalism, or racism, created the concentration camps
in South Africa during the Boer War, the little-known genocide of the
Herero and Nama peoples in Namibia (then South West Africa) under
German control in 1904 through 1907, and the Armenian genocide of
1915–1923.110
This history has only intensified over the decades since. World War I
shattered the complacency of Europe and destroyed a generation of young
men; a decade or so after the war ended, the Depression began; that long
ordeal ended with World War II, which in turn introduced the nuclear
bomb and the Holocaust. The changed geopolitical conditions after the
war led to the foundation of the state of Israel and the displacement of the
Palestinian people; it also opened the way for the independence of India,
which came to pass with the Partition of India and Pakistan, an event
accompanied with the slaughter of around one million people. Shortly
thereafter began the Cold War, the arms race between the superpowers,
and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in limited ways continues to this day. Over this period, the legacy of the Enlightenment took
on a darker hue; the example of the American and French Revolutions,
which had initially opened the way for nations around the world to intervene in their traditions and reinvent themselves, inspired the Russian and
Chinese Revolutions, whose leaders eventually sought such systemic,
wholesale change that they plunged their nations into famine or worse
(under Stalin in the 1930s and Mao in 1958–1962). In the wake of the
Holocaust, which inspired the world to vow that it would “never again”
tolerate the attempt to destroy a people, we instead witnessed genocide
and the massive destruction of human life in Burundi, Cambodia, the
former Yugoslavia, East Timor, Rwanda, Darfur, and elsewhere, as well
as the murder of roughly five million people, still ongoing, in Congo. In
the early years of the present century, 9/11 brought to the fore international, stateless terrorism and its counterpart, the “war on terror”; these
developments, along with events in Rwanda and Congo, suggest that in
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the coming decades this history of violence will continue outside of state
control, becoming an endemic feature in failed states around the world.
Throughout the past several centuries, then, human beings have never
been assured that the life they know will endure; on the contrary, the
prospect of global violence, the attempted decimation of whole peoples,
and in recent decades, the destruction of the entire human race have
loomed large as distinct possibilities. We have been living with disaster for a long time. By now we may have become used to the possibility that the entire lifeworld in which we live is terribly fragile and that
humanity itself may disappear. In response, however, we have attempted
to beat back the forces of destruction in the hope we can put the worst
behind us and enter an era of peace. In the United States, for example,
we have tended to assume that the emancipation of the slaves put the
most egregious forms of oppression safely in the past. The international
community, having founded the United Nations, warded off a nuclear
war, survived the Cold War, and prevented the outbreak of many other
conflicts, may also believe that it has finally marked out the boundary of
disaster's kingdom.
How well does climate change fit within this history? In her remarkable Earthseed series, composed of the novels Parable of the Sower and
Parable of the Talents, Octavia Butler depicts a future United States
wracked by the consequences of climate change, speculating that in a
society torn by violence, insecurity, poverty, and lawlessness, slavery will
return. The form of slavery she envisions is more sexual and economic
than racial, based in the exploitation of individuals rather than a visible category of persons. Nevertheless, her work suggests that if things
go awry, the forms of injustice we Americans think we have surpassed
will return.
While we have not often contemplated these possibilities in the
debate about climate change, her suggestion has the ring of truth. If a crisis is deep enough and lasts long enough, all bets will be off; the guarantees of the Constitution will not protect the poor from the rich or the
weak from the strong. After all, they have never done so completely, and
even now the battle to guarantee civil rights for all continues. Butler's
novels remind us that we have not eradicated inequality and exploitation
from our society; the endurance of class privilege and deep poverty, as
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well as the resegregation of public education and the neglect of inner-city
communities, tell us that we have used the fact of our previous abolition
of slavery and other open abuses to justify tolerating a host of social ills
today. The persistence of these profound inequalities creates the conditions for harsher practices to return. This point extends to the international context as well. If we consider the inevitability that under the pressure of climate change millions of people will attempt to migrate across
national boundaries, that societies will clash over resources, and that
various states, weakened by perpetual crisis, may not be able to prevent
conflict, we must admit that conditions will be ripe for the return or proliferation of many forms of injustice.
In that case, climate change may create the conditions for reversing the
guarantees established by democratic societies and the modest achievements of the United Nations. Going forward into the ruined future,
we may instead recede into a version of the past. The major difference
is that this time, we would not be able to escape from that past so easily through establishing individual rights or creating economic growth.
That future will have discredited such possibilities, showing that they
could not deliver on what they promised, for the societies that protected
individual rights will have been the same that created planetary distress.
Moreover, because we will retain the memory of less woeful days, we may
experience such injustice with greater pain than did our ancestors, many
of whom had no memory, and no notion, of human rights. Used to being
treated fairly, we will resent the opposite fiercely. The return to certain
abuses will not merely take us back to the past; it will cancel what we
thought were permanent guarantees and thus traumatize us intimately.
We may then learn that the notions of liberty and individual rights are
only fictions, resting within a network of exploitative social relations we
never fully attempted to dismantle.
Inspired by reflections like these, we may wish to denounce those who
keep alive the structures of inequality. But climate change undercuts such
an attempt at moral clarity. A look at the international consequences of
climate change tells us this much. On one level, the fact that the world's
industrial nations have emitted and will eventually emit far more greenhouse gases than other nations is already a sign that we live in a world
shaped by yet another form of oppression, a greenhouse gas imperialism.
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We who live in the developed world are clearly perpetrators of a great
violence. Yet it is not as if we will escape the consequences of our actions.
We are immersed in a society that continues to emit greenhouse gases at
a ridiculous pace, and most of us will also live long enough to endure the
consequences of those emissions. We, too, will endure great difficulties;
our societies will be wrenched as well. As a result, we will become our
own victims. Some of today's wealthy may assume that their money will
enable them to survive relatively unscathed through a dystopian future.
But no individual should be complacent; economic disarray and internecine violence have a way of shattering any smug arrangements, destroying businesses and households, and leaving individuals stranded in the
midst of chaos. The return of injustice and violence potentially extends
to all of us; we cannot be sure we are not enslaving ourselves, creating a
prison that neither we nor others can escape.
If we take these scenarios just one step further, we can place the
potential consequences of climate change within the history of collective destruction. In a previous chapter I mentioned that climate change
most likely created the conditions for the brutal violence in Darfur.111
In itself, of course, climate change does not actually take human lives; it
creates the miserable matrix for that violence. By destroying ecosystems,
depriving people of their livelihoods, and forcing them to migrate, climate change vastly increases the opportunity for conflict. The events of
Darfur illustrate that fact well. Once climate change increases in its severity, further violence of this kind is nearly inevitable—and not only in
areas far removed from the developed nations. Because the modern state
often takes unintelligent, corrupt, and oppressive forms, because several
versions of violent stateless entities (insurgent armies, separatist organizations, or jihadist movements) have emerged and are likely to arise in
many regions of the world, because absolutist ideologies of various kinds
still have armed adherents, and because ethnic rivalry and prejudice
thrive as well, all the ingredients for international conflict, civil war, and
systemic murder remain in place. Now that we're adding climate change
to the mix, those ingredients are more combustible than ever before.
The prospect of this future violence takes shape against the background of our greater awareness of its costs. In recent decades, many
interpreters have become increasingly conscious of the psychological
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consequences of surviving war, genocide, sexual violence, domestic
abuse, and other horrific events. As they have argued, trauma is devastating because its severity breaks into consciousness before the mind can
adequately prepare itself—or, more precisely, in a way for which it could
never prepare itself; as a result, the mind bears the wounds of events it
cannot absorb or understand. Because traumatic experiences in some
sense never fully take place for their victims, they can never move on,
never entirely live after those events.112 In the era of the Vietnam war and
after, we in the United States have called this “post-traumatic stress disorder,” and in the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, we recognize
that this syndrome continues to afflict soldiers and civilians alike.
But if we take the possibility of severe, global climate change seriously,
and thus acknowledge the near inevitability of the genocides to come,
what happens then? Can we be traumatized by events that have not yet
taken place? If trauma is characterized by an inability to absorb experience into the ordinary realities of life, could envisioning the horrors of
the future have a similar effect? For a modern Cassandra, such a trauma
would be possible: she would behold events to come with an intensity
that would devastate her. Perhaps a modern version of a biblical prophet
would endure the same. But it is instructive that such figures, announcing what they see, are never believed; those who hear their warnings
melt away, unmoved. That indifference makes clear that for the rest of us,
anticipatory trauma does not seem possible. After all, if we are imagining
trauma, we are not truly living it, nor is it shattering our minds in a way
for which we are not prepared. Perhaps future events can never be as real
to us as past or present ones. In that case, climate change simply cannot
be as vivid for us as the horrors of a certain past.
What, then, is the status of a violence to come? An awareness of the
immense consequences of our ordinary acts today for the lives of ourselves and others will shadow those acts, giving them a haunting depth.
A truthful look at our current practices—especially at the exceptionally
high rate with which we burn fossil fuels in the United States—should
give us pause. Are we perpetrating a kind of genocide ourselves, just one
that will take place later? Are we participants in a systemic violence that
will work itself out only over the coming decades? Part of the answer
must be no; as I suggested above, climate change is not itself genocidal,
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for it provides no more than the matrix for conflict. But since it does that
much—and can therefore generate a perpetual series of horrific events—
it is actually much larger than any single genocide. It is at once less and
more than the violence in Darfur.
In fact, since we cannot know precisely what form of climate change
our present use of energy will create in the future, the specific implications
of our acts remain out of reach. The problem here is not an experience
that is too vivid, so shattering we simply cannot absorb it, but one that
is too removed, too difficult to capture. Climate change works on tape
delay: someone acts in a harmful manner, and the results might emerge
soon, perhaps decades later. It also works in the aggregate; any single act
can contribute to an overall disorientation of the climate, which in turn
causes a series of further physical processes to kick in. Climate change
is caused by a systemic violence that is cut off from any direct tie to its
consequences.
As a result, our actions as participants in a fossil-fuel economy are
accompanied, not by trauma, but by its photographic negative, as it were,
its equally devastating counterpart—a violence we can infer but not
actually see. Our actions thus take on an unknowable extra dimension,
an imprecise but palpable edge, for they are inevitably shadowed by the
horror to come. For trauma in its original sense, events are too vivid and
specific for the mind to handle; in contrast, for the anticipatory trauma of
our time, the mind conceives of a real violence that is not yet vivid or specific enough. If trauma is the result of an experience that is too intense,
too heavy, we live an experience that is too light. But in this way, we too
participate in events we cannot absorb, a horror we cannot assimilate.
These reflections may clarify the place of climate change within the
history of enslavement, war, and genocide. But what about its effect on
a world now used to the prospect of global nuclear war? That threat,
far more encompassing even than genocide, threatened to destroy the
entire human reality in a moment, almost without warning, wiping out
everything we cherish in a single blow. Without a doubt, it endangered
our individual and collective lives on a fundamental level. The fact that
a head of state in the United States or the Soviet Union, and to a lesser
degree in other nations, could in a single gesture threaten the viability of
the human race was unprecedented. In the nuclear era, the existence of
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humanity as a whole ceased to be guaranteed; it was no longer as definitive a reality as nature itself.113 No longer could we be confident that a
divine force was protecting us or that our cultural values might in some
way prevent our annihilation. Indeed, for a time it seemed possible that
the contest over those values might lead to our annihilation. The things
we held sacred and the things that threatened our reality were potentially
one and the same.
But in contrast to climate change, nuclear annihilation, however horrifying, seems almost comforting. We imagined that event as an interruption of our everyday lives. What made it truly terrible was the prospect
that it would suddenly destroy billions of lives that would otherwise continue and possibly flourish. As a result, for virtually everyone the threat
of nuclear war inspired an immense desire that ordinary life itself would
endure. The absolutely horrifying thought of the world's end authorized an absolute affirmation of the familiar. That emotion was typical
not only of anti-nuclear activists but of heads of state as well: the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, propagated by the U.S. Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara, drew on this emotion, claiming that the
Soviets would not destroy us if they knew we would destroy them in turn,
and vice versa. The idea was that our affection for the lives we led and
our hope for the future would make it impossible to push the button. The
prospect of total destruction could paradoxically lead ordinary citizens as
well as heads of state back to their primary loyalty to the familiar world,
perhaps even intensifying that loyalty in a manner not known to any prior
generation. If anything, the nuclear era inspired us to regard ordinary life
as fragile and so to value it all the more. The threat could somehow give
the everyday a stunning intensity.
Climate change, however, is another matter. As I suggested in the
introduction, this time around, the prospect of future ruins arises from
our way of life, rather than threatening to interrupt it. Virtually everything we do in advanced industrial societies is powered by the burning
of fossil fuels in a process that directly contributes to global warming.
The implications of this threat are thus truly unprecedented. If we wish
to ward off a globally traumatic event, our task is not simply to avoid a
certain course of action, to refrain from hitting the button. We face the
much more difficult challenge of undoing and transforming a fundamental
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aspect of our societies on a massive scale. This time, we are the threat,
and if we wish to preserve anything like the lives we lead today, we must
change those lives as soon as we can.
As a result, this threat has a very different impact on our attitude
toward everyday life. Under the pressure of climate change, the everyday
is at once precious and a threat: it is split at its core. Where the nuclear
led us to affirm ordinary life virtually without reserve, climate change
forces us to imagine how it can be transformed so it will no longer undermine itself. This affection for our way of life paradoxically does opposite
things: it at once motivates us to sustain and to change it, to cherish and
transform what we know. Our way of life speaks at once of what we wish
to protect from trauma—and of the trauma it will create. In that case, we
are even today both perpetrators and victims, slowly destroying our lives
and surviving that destruction at the same time. Thus even the relative
clarity of trauma dissolves into a contradictory, paradoxical state that
blends the imposition and endurance of disaster.
The moral clarity of the threat and the necessity of responding to it
are different this time as well. If severe climate change takes place, it will
not happen in a single, annihilating event. An all-out nuclear war truly
would have decimated the conditions for human life; even if a few victims struggled on briefly, in the end no one would have survived. Climate
change, however, has its impact over decades and centuries. In contrast to
the single event, its pace seems incredibly slow—so slow that we might
decide simply to ignore it. If it seems slow, it is also sure; if we ignore
it, it will destroy what we take for granted. It is thus a truly insidious
threat, almost creepy in its persistent force. But it is also less absolute in
its potential devastation; because it is comparatively slow in human terms
(though not on the evolutionary time scale), we can well imagine that it
would never truly annihilate us, never actually bring our world to an end;
on the contrary, given its pace, we might guess that a good share of the
human race would survive it, though with lives quite different from what
we know today.
This contrast between nuclear war and climate change may explain
why we do not yet take the latter very seriously. In the nuclear era, we got
used to an all-or-nothing scenario. Either the world would end, truly and
for good, or it would go on without a hindrance. Climate change doesn't
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give us either ending to the story. It doesn't destroy us outright, nor does
it let us live on as we are. It combines devastation and survival. It doesn't
give us apocalypse, nor does it give us the satisfaction of having avoided
the world's end. It is something altogether different, as if it is at once sinister and benign. It's as if climate change tells us that the world ends, yet it
goes on—or that it ends, gradually, as it goes on. It gives us that unprecedented experience: a slow and endless horror.
This dimension of climate change compounds its already paradoxical effect on everyday life. Because the consequences of climate change
are neither immediate nor absolute, we can surmise, if we wish, that it
imposes far less of a moral imperative on us than the nuclear threat did.
Our society so far hardly wishes to embark on the necessary effort to
comply with that imperative, for it is still thwarted by those who protest
against taking action, and the rest of us have not yet demanded a revolutionary transformation strongly enough. We delay and hesitate while
crucial decades go by. Such recalcitrance would have been impossible in
the nuclear era: nobody seriously attempted to deny that the bombing
of Hiroshima had taken place or that the Soviet Union existed. Today,
however, in the United States, negating reality has become the profession
of many and the hobby of millions, and a general indifference or passivity
characterizes many more.
In consequence, for Americans reality is split once again: the physical fact of climate change has not yet achieved the status of a social or
political fact. At the moment, we Americans live in a society that fails to
acknowledge the crisis of the biosphere. The climate tells us one thing,
our politics another. In consequence, we endure a state of radical dissociation. For us in the United States, things are truly confusing: not only
is the world ending as it goes on, we also hear that it is not ending at all.
Because we cannot defeat that false message, we sense that our everyday
lives devastate our own future—and present—while also being asked
to pretend they are doing nothing of the sort. The contrast between our
knowledge of the consequences of our actions and a collective, deadening indifference continues to grow, making the incoherence of our experience even worse.
Here again, in retrospect the nuclear doesn't look so bad. The nuclear
threat almost seemed to take care of itself: the doctrine of mutually
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assured destruction captured the situation well, making it plausible that
no one would ever push the button. Furthermore, once technicians
installed various fail-safe devices to forestall accidental nuclear war, we
could assume that massive annihilation would take place only if a person actually chose to authorize it for some purpose. That notion of human
control gave us hope that the moment of destruction would never arrive.
We could believe that this choice came with a certain moral clarity, a
deliberate decision to destroy or preserve the world.
With climate change, however, we can have no such illusion. If anyone is in control of this threat, all of us are. But it would be foolish to
imagine we actually are in control. The physical complexity of climate
change dramatically undermines the moral clarity we might bring to bear
on preventing it. The limits of our knowledge, the immense difficulty
of communicating what we do know to all the world's citizens, and the
huge challenge of altering our material practices in midstream make it
very likely that many of the world's people, including ourselves, might
help bring about severe climate change without knowing it and without
intending to do so. The physical processes at stake will work themselves
out even if we do not fully grasp them or if we deny that they exist at all.
That possibility points to another instructive contrast to the nuclear
threat. In the height of the nuclear era, observers sometimes rated the
degree of danger by estimating how many minutes remained before
“midnight”—before the dread hour of nuclear conflagration. Today, the
same metaphor would work well—up to a point. But this time around,
it's quite conceivable we could live past midnight and not notice a thing.
As I suggested earlier, the dread hour of triggering a series of positive
feedback loops could arrive while no one lifted a finger. What then? We
have no common language for describing what the world looks like when
it survives such a moment. Our nuclear fictions, of course, constantly
imagined not the nuclear event itself but a post-nuclear landscape—as
if it were even remotely possible that something like human life could
go on for very long after that event. Those fairy tales have little relevance
to our situation today. Now we must confront the possibility that all of
us will live in a world that seems unchanged after it has been fundamentally harmed.

132 Chapter 8

How do we describe that world? We could use the metaphor of the
ship already struck by the iceberg and about to sink, as I did in the previous chapter. But even that notion only goes so far. That ship might keep
going for a few more decades, sinking very slowly into the depths while
the years pass. We simply do not know how to understand a world that
lives after the disastrous moment has passed and finally becomes aware of
its situation—but too late.
One type of story provides an inventive response to this situation.
The back-to-the-future scenario, especially in the Terminator movies,
imagines that in a disastrous future we might come back to this present
and avoid doing anything to cause that future. This scenario does at least
imagine a life after the disastrous event. But it does so in order to convey
the urgency of acting now—as if all of us in the present have been sent
back from that future to make sure it doesn't happen. This type of story
is perfect for the era of climate change: indeed, nearly all of the warnings
that scientists give us about the effects of our fossil-fuel economy could
be told in that way. But what happens if we discover that the event has
already taken place—and we have no machine to help us go back in time
and make things right?
Our inability to know when that moment will take place or if it has
already happened, as well as our relative lack of control over whether it
will happen, stems in part from the radical limits in our knowledge of climate change. In the nuclear era, everyone knew well enough what pushing the button would lead to. But with climate change, things are utterly
different. If scientists had not begun to calibrate the levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere in the mid-twentieth century, and if they had not
become attentive a couple decades later to the possible consequences of
introducing greenhouse gases in novel quantities into the atmosphere,
none of us would have had more than a vague sense of what was taking place. Without the ongoing work of hundreds of scientists around
the world, we wouldn't have a ballpark estimate of our situation even
today. Yet despite that effort, nobody knows how climate change works
in all its permutations. One reason for this contrast may be that human
beings created nuclear bombs, could test them, witness their results,
and contemplate their possible use. Nobody planned and implemented
climate change.
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But we could plan and implement a planetary response to climate
change. Some observers are fond of saying that if America once embarked
on the Manhattan Project to create the nuclear bomb, why couldn't it do
the same to create a new energy economy? One problem with this comparison is that today the United States, or more likely the international
community, would need to create several equivalents of that project,
invent a range of new technologies, and implement them on a wide scale.
We need a Manhattan, a Brooklyn, a Queens, a Bronx, and a Staten Island
Project, just to get started. But the further irony is that the goal of that
earlier project was to create a devastating weapon; the goal this time—
and a far more difficult one—is to prevent destruction. Of course, in that
era American government officials argued that they needed a weapon to
prevent the Nazis, and then the Soviets, from destroying the nation. They
hoped to use destruction to ward off destruction. This time around, we
have no convenient weapon we could use to blow up climate change.
This demand for a different kind of national—or more likely, international—project will require us to alter our relation to the technological
breakthroughs of the modern era. In the Manhattan Project and thereafter, the United States hoped to secure its dominance by taking the logic
of destruction to its limit and becoming the supreme master of annihilation. Although the development of a nuclear weapon was certainly new,
it nevertheless operated within the general flow of history, toward the
ever-greater capacity to destroy. It arose as well from within that broader
historical dynamic, the creation of many technological innovations—the
production of the automobile and the airplane, radio and television, digital systems and the Internet—which took for granted another version
of the power to destroy, to use the Earth's resources without reserve for
human benefit. Climate change will not allow us to go with this flow, for
it demands that we make technological breakthroughs that will roll back
the pattern of destruction. It demands that we contest the entire momentum of the modern era, indeed the celebration of the “modern” itself.
On many different counts, then, climate change represents a major
shift from a danger that has become quite familiar to us. In retrospect,
the nuclear era seems positively saturated with moral clarity—with a
clear and present threat, the prospect of an instantaneous and absolute
end, a public that readily agreed that such a threat existed, a specific
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technological project that could be completed to respond to that threat,
and a presumably sane and rational figure who could be relied upon not to
choose annihilation. Climate change undercuts these certainties at every
turn. It gives us a scenario loaded with paradoxes and contradictions, one
that seems to complicate the necessary urgency several times over.
If this quick, cursory look at our place within the history of the modern world teaches us much, it tells us at least that the terrors of the past
few centuries, along with their apparent moral certitudes, have not prepared us for the present moment. Climate change ushers us into a truly
new era. Living with climate change throws us out of our familiar narratives: it tells us that we have not surpassed the violence of the past and
that the apparent guarantees under which we live may be illusions. As we
live in the shadow of future devastation, the bitter taste of what may eventually transpire invades our daily lives, giving us the uncanny sense that
our ordinary actions are accompanied by the trauma to come. Climate
change also cracks open the tale of the willed, instantaneous death of
nuclear annihilation, for it constitutes an event that finishes off one way
of life while letting us live on in a disaster that takes generations, if not
centuries, to unfold. It is as grave a threat to the Earth and its people as
any before it, yet it is less understood, less amenable to our control, and
more difficult to prevent. As this prospect weighs on us, it splits our reality to the core, forcing us to live at once with and against our ordinary
lives, to cherish what we must also change. Our challenge today is to bear
up under all these difficulties nevertheless, to do what must be done, and
in defiance of the long odds, to sustain as habitable a planet as we can for
ourselves and for those to follow.
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there. “Genocide” is now our term of choice to designate collective murder,
even though it technically refers to an attempt to decimate members of a
particular race or ethnic group. We need another term to specify violence that
arises from different motives or spills over particular ethnic boundaries. For a
reliable guide to the recent history of Darfur, see Julie Flint and Alex De Waal,
Darfur: A New History of a Long War, revised (New York: Zed Books, 2008).
112. For a classic discussion of these themes, see Shoshana Feldman and Dori
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113. The “nuclear era,” of course, is by no means over, since technically the
possibility still remains that one or more powers could use nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the fear of nuclear war between the great powers no longer
defines our moment (although the international community continues to
worry about nuclear proliferation and nuclear terror), and accordingly I will
describe the “nuclear era” using the past tense.

Chapter 9

Infinite Responsibility
If what I have been suggesting is true, our present failure to do what is
necessary to ward off severe climate change constitutes a grave threat not
only to Earth's living systems but also to fundamental aspects of our ordinary lives. As I have argued, it endangers the future that shapes the narratives by which we live, undermining the significance of everything we do.
The reality of that threat calls upon us to value the lives we know and to
see them as destructive at the same time, as a result splitting our response
to ordinary experience.
The ethical implications of our inaction are equally divided. Our failure will ultimately steal the future from those who follow us, depriving
them of a full opportunity to address the problems that will afflict them.
But our ineptitude, in turn, arises in part from the decisions of our ancestors; over several recent generations, they expanded the world economy
exponentially and produced us in staggering profusion, greatly limiting
the options available to us.
Heirs of a discredited past, haunted by a disappearing future, we
meet our present moment in dismay. Yet we cannot simply surrender to
despair, for the demands of ordinary life perpetually call us to orient ourselves to a future, even if it is disappearing. We are thus caught beyond
reprieve between the demand to act and a great difficulty in doing so,
shackled and stumbling at the crossroads of history.
If we truly experienced in full the haunted, broken qualities of the
present, we would yearn for an emotional and spiritual resource through
which we could gain consolation. Yet our situation already undermines
nearly every version of comfort and hope familiar to us. As long as we
work hard to provide for a better future, as long as we depend upon hope
that the world we know will endure, and as long as we grieve in a mode
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that still promises eventual recovery, we are caught within an emotional
dynamic whose foundations are disappearing.
We thus find ourselves in a situation where we cannot help but seek
some other basis for ethical action, another resource for endurance.
Once we recognize that the future is in ruins and our present is shattered,
the task of encountering the human significance of climate change is not
yet complete, for we must still discover some foundation on which we can
build, a foundation that can stand no matter what may come. Finding
that foundation is the task of this chapter.
The first step in doing so is simply for us to accept the present horror in full. Doing so is surprisingly rare. One would think that our highly
contradictory, almost impossible position would inspire consternation or
outrage. Instead, we have in general responded in a very different tone.
Nearly everyone endures this crisis in distraction, mild dismay, ambivalent passivity, indifference—or in a sort of baffled indignation. This very
absence of a passionate response from the great majority of us is striking.
What could possibly explain our reluctance to acknowledge the nightmare qualities of our ethical dilemma—or what is worse, our tendency to
accept it in a mode of quiet desperation?
The answer may well lie within the history I outlined in the previous chapter. We've been living with disaster so long that we're used to
it. For generations now we have accepted the shattering of tradition, the
decimation of native peoples, enslavement, economic displacement and
exploitation, genocide, and the threat of nuclear annihilation as inevitable aspects of our world. Such violence is so interwoven into the very fabric of modern culture that we cannot imagine a world after it has ceased.
In consequence, we do not truly attempt to move beyond what we know.
We seem to have surrendered ourselves to the prospect not only of our
mortality, but of the potential destruction of our societies, our ecosytems, and the biosphere itself. Although we protest against these prospects, in the end we consider any concerted attempt to overcome them
as delusional.
We might at times suggest that we disapprove of this violence, but
at every turn we take it for granted, accept its results, and flourish on
the wealth it produces. We often treat those who protest as moralizing
annoyances, as partisans of a simplistic and ultimately failed viewpoint.
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We incorporate their denunciations of contemporary society into our
own thinking without giving up our love of what we possess, ending up
in a partly ambivalent, partly celebratory mood, uneasily aware of what
our history has cost but not finally regretful. When we do acknowledge
some dimension of that cost, we usually turn it into the pretext for partial, narrowly construed resentment, a demand that our particular group
be invited more openly to the party and given a greater share of wealth
and respect—as if that broader world, despite the systemic violence on
which it is based, remains legitimate. In short, although we know that the
world in which we participate emerges from a history of devastation, we
ultimately accept its violence because of its benefit to ourselves.
Our response to genocide, however, suggests that on occasion certain events do give us pause. Shocked and appalled by the Holocaust, we
vowed never to let murder on that scale happen again. But we have not
yet made good on this vow. Although we created the United Nations to
help adjudicate conflict, that body places too great a trust on the powers of the modern state to intervene into its affairs and accordingly to
this day often allows nations to commit grievous violence against their
own citizens. Neither the destruction of a third of the world's Jews nor
the long series of genocides in the last four decades has inspired us to act
with sufficient resolve. Although we decry the consequences of state violence, we have not dared to shift our loyalty to any alternative that would
be powerful enough to curb it.114
Our inability to realize the goals stated in that vow may arise from an
even greater inability to understand violence on that scale. Yet such incalculable violence should not disable our resolve but make it incalculably
strong in its turn, elevating mourning into an even more powerful emotion that demands resolution. Our failure in this regard in the six decades
since the Holocaust suggests either that we did not mourn those deaths
or, more likely, that we have learned to dissociate mourning and action,
emotion and institution.
The response to genocide thus exposes a fundamental impasse in our
culture: a vast gap between our vows and our actions, our confidence we
can build new institutions and our ability to do so. We have so far not
passed from intention to fulfillment, from horror to resolution. The failure to act in one regard exposes a much broader, long-standing failure
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to recognize and address the destructive consequences of modernization for the world's people. Our response to the Holocaust foregrounds
what is true virtually across the board: however great our private grief,
we live within a public sphere that on ultimate matters remains largely
disabled and bankrupt, that operates from within a legacy of uneasy,
haunted denial.
This legacy is intensified even further in the era of climate change. If
we cannot grieve for those destroyed by genocide, we are even less likely
to grieve for those we have not yet lost. Yet the potential violence to
come, as I have suggested, dwarfs the destruction of any genocide, indeed
of many more genocides than we have yet seen. Our present moment is
thus characterized with a dissociation more striking than ever before—a
strange compound of horror and complacency, resolution and indifference. It is as if in our halting way we wish to explore the ultimate reaches
of disorientation and self-estrangement.
As I suggested a moment ago, our inability may stem from a continued
fidelity to the very thing genocide already discredited: the unchallenged
rule of the modern state. The United Nations has not yet found a way to
supersede the claims of its member nations to govern their internal affairs
without interference. This collective failure to curb the powers of the state
is especially harmful today as negotiations over an international treaty to
address the causes of climate change frequently run aground on competitive assertions of state interest. Such assertions arise from developed and
developing nations alike, even from the world's wealthiest nation that can
best afford to be generous. Recently many commentators have blamed
international inaction on the resistance of nations such as China or India.
But we should not forget that in response to the Kyoto accords, in July
1997, the United States Senate voted 95-0 not to agree to any protocol
that did not apply as well to developing nations or that would harm the
American economy.115 States clearly assume that their priorities are more
important than any potential threat to the biosphere, just as their interests are more crucial than protecting human beings from mass slaughter.
The rule of the state, it seems, can brook no interference, except from limits the state freely accepts on its own terms.
Our tolerance for the power of the state finds its equal, in the American
political sphere, in our respect for the abstract liberty of the individual.
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As I suggested in an earlier chapter, the harsh resistance to a carbon tax
or untax expresses the wish to protect individual liberty even from the
overriding demand to transmit a living biosphere to posterity. The fierce
defense of liberty defined in this way—a liberty free of obligations to
others or responsibility to the future—ultimately protects irresponsibility and a refusal of obligation, much as the tolerance of state power in the
abstract authorizes a potential abuse of power. The international inability
to respond to genocide is echoed in our general endorsement of the right
to drive SUVs, build excessively large homes, apply nitrogen-based fertilizers to crops, or engage in mountaintop removal coal-mining. Taken
seriously, the perpetual complaint about environmental regulation voices
a demand that one have the right to use or abuse the Earth's resources as one
pleases, or more directly, the right to destroy. Such an insistence, I would
suggest, applies in one domain what the murderous abuse of state power
enacts in another.
This insistence on the rights of states or individuals makes clear what
is at stake in the habits of indifference and self-estrangement. We refuse
to mourn the violence of modern history primarily because we are its
beneficiaries—because it exemplifies, on a much broader scale, the
right to destroy that we claim for ourselves. We ultimately do not wish
to take responsibility for the violence that sustains us because our belief
in a certain liberty requires us to value that liberty more than responsibility itself. Although we may deplore the exploitation that pervades the
world economy, we do not finally lament it, for we do not allow it to crack
open the notion of individual liberty or the reality of our relative economic privilege.
The most direct way to overcome this flawed legacy is to renounce
the notion of an abstract, purely formal liberty—a right in the end to
destroy—and affirm instead our place in a web of relationships with family, friends, neighbors, and partners at the workplace, with fellow citizens
in our locality, state, region, and nation, with the living beings who share
our habitats, with those who make the goods we use or who consume
what we produce, with those who share our humanity, with the dead and
the unborn, and with the Earth's dynamic, living systems. An abstract liberty is as nothing compared to our power to respond and be responded
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to in turn—that is, our power to be responsible for others, to others, to
all others, and indeed to the very domain in which all others can flourish.
The interpretation of the world as a scene of countless relationships,
familiar in archaic cultures but gradually marginalized in recent centuries,
provides the ground for a much more coherent approach to the challenges of our time. Our ambivalent acceptance of the legacy of violence,
for example, stems in part from our inability to conceive of strangers as
related to ourselves. Marooned in the past or future, in another country,
in a reality we consider too far removed from our own, they do not have
enough substance in our minds to merit serious attention. They exist
within that vast abstraction, our world, which in its incalculable complexity cannot move us. When a great evil such as the Holocaust takes place,
we may experience astonishment, horror, and pain, responding with
enough interest, perhaps, to learn something of its history. But without
recognizing its implication for our ordinary lives, its power to arise from
within institutions familiar to us, we enact only an empty grief, a formal
attentiveness without consequence. We could instead allow our relationship to strangers to have a practical effect on our lives or on the practices
of which we are a part; if we did so, we would actually complete the process of grief by identifying the cause of the horror and dealing with it
directly. The point, in short, would be to consider ourselves responsible
for the event and its possible reappearance and to act accordingly.
The same applies to our situation in the era of climate change: we
must not simply mourn the victims of the future, nor merely comprehend the problem and its potential solutions, but above all consider ourselves responsible for whatever damage will take place—responsible, in
short, to coming generations—and thus by definition to respond. Only if
we regard ourselves as participants in a web of mutual obligation will we
have the motivation necessary to overcome indifference and shatter our
unthinking, psychotic belief in our right to destroy. Others have given to
us and made our lives possible; let us give to others in return.
To live our moment fully, to feel the horror without reserve, is to be
given fierce motive for ethical action. If we were truly to accept our place
within a web of relationships and thus attempt to respond, what would
follow? Let's imagine that we were to face what Al Gore calls our choice,
decide wisely, and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions, use more
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energy-efficient techniques, minimize the environmental harm from our
management of forests and farmland, create market-driven incentives for
everyone to take these steps, fund a wide array of new technology projects and implement them as soon as possible, and reach international
agreements that would enable nations around the world to undertake
similar efforts of their own.116 As I have suggested, to do so would require
that we act in a truly revolutionary manner—that we would defy the
assumptions and habits of generations for the sake of a common end.
By acting in that decisive way, however, we would also do much more.
We would demonstrate that we are free in a sense scarcely ever mentioned by the pretended partisans of liberty—that we are not merely
puppets of our cultural traditions but are still capable of making the right
choice despite all odds. For much of this book, I have outlined a series of
tough obstacles in our path, including the short timeline for action, the
difficult technical challenges, the limits of our political institutions, our
addiction to economic growth, the self-interested calculus of state interest, and the belief in a false version of freedom. But it does not follow that
these factors ultimately determine what we will do; we are still capable of
surpassing what we have so far achieved.
But acting in this way would ultimately go much further than showing
our power to alter our common history. If we truly enacted the necessary
ecological revolution, we would finally bring about what our forebears
barely envisioned and scarcely ever attempted. In doing so we would also
address the systemic violence and excess of modern culture, that vast legacy of exploitation and devastation that still defines our time. Choosing
justice would not only enable us to transform our historical circumstance;
it would also take responsibility for that history. It would say that in our
freedom, we are capable of making that history our own, placing it to our
charge, and judging it in the clear light of its consequences. Most crucially
of all, it would show that we can make reparation, do justice to those we
have harmed and would otherwise still harm, and fight against the motivating force of this history. By taking up this task, we need not admit to
an inherited guilt; we are not automatically accountable for the actions
of our forebears, any more than those who follow us will be accountable
for ours. Our act would thus be free in yet another sense, for it would be
freely chosen rather than demanded; it would suggest that we are capable
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of shouldering a burden that should never have fallen to us, but that in
taking up that burden we can at last pass beyond enduring the weight of
our history and move to a new phase, into a world we have not merely
inherited, but made.
But that is not all. Because this ecological revolution would salvage
something of the future of the biosphere, as well as of all human societies, it would demonstrate our capacity to assume responsibility for the
encompassing ecological context of humanity's future as well. Insofar
as not acting would deprive people in the future of a full opportunity to
respond to climate change, as I argued earlier, an ecological revolution
would do precisely the opposite: it would protect the very possibility that
in the future we or others could act on humanity's behalf.
Acting in this way would, in short, go far toward restoring some
dimension of the stolen future and thus mending in some degree our
own broken present. It would salvage something from the ruins, piecing
together a remnant of the human despite the shattering effects of climate
change I have been describing over the last four chapters.
In doing so, however, we would take on a task breathtaking in its scope
and significance, for we would necessarily assume the ethical burden of
generations not our own—the weight of a violent history, on the one
hand, and of the potentially devastated generations to come. But even
this is not all. Between these two domains, of course, lies our present,
which in its almost insurmountable momentum, its ambivalent indifference to the violence it still causes, and its refusal to accept genuine transformation imposes still another burden on us—one that we can instantly
recognize as our own. In our free choice to save the biosphere from further destruction, in our attempt to salvage something from the ruins of
our shared history, we must ultimately assume responsibility for addressing
the violence enacted throughout the entire sweep of modern history, from the
past through the present and into the future, and thus for many centuries of human endeavor.117 Strangely enough, to act justly we would in
our single generation bear the weight of that entire development, discharging an immense debt on behalf of the dead, the living, and the unborn.
Although we did not choose this moment, we might still freely choose to
accept its challenge, to make at last a full reckoning with modernity itself.
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Yet even this description does not capture the full dimensions of our
moment. We would hardly grasp the implications of this choice if we
did not extend our view further into the past. With Jared Diamond, for
example, we should trace the chronicle of civilizations that pushed their
environments beyond the breaking point and eventually collapsed—or
those that through foresight avoided that fate.118 A decisive moment has
occurred on many previous occasions to civilizations around the world;
our version of that moment is unique only because it encompasses the
fate of the biosphere itself.
We could extend this view even further back. Contemplating the
whole sweep of human evolutionary history, we could attribute its disastrous effects to an inherent fault in the species. After all, the story might
go, over the millennia we have wiped out most of the large mammals,
destroyed many ecosystems, learned how to exploit nearly every living
thing for our benefit, multiplied our numbers seemingly without limit,
and now are about to torch the climate itself. If we continue with our
ways, consuming the biosphere to our heart's content, we will make survival for a good portion of living things difficult if not impossible.
Such stories could justify utter despair; if we have depleted the planet's resources so systematically for millennia and have pushed the logic
of civilization beyond natural limits time and time again, there can surely
be no hope we will depart from this pattern today. But such a despair
would hardly take into account how often we have acted wisely, or—
as Diamond’s examples of the New Guinea highlands, Tikopia Island,
and Tokugawa-era Japan indicate—how often we have lived within our
means.119 Nor would it recognize that we are neither simply a biological
species nor directly determined by our long history; we are also capable of
recognizing our status as animals whose actions threaten the other forms
of life on this planet and therefore are capable as well of surpassing our
selfishness for the sake of all life. Evolutionary and historical knowledge
should count for something; the awareness of that long legacy, unique to
our era, necessarily alters what it means to be human, transforming our
relationship to the conditions of our existence. It is surpassingly strange
that we as a species, arising from within the complex web of living forms,
would ultimately prove capable of damaging that web itself. But if that
is so, we have exceeded purely evolutionary determinations and become
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unnatural in a precise sense. Facing that legacy, our challenge is to step
outside biological determinations in a further and opposite sense, to
accept responsibility for addressing the ecological violence endemic throughout
our history as a species, to make reparation as greatly as we can to the web
of life from which we evolved and in which we live.
Taking responsibility for that history may not be the first course of
action that many observers would consider. Contemplating this long
history of ecological destruction, some might simply wish that human
beings would cease to exist: only that prospect, they might argue, could
protect the further flourishing of life. But this profoundly misanthropic
wish, which could never come true in any case, denies that we, too, are
part of the life whose future we wish to protect; eradicating ourselves, if
only in thought, is to partake in a version of ecological destruction and
genocide multiplied many times over. It is to imagine the kind of devastation that our ethical action is aiming to prevent.
The point is not to destroy humanity, but to undo what Stephen Jay
Gould called our “cosmic arrogance,” the anthropocentric attitude that
imagined we were the pinnacle of evolution, its ultimate goal.120 The best
strategy in defeating that arrogance is not to negate human history but
paradoxically to affirm it and transform it as a result—to make our presence on the Earth into a presence for the Earth, as an agent charged
with protecting all its forms of life. Choosing to do justice to the life of
which we are a part, we would freely accept a task that no other species
has attempted to perform: to deny our impulse to thrive and reproduce
without limit. By taking this unnatural step, we would finally become the
stewards of that realm to which we owe our existence and which, thanks
to us, can no longer flourish of itself. Paradoxically, by fully assuming our
unnatural status as stewards, we would at last do justice to the biosphere,
making the thriving of all life an ethical, not merely biological, good. If we
set out to do so, we might set as our goal the challenge of becoming genuinely indigenous again, of truly inhabiting the ecosystems where we live
with intelligence, modesty, and foresight, and thus prove ourselves capable at last of joining that long counter-tradition, also evident throughout
our history as a species, of human generosity to the ecosystems of which
we are a part.
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Considering the full dimensions of this decision, then, teaches us that
enacting an ecological revolution is a world-historical act, immense in its
implications, for through it we would accept responsibility for the ecological costs of human evolutionary and cultural history across the past,
present, and future, and as a result would ultimately accept our role as
stewards of the biosphere itself. But such a massive act is not a further
example of cosmic arrogance. On the contrary, that act has these dimensions only because any act we commit today will ramify backwards and
forwards across our whole history; in its physical consequences for the
biosphere our decision will reveal the overall significance of that history
for better or for worse, showing that human beings are in the end agents
of reparation or disaster. The enormous, overbearing import of our current moment arises not from our ambition but from our position at the
crucial moment of the Earth's climate history. We are at the crossroads,
and we simply must choose.
But this act may seem far too immense in another sense. How can we
turn against the longstanding historical patterns that have produced our
current ease and convenience? Why would we relinquish the unprecedented abundance that meshes so well with our wishes? No doubt
doing so will be very difficult. But we need not act out of purely altruistic motives. We now know that business as usual will condemn us to
a miserable fate, dissolving the future that anchors the narratives of our
lives. To retain the value of our own present actions, to maintain the possibility that we can live intentionally, we must intervene. Acting wisely, in
short, is in our own self-interest. This fact should give us some comfort.
It is not so difficult, after all, to set aside immediate whim in the name of
long-term self-interest; we learn to do so as soon as we go to school in
childhood and in various ways continue to do so throughout adulthood.
Delaying some portion of gratification is a necessary part of modern life.
A smart decision would simply take such prudence one more crucial step,
extending it to the fate of the biosphere itself. Acting responsibly does not
require us to become exemplars of stunning virtue, moral heroes of some
kind; it only demands that we step up our prudential thinking, applying it
to a part of our experience that once seemed exempt from such concerns.
Because acting in this way serves our interests, the fact that it would
also conserve a future for others seems less of a burden than a bonus. In
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this case, the usual contrast between selfishness and altruism disappears.
As it turns out, if we take our own interest seriously, we will fight to preserve a future for a whole range of others as well. Protecting ourselves,
we would also save the prospects for Earth's living systems. Our single
decision, then, would operate on several levels, saving the future for ourselves, humanity, and the biosphere, all at once.
One way to imagine the full dimensions of the present choice is to
incorporate into our present activity the possible experience of those to
come, ultimately making them into the guardians of our own future as
well. We would see the present through their eyes, judging it as we imagine they will judge it. We might even fancifully imagine ourselves to be
the emissaries of the ruined future, its embodiment in the present. We
might see ourselves as people out of time, terribly inconvenient to our
contemporaries—ambassadors charged with interrupting our moment
with bad news, cracking open today's complacencies with a dire message from coming generations. We would warn our compatriots of the
disaster to come.
If we saw ourselves in this light, some might suggest that we would
be the secular counterparts of the biblical prophets, who warned their
hearers of what would follow in the absence of repentance. But we would
also have to extend that scenario to contemplate the failure of our warnings. In the biblical world, when prophecy failed, the hope for apocalypse
followed; the redemption that did not come to pass in history could
only take place through a divine decision to bring history to an end,
pass judgment on the living and the dead, separate the elect from the
damned, and create a new heaven and earth. (Apocalypse in the biblical
sense does not refer to a cataclysmic, final event, but to a final redemptive
event, one that liberates the redeemed from the horrors of history. The
book of Revelation, or of Apocalypse, is after all full of good news for true
believers.)
In our time, however, we face the possibility that redemption will not
come in any form, neither from within history nor from its end, leaving
us without divine guarantees, without a judgment day that could impose
a moral significance on all time. In that case, we endure in a post-biblical landscape, abandoned to a history that provides no ultimate justice,
no final consolation. Our willingness to serve as emissaries of the future
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would make us nothing like the biblical prophets; we would instead simply serve as messengers from our own future selves, spokespeople for
those whom we will otherwise have damned. We would merely be fallible citizens who wish to do the least harm to those who will follow.121
Yet even the prospect of acting in that way is now disappearing.
Although the case for action is extremely compelling, indeed definitive,
our society is now taking the opposite course. As I have argued above, the
odds of our taking the necessary action in time are slender indeed and are
virtually gone. We are thus in the position of outlining the overall implications of the right choice primarily to grasp its opposite. Understanding
responsibility at this late hour may be most useful in helping us comprehend the full force of a radical irresponsibility.
What might that irresponsibility look like? Today, although the
effects of climate change are already quite visible around the world, we
still hesitate to act. It thus seems very likely that those effects will get our
serious attention only when they are more widespread, continuous, and
severe—only when they are significantly worse. In short, it seems we will
act only when the consequences of climate change have become much
harsher than today.
A concerted effort in a decade or two, of course, would come far too
late; it would not counteract the climate patterns that will have already
set in. As a result, in the years after we do act, people will soon notice
that their efforts will seem to have accomplished nothing. They will
ask, “Why are all the eco-friendly measures not working? Why are we
not seeing the results we hoped for?” The usual relation between action
and result will be suspended, raising tough questions about the value of
addressing the problem at all. Only then, perhaps, will we finally experience the nightmare of enduring in a world that is much more difficult to
inhabit, whatever we do.
At that point, we might be tempted to abandon ethical action altogether. Because we will be living in wounded ecosystems, shrinking
economies, and distressed societies, we might well cast aside the attempt
to live responsibly, choosing instead to hunker down and weather it out
on our own terms. For many, only the promise that ethical action might
alleviate further suffering later on, by ourselves or others, could sustain
a choice for ecologically responsible living. But because by then we will
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already be enduring the partial collapse of the civilization we know,
surviving social conflicts, natural disasters, and food shortages that are
unprecedented for us, we may not even have the luxury of worrying
about our future fate. We may discover that we are living in the ruins of
ethical action itself. Our position might be akin to that of a person who
has endured an amputation but must nevertheless save someone from
drowning, or a person who has had a lung removed but still must help
carry the wounded. In such a situation, acting to help others might be
possible, but it is far more difficult and may not occur much at all.122
It is thus all the more astonishing that we will not act today, when
doing so might actually prevent that nightmare scenario from coming to
pass. The possibility that we might act freely to save the Earth, however,
helps clarify that a failure to act is also a choice: a choice to destroy. The
ecological revolution is missing today, and will be missing tomorrow, not
because it is impossible for us to carry it out but because we will not; it
speaks of our decision to remain relatively indifferent to the destructive
aspects of modern culture, to sustain that destruction well into the future,
and thus to remain caught by the habits of our common history. This
decision, too, we should regard as freely given, as an instance of moral
assertion—this time, however, for inertia, ineptitude, and ultimately for
disaster. It would freely allow our traditions and the bounds of circumstance to define us without limit, to saturate us through and through, and
to make us exemplars of what could well be judged as idiocy, mendacity, and moral cowardice. If we made this choice in full awareness of its
consequences, we would do so with a certain negative dignity, perhaps,
as if we were intent on displaying willful blindness and self-destruction,
in embracing intoxication, excess, conflict, and death. But it is far more
likely that we will make this decision without noticing it, without truly
asserting ourselves at all, lapsing into self-destruction as if it came over us
in our sleep.
So far, at least, we may go if we adhere to that slight possibility that
acting now will enable us to salvage a bit of the stolen future. But if we
are honest about the lateness of the hour, we must acknowledge that we
may well have already decided for calamity without consciously choosing a thing. That numbed decision for disaster grows stronger every day;
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irreversible climate change draws nigh; the world we dread is upon us, for
it will be almost impossible for us to ward it off now.
What does responsibility look like in the midst of this surrender, as
our ecosystems and societies undergo a slow and irreversible collapse?
How can we remain responsible in the midst of this general indifference, as the benefits of action are continually superseded, cancelled, or
ignored? In these circumstances, the case for responsibility becomes
even more difficult; the paradoxes of climate change hit home with terrible force. If we try to sustain an ecological ethics today we would face
the stunningly difficult, if not impossible, prospect of deciding to preserve
a future even after it has been largely destroyed. Even further, we would find
ourselves living forward into the very disaster we are fighting to prevent. If we
take such action, the momentum of history would still carry us directly
into the fate we did not and do not choose. In our moment, history not
only fails to reply to such efforts; it directly contradicts such efforts, as if to
mock us for believing in the purpose of action at all. In effect, we would
attempt to sustain responsibility amidst its ruins, to remain just when the
frameworks in which justice is effective have dissolved.
To sustain an intentional sense of human life in this context takes a
supreme moral effort, a belief in human freedom that can defy nearly
all odds, a sense of integrity that insists on justice even where it retreats
beyond virtually every horizon of possibility. All the overtones of free
responsibility I outlined above would be tested to the breaking point, for
in our new setting we would be asked to take up a responsibility seemingly
without purpose.
The difficulty of that moment would come home to us in other ways
as well. Once severe climate change kicks in for good, the Earth's temperatures will not return to their former levels, nor will the climate restore
itself; on the human time scale, the loss will be permanent. Moreover, the
harsher the climate, the greater harm it will do to the communities and
people we know, and the more we will grieve for the climate's impact on
our lives as well as on the Earth itself. But our grief will have few effective outlets, little space for meaningful resolution. Instead of embarking
on a process of mourning that will absorb what we have experienced and
renew us, we will find that there is nothing beyond this loss to move on to.
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Many observers have written about the experience of environmental grief, of mourning for ruined ecosystems. In ordinary circumstances,
grief enables us to accept the loss, to acknowledge a new absence within
the reality in which we must live, and to face the future having integrated
that past into our lives. Through this process of recovery, in some sense
we recover our sense of reality, regaining a future through absorbing
that loss.123
But grief in the era of climate change can no longer operate in this
way. Grieving for those we have lost, we will move forward into more loss,
into a generalized experience of even greater mourning. In effect, because
we will face those losses and absorb further devastation without end, we
will never fully recover from them. The process of mourning, which will
become inevitable for virtually everyone, will lead to little healing at all.
Furthermore, if we acknowledge the prospect that we are not likely to act
in time, our emotional situation today transforms as well. Facing a stolen
future, mindful of the immense social crises to blossom around the world,
already enduring the traumas to come, we have little choice but to mourn
forward, to mourn into the very disaster we grieve. Even the specific emotional future promised by the process of grieving disappears, replaced by
nothing that grief can overcome. Already today, and to a greater degree in
the years to come, we will have to take on a kind of second-order process
of grieving for the future and for grief itself, for the very possibility of integrating such losses into our lives and surviving.
Because of that fact, we cannot rely on grief, or indeed on any other
emotional process, to carry us through this moment. However devastating the crisis for longing, hope, grief, and despair, however harrowing our
emotional lives may be at this moment, we cannot salvage them on any
familiar terms; we simply must find another basis on which to build any
prospect of ethical integrity.
The same difficulty confronts us if we contemplate our responsibility to the generations to come. In our era, as the future is disappearing,
any ethics that grounds itself in a future good is in danger of shattering
beyond repair. Abandoned to history, living without guarantees, we may
soon discover that the basis of our efforts to safeguard the biosphere for
ourselves and others to come will fail. A purely secular description of
our moment may falter as much as a purely religious one; both dissolve
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when we attempt to do justice in the midst of the ruins. Once irreversible, severe climate change arrives, once the domain of indifferent events
sweep away nearly every positive consequence that might arise from our
actions, what could possibly inspire us to be just?
Our only choice in that case would be to abandon all reference to
the future—a future for ourselves, for others, or for the biosphere itself.
Although I argued earlier in this book that nearly every action we take is
grounded on our orientation to the future, under the unrelenting pressure of severe climate change we would have to construct an ethics that
has no such orientation, that takes its inspiration from a radically different resource. We would have to adopt an ethics that would no longer have for its ultimate basis a belief that just action would necessarily
lead to an eventual good for ourselves or others or a material benefit that
might actually arrive. Adopting such an ethics, we would enact justice
for another purpose entirely—one realized in the act itself. We would
respond to others without calculating whether our action would pay off
in the long run, without measuring our action according to the demands
of a realistic common sense, accepting the possibility that our actions
may have no results that would ever be visible to us or to others. In effect,
we would accept a responsibility that would be infinite in still another
sense—one that would bear upon us beyond all pragmatic, finite considerations, aiming for a good that is valuable in itself—a good visible, perhaps, only in our intention, in our sense of a justice without which the
value of all action disappears.124
An ethics of this kind—an ethics in extremis—can endure nearly any
circumstance. In the midst of disaster, where pragmatic action may fail
us, where grief itself must run aground, when all the familiar scenarios
of daily life and of human emotion decay, we can still enact justice for its
own sake. If we act on these terms, we accept a world without redemption, whether religious or secular; giving up any appeal for a transcendental solution, by the same token we release ourselves from a purely
material history, discovering instead our ability to do justice beyond all
calculation. From a certain point of view, it might seem that this mode of
justice would enact a caring that could not heal, a politics that could not
liberate, a hope that could not come to pass. Yet in fact, if we take action
whose benefits we cannot know, giving ourselves to what may never
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come to pass, we discover a integrity in the very act of doing justice and
show respect for a sanity that may endure even in the ruins.
It might seem that anyone who could adopt such a practice would
truly have exceeded the limits of self-interest and become something
other than human. But acting in that manner, while exceptional, is not
outside ordinary human experience. Today if someone we love contracts
a terminal illness, we do not abandon that person; on the contrary, we
care and love that person to the bitter end. Love's purpose is the person,
not the future. Does it follow that love is somehow religious, that it aims
for transcendental ends? Not at all: love ignores transcendence, too, realizing nothing but itself, and as a result constitutes a form of action that
aims beyond the religious or the secular, one that beyond all others realizes itself through its own acts. However strange it may sound, then, it
follows that those who practice an apparently impossible ethics enact a
version of this love on another scale.
But even these reflections do not bring us face to face with the most
difficult challenge of all. If we found ourselves in the midst of disaster,
how would we take responsibility for that disaster itself? Since it would
have arrived thanks to human activity as well as human indifference
about the harm our activity has been doing to the biosphere, we would
have to take the final and unbearable step of accepting the burden of that
failure itself.
Some might do almost anything to avoid taking this step. After all,
they might say, we have done all we could to save the environment, reducing the harm we do in our own lives and fighting for years to bring about
the necessary actions. No doubt for certain people such a protest could
ring true. Nevertheless, none of us can claim innocence; all of us in developed societies are implicated in the harm wrought by modern industrial
culture. Our very knowledge of climate change depends on the technological infrastructure available to contemporary scientists as they do their
research; our very ability to converse about it, to organize activism against
it, relies on modern publishing, communication technology, and forms
of mobility. We couldn’t even participate in a movement to save the Earth
without inhabiting the structures we fight against. No doubt it is entirely
understandable that we who endure a horror created by human beings
might be tempted to sink into resentment and anger against others. Such
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a gesture might be bitterly pleasurable and even be partly accurate, but it
would enable us to evade the fact that we benefited from and participated
in the practices that brought about such devastation.
We would thus do far better to take this failure as our own, to wear
the mantle of defeat, to take responsibility for the collective decision not
to do the right thing—in short, to accept untold loss as a consequence
of our own collective history. Such a step might seem almost impossible
to contemplate, so directly does it name our futility and humiliation. Yet
by taking that step, we would achieve a certain integrity in our power to
assume the full measure of our defeat, to name as our own what would
then be visible as the true contours of human being: its ultimate inhumanity. In that bleakest moment, we would accept responsibility even for
the fact that our attempts at responsibility fail, taking to our charge what
would then be revealed as the nullity of our entire history.125
Here is the ultimate, most unbearable level of responsibility: the task
of owning disaster, putting it to our charge, taking its burden on ourselves
as human beings. At first such a step might seem to take us to the furthest, most bitter reach of self-contempt and humiliation; here at last, it
might appear, we truly give up, collapse, dissolve into ruin ourselves. But
such is not the case. Here, at last, we would move beyond our horror at
our inhumanity as well as our grief for the passing of the societies and
ecosystems we knew. By taking responsibility for a vast failure, we would
in that same gesture accept absolute loss without nostalgia and without
condemnation. Giving up the temptation to dismiss humanity as a mere
evolutionary anomaly or to cling to some faint idealization of our kind,
we would accept humanity in all its inhumanity and thus find ourselves
in a space of radical openness, capable of affirming the entire process
that brought us into being. Marooned on the junk heap of history, facing
no prospect of redemption, we might attain a great serenity, broken and
destroyed though we may be.
So it seems that the baffled, broken life I described in the past four
chapters can ultimately lead to something more, to a basis for a renewed
integrity even in the midst of the ruins. That basis is not a new hope, but
the capacity to affirm and endure the worst. To find our way beyond
the trauma of our time, to push beyond a scenario of endless grief, we
can abandon anything that might heal us and instead embrace trauma
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and grief themselves without reserve—and discover that by doing so they
subtly change: through embracing trauma more fully we can accept the
broken world without being haunted and distressed by it; and through
submitting fully to grief, even a grief for grief itself, we might find how
to relinquish our attachment to recovery, accepting instead a serenity in
destitution. By owning disaster in these and other ways, we might relinquish that fidelity to a sense of our innocence and that belief in the validity of our culture which made the shattering of both so painful. Through
that process, we may at last lay hold of a new foundation—one so radical
that on its basis we may endure whatever may come. On the other side
of a mutilated happiness we might discover vaster possibilities, including
a capacity for affirmation without limit and a power to love without the
hope of return.
In discovering that we may persist in doing justice even in the ruins,
we can find the basis for an ethical optimism that can survive even in
the midst of utter defeat. We need not fear, now or later, that political
or climatological realities will cancel our capacity to follow through on
our responsibility to others and to the forms of life that have sustained
us. By working through the series of potential ethical challenges to the
bitter end, by imagining the worst that may befall—and finding that we
can survive even that horror with integrity—we discover an indestructible ethical agency we may never have known we possessed, discerning
hints of possibility that lie unremarked within the impossible challenges
of our era, sources of strength that will remain to us even if the future
disappears. Through that same encounter with the worst, we learn how
to dwell with the full range, however painful, of emotions that arise in
response to the dilemmas of our time, at last overcoming the dissociation
habitual to our culture.
Bringing these discoveries with us back from this hypothetical future
to our own moment, when we cannot yet be certain that all action is
futile or that the future has utterly disappeared, we may realize that we
can make good even now on the agency we have gained through this
foray into the future and as a result can face our present difficulties with
a surprising authority. Moreover, by returning to the present in this way,
we expand the significance of that future ethical decision outward, to
include our own present as well. But by assuming responsibility today
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for the disaster that may come, we necessarily accept the demand to
renounce any further participation in the practices that are leading to
catastrophe and to make reparation, as far as is possible, for the harm we
have done. No doubt our ability to do either is severely constrained; for
most of us, simply living our lives does far more harm than we wish, and
the task of reparation requires far more of us than we will ever achieve.
We who are the inheritors of a disastrous history were never meant to
carry that entire history on our backs; it is only understandable that as we
try to do so, we may stagger under the load. We will have to develop new
reserves of humility, new levels of resilience, new styles of dark comedy
to endure. The task we accept seems well-nigh impossible. Yet by taking it
as our own we become the agents, and not merely the heirs, of our shared
history—even if, as agents, we necessarily have in our hands a truly horrific power to destroy as well as save. In accepting this task, we finally
acknowledge what would be true in any case, that at this juncture, as in
no other, ours is an infinite responsibility.
What does that power mean for us today in our ordinary lives, as we
inevitably face a wide array of decisions about our everyday practices?
We cannot do better than to take the most transformative, constructive
steps available to us. Because our task is to reduce those practices that do
the greatest physical harm to the biosphere, the ultimate measure of our
willingness to do justice is not purity of heart or intensity of spirit but the
practical, measurable effect of our actions. Yet to bring about those concrete results requires a real ethical commitment. As a result, we find ourselves today in what might seem to be a paradox: we accept an incalculable responsibility best when we calculate with great rigor exactly what
we can do to make the most difference in our ordinary practices—and
carry through on that calculation as well as we can. In short, we must cultivate nothing other than a pragmatism of infinite responsibility, one that is
endlessly resourceful in discovering and implementing the most sophisticated ideas for salvaging a future. To that task I now turn.
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Chapter 10

Making Reparation: Offset Your Life
If, as I have just suggested, owning disaster is also to own the demand for
reparation, even where reparation is impossible, then our way of surviving the slow horror of our time does not relieve us of the task of practicing justice in everyday life. On the contrary, given the enormity of the
disaster we now take to our own account, the task becomes enormous as
well. All our pragmatic actions in consequence thus become small indications of a reparation we will never and can never complete, a task as incalculable as the disaster it is meant to repair.
But if we commit ourselves to doing justice in our daily lives, we
immediately face a series of skeptical responses from ourselves or others.
What can we do as individuals in the face of such an enormous crisis?
Individual action can do very little in comparison to concerted national
and international measures to address the key causes of climate change.
But this is not in fact an objection to a renewed ethics; it is rather a
description of our first, overriding, and most pressing task: fighting hard
for an ecological revolution. All other actions we might take pale in comparison. When our political institutions pose obstacles to the necessary
transformation, we should become more creative, change tactics, and try
new angles on the problem. If we fail again, we should persist with still
further efforts. Nothing should ever intimidate us.
But it does not follow that we need do nothing to change our behavior
in our own lives. If we are to do justice no matter what comes, we must
commit ourselves to making a difference however we can. Doing so may
be difficult if it’s clear that we are still caught within a society that refuses
to alter its ways. Yet we cannot use that fact as an excuse. As I asked
above, how tolerant are we toward a slaveholder who refused to liberate
his “property” on the excuse that his doing so would not by itself liberate
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all slaves? How well do we accept the plea of a woman living in Nazi
Germany that she cooperated with the system of extermination because
she did not have the power on her own to bring it to an end? If we are not
likely to let such people off the hook, we must believe that people should
do justice whatever the odds, even in the face of impoverishment, punishment, or death. Since living in an environmentally responsible fashion would provoke no such threat against us today, we have even fewer
excuses; our criteria in those other cases make our judgment about our
current behavior quite clear.
We may hesitate to go further than we already do because we are not
convinced it is necessary or all that helpful to do so. We might conclude,
for example, that statistically speaking, our personal actions will have
only a miniscule effect on the overall situation. But even if such action
may be statistically insignificant, it is still necessary. Our ordinary moral
compass tells us as much. If one of us kills someone we hate, statistically
speaking we would have reduced the human population by an almost
infinitesimal amount. Similarly, if we break into someone's home to steal
an object we coveted, we do virtually nothing to harm the gross national
product. Yet we refuse to commit such actions for good reason. The same
applies to environmental ethics: it's silly to imagine that driving a gasguzzling vehicle is acceptable simply because that machine is only one of
millions on the road. If we're destroying the biosphere, we're destroying
it—and statistics is no excuse.
Other factors may enter into our thinking as well. Even if collective
efforts to change our societies are weak or tardy, individual action can
still make at least a minimal difference. For one thing, it will help realize,
if only on a small scale, some aspect of the society we are demanding.
For another, it will relieve us of a certain kind of hypocrisy, helping us
close the gap between what we demand and how we actually live. Finally,
if enough of us act, and encourage others to do so, together we may build
momentum for a much more widespread transformation.
Such considerations may already motivate us to do a great deal.
Already millions have learned that we should use renewable energy in
place of fossil fuels, rely on energy-efficient forms of transportation, save
energy in our households, consume less, reuse and recycle as much as we
can, buy local and organic food, and compost our waste. Over the past
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four decades or so, these practices have gradually become a familiar part
of developed societies, at least in many locations, and now sound like
basic common sense for many of us.
But because even now the greenhouse gas footprint of the average
American citizen remains sharply higher than that of people elsewhere
in the world, in this nation we have far to go. Moreover, as I suggested in
chapter five, even if humanity as a whole shifts to renewable energy soon,
our imprint on the Earth's surface will still be enormous in part because
of the immensity of the global human population.
To address these challenges, we must go significantly further than
we already have. We may be forced to examine aspects of our habits or
assumptions that we do not want to think about at all, to tackle serious
difficulties not only in the public sphere but in our own lives as well. If
we are to see our own moment through the eyes of the future, we may
have to endure changes to our intimate lives that we can hardly bear, to
do what seems at first impossible. Our dilemma forces us toward radical
thinking and action on every level—political and cultural, social and ethical, collective and personal. It demands that we cut to the root in every
domain, including in our own individual lives.
In the end, we have no serious reason to hesitate applying a pragmatic environmental ethics to our own lives. Refusing to do so cannot
withstand close scrutiny. Living by such an ethics will be no easy matter;
we will inevitably meet resistance from that part of us still caught in the
familiar habits of our culture. As a result, we might be tempted to alter
our practices only when it is most convenient to do so, when it intrudes
least into our lives. We might attempt to combine ease and responsibility,
blending our current habits with new ways, as if changing our lives a little
bit will be enough. Most dangerously, we might bargain with the future,
giving up practices that do relatively little harm so that we can keep those
that do much more. Renouncing the disastrous habits of our culture can
be surprisingly difficult. The toughest and most essential task is to overcome this resistance, especially with regard to those truly destructive
practices on which we most depend. On this score we should compromise as little as possible.
Accordingly, in this chapter I will focus on one example of damaging activity—travelling by air—to examine how great a harm it causes,
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why we might resist abandoning it, and what steps we could best take
within the actual limits of our lives. Thinking through this single example
may provide us with a template for how we can confront other destructive practices. Since air travel eventually will lead to the question about
whether to rely on carbon offsets to compensate for our flights, we might
also take up whether those offsets could work more broadly, whether
they might be a useful strategy in response to all the harm we do. In short,
this chapter will attempt to outline one practical approach to the chief
ethical challenges of our time.
In most discussions of how we might shift to a new energy economy, the topic eventually turns to air travel. In nearly every other area
of greenhouse gas usage, we can imagine a transition to alternative energies and can begin to make reasonable steps in that direction. But not
with air travel. As David MacKay points out, “planes are already almost
as energy-efficient as they could possibly be.”126 Yet flying by plane has
an enormous, negative impact on the atmosphere. George Monbiot, in a
representative and remarkably clear discussion of the subject, citing the
research of the (British) Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution,
writes that “the carbon emissions per passenger mile 'for a fully loaded
cruising airliner are comparable to a passenger car carrying three or four
people.'” So far so good. But as Monbiot goes on to point out, “while the
mean distance travelled by car in the United Kingdom is 9,200 miles per
year, in a plane we can beat that in one day.” Planes are such an efficient
form of travel—they enable us to cover such huge distances so quickly—
we forget how much energy is required to move us so far. If the carbon
footprint of a given air mile doesn't seem so great, taking the full distance
into account expands that footprint very quickly.
But this isn't the half of it. The impact of travelling in airplanes,
Monbiot continues, “is not confined to the carbon they produce.”
Airplanes emit many different particles that have varying effects. The
IPCC thus estimates that the overall impact “is a warming effect 2.7 times
that of the carbon dioxide alone,” due primarily to the mixing of vapor
from jet engines with the air in the troposphere, creating the vapor trails
we can see from far below. “This means that subsonic aircraft, if all their
seats are full, cause roughly the same total warming per passenger mile
as cars.”127

Making Reparation: Offset Your Life

163

Bringing this analysis home to our own lives can be quite sobering. Let's say you drive a fuel-efficient car, recycle, and live responsibly—except each year you take a single cross-country round-trip flight.
According to a representative carbon footprint calculator—the one at
terrapass.com—driving a car that gets forty miles per gallon 12,000 miles
a year pumps an estimated 5,869 pounds of carbon dioxide—just under
three tons—into the atmosphere. In comparison, a round-trip flight from
Boston to San Francisco, with one stop along the way each direction,
emits 2,553 pounds of carbon dioxide per passenger. But if you multiply
that number by 2.7 to reflect the full impact of that flight on global warming, it has a net effect of around 6,893 pounds—a half-ton more than the
carbon footprint of driving that car the entire year.128
So would it be better to take short-haul propeller flights? The latter, it
turns out, are inefficient because they require planes to spend a greater
percentage of the fuel getting aloft. It's far better to use other forms of
transportation to reach destinations so close; Monbiot's own estimates
suggest that it's about twice as efficient to travel that distance by car
(with the British average of 1.56 passengers on board), over ten times
more efficient to take the train, and around fifteen times more efficient to
travel by bus.129
Wouldn't it be possible for airplanes to use renewable sources of
energy? Not yet. Ethanol and other biofuels do not burn well at the
extremely cold temperatures found in the troposphere, and a hydrogenfueled plane would contribute thirteen times more to global warming than today's jet airplanes.130 Amyris, a biofuel company, has created
a renewable jet fuel suitable for actual use and is currently testing it for
release in a few years.131 But whether it can be produced cheaply enough
and at an appropriate scale without causing too great a damage to current ecosystems is doubtful. So far, there is no available alternative to the
kinds of aircraft we fly today.
Facts like these fill a good number of us with outright dismay. Those
who live far away from family or friends, whose professions virtually
require us to get around by plane, or who simply love to explore the
world would do almost anything rather than give up air travel. We might
even regard the very thought as a kind of personal affront. But that is the
very fact that makes this example so powerful and so instructive. The
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biosphere doesn't really care all that much about how we feel; the reality
is what it is, and we must bear with it.
Our first reaction might be that we should simply stop travelling by
air. For many of us, that is no doubt the best option. We may be lucky
enough, or smart enough, to live near all those we wish to see. Most of
the rest of us should be able to visit with family members or colleagues
using phone calls, Internet video links, or videoconferencing. If we do
need to travel, we might be able to do so by bus or train. In fact, given the
harm that air travel does, we should set this as our default response: we
should determine to fly as little as possible, regarding it as a harmful act
that we should undertake only when we have no other options.
But for millions of us, adopting such a response seems to ask too
much. The most crucial part of this discussion thus arises when we must
decide how to adjudicate between the harm of air travel and its apparently necessary place in our lives. It may be useful to pause here to ponder a series of motives for travel and imagine a plausible response to each.
Many of us use air travel as a way to take a break. What happens to
the family vacation, the weekend getaway, the mid-winter trip to see
sunshine? What about that week in Hawaii or the visit to the Caribbean
resort? These outings are pleasant, but scarcely necessary, especially in
the midst of the climate crisis; we would be wise to forego them entirely.
Changing our habits in this regard will not be easy. It will alter our
relationship to the very idea of getting away from it all; we will have to
rethink our sense that the biosphere exists in part to assist us in enjoying
leisure time.
Cutting back on air travel also raises a number of tougher questions.
Should students apply to the best colleges, wherever they may be; should
workers relocate to wherever the jobs are good; and should seniors retire
to Arizona or Florida—if doing so requires that somebody travel by air
to join the family gathering at Thanksgiving and Christmas, if not the
summer holidays? What must give way: personal ambition and satisfaction, the notion of family, and the satisfactions of retirement, on the one
hand, or the threat of climate change on the other? If we care at all about
the survival of the biosphere, the answer over the long term is clear: we
must learn how to become a far less mobile society, to abandon our belief
that something fabulous will happen to us if we settle hither and yon or
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venture continually to the far pavilions. Yet because we inherit the consequences of that mobility for our own lives, we may find ourselves far
removed, and perhaps permanently, from family members.
Perhaps a good compromise is to be honest about what we can do, but
also what we cannot give up; perhaps we should accept what has already
taken place—such as our moving far away from family members—and
thus accept occasional air travel to see them. But such a reason cannot
serve us forever. As time goes by, we should take steps, wherever we can,
to rejoin those we love and find far more local and settled ways to live.
Adopting an environmental ethic will inevitably force us to rethink our
improbable attempt to combine distance and intimacy.
Similar pressures abound elsewhere. Should members of various
professions attend annual conferences intended to keep them apprised
of developments in their fields? How well could they share information
without meeting face to face? To cover contemporary events, journalists
fly to destinations here or abroad in order to observe developments firsthand. How urgent must developments be to justify such a large environmental footprint? Salespeople, consultants, businesspeople, board members, and executives—to give a partial list—are among the nation's most
frequent fliers; how are they to conduct their business?
Insofar as these professions take for granted that flying should be routine, that it must become in part a frequent activity over the year, they
have accepted what amounts to the perpetual abuse of the biosphere. The
assumption that actions of such harm should be ordinary must go. As
a result, those professions must evolve very quickly into another form,
relying instead on alternative forms of contact, such as videoconferencing, to conduct ordinary business. Such a change is in fact plausible if
those in such fields make a concerted effort over the next few years. But
calling for an absolute ban on face-to-face encounters might go too far
and create a backlash against this entire effort. Here again, one might
justify occasional flights on the basis of the most pressing needs or most
fruitful encounters.
Even further questions arise when we contemplate our place in the
international community. How are we to break out of an insular narrowness if we cannot travel to other countries, learn their languages,
and partake in their cultural traditions? Artists, performers, filmmakers,
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musicians, chefs, cultural critics, and people in the world of fashion cannot remain on the cutting edge without being exposed to cultures elsewhere. Would we welcome the results if they travelled less, if mutual influence took place in another way? Diplomats, workers in nongovernmental
organizations, and employees of aid groups travel frequently around the
world, but in a severe irony, by doing so they contribute to harming the
planet. How are they to do their work without relying on air travel?
The consequences of globalizing trade relations are at stake as well.
The increasing volume of goods moving between nations, especially by
sea, are inevitably accompanied by an increase in international air travel,
at least to support bilateral business arrangements. Globalization is also
felt in cultural exchanges of all kinds. Nowadays people who live in large
towns or small cities assume that they will have access to good French
and Italian food, a nice Mexican place, good Chinese food, a sushi restaurant, Thai and Indian food, and maybe even a tapas place as well. In any
large city, we assume that we'll experience some real multiculturalism,
too—that there will be sizable ethnic or cultural communities integrated
into the mix. In the last several decades, the United States has invited
highly skilled or educated immigrants into its society, creating an influx
of people from many nations around the world—migrants who may wish
to take flights back to their homelands from time to time. All these trade
relations, cultural contacts, and family ties rely on a mode of travel that
does immense and ongoing harm to the biosphere. Is it possible to maintain anything like this openness to the world without doing further harm?
However greatly we may value these cultural benefits of globalization and the gradual shift from insular to more cosmopolitan attitudes,
we cannot give those benefits absolute priority over the survival of the
biosphere. Converting the planet into a multicultural ash heap does not
serve humanity well. To the extent that we can, we should sustain the
vibrancy and creativity associated with these international exchanges
while dramatically reducing the number of international flights. And
because those flights have a staggering carbon footprint, since they damage the biosphere more than any others, we must consider cutting them
back as far as possible. If we do so, however, we will inevitably relinquish
many aspects of globalization on which we have come to rely—the easy
exchange of goods and fashions included. Our cultures and economies,
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our sense of multicultural contact, will have to evolve as we do so. We
may thus end up in this case as in the compromises above, accepting
occasional journeys for truly urgent purposes but otherwise giving pride
of place to the planet’s survival.
How do things look so far? On the broadest scale, we could pressure
governments to adopt a greenhouse gas untax of the sort I described earlier in this book. An increase in the price of fossil fuels would raise the
price of air travel and could prompt us all, whatever our sense of the climate crisis, to change our ordinary practices. If necessary, we should also
ponder how to change the attitudes that our professions take for granted.
Workers could insist that their employers allow them to travel visually
rather than in person or to find other workable alternatives to flying.
We could all begin to think creatively about how we can meet, exchange
information, socialize with professional peers, and forge workable bonds.
All these changes will be necessary if our societies take real action; we
might as well get a start on that massive cultural shift before it is too late.
Moreover, if the compromises I outlined above sound plausible, we
could then commit ourselves to flying only on specific occasions, narrowing the number of flights over a year to one or less, and over a lifetime
to a few: to study abroad, to return to an ancestral homeland, or to make
a few visits to specific, long-desired destinations. This severe reduction
in the number of flights might rightly inspire us to do the most with each
one, to make those air miles count as much as possible. If our lives allow
us, we might for example stay at our destination for several weeks if not
months, substantially reducing the climate impact per day of the visit.
Wherever we fly, we could take into consideration research that suggests we could reduce the environmental impact of air travel if we fly
when a plane’s vapor trail can reflect sunlight back into space—that is, in
the daytime and in the relatively bright seasons of the year. (One study
suggests that travel from December through February, only one-fourth of
the total number of annual flights in southeast Britain, caused one-half of
a year's warming effect from contrails; travel at night, around one-fifth of
the total there, caused 60 to 80 percent of the effect.) However, because
contrails may constitute only a portion of flying's overall impact on the
atmosphere, taking this step may have no more than a partial benefit.132
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Although these compromises might seem sensible, flying to this
degree would still contribute to climate change. As a result, the approach I
have sketched so far is still inadequate. A key further element, then, is the
opportunity to purchase carbon offsets for each of those flights—that is,
to contribute to organizations that use the money for projects that reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Surprisingly, such offsets are fairly cheap: you
can offset the emission carbon dioxide through a credible and certified
organization for around $12 to $15 a ton. Doing so responsibly, however,
takes a bit of research. For such offsets to be effective, they must fund
efforts that would not otherwise take place, do not merely shift harmful activities to another site, and are not already being counted under an
existing environmental policy. Furthermore, such offsets should support
interventions that truly make a difference now. If you fund projects for
planting trees, for example, they may not begin to pull carbon dioxide out
of the atmosphere for many years, and already, as I mentioned in earlier
chapters, many forests under the pressure of climate change are drying
out, decaying, and are thus on the verge of emitting more carbon dioxide than they absorb. It is thus much wiser to fund programs that choose
other strategies, that reduce the burning of wood or charcoal for cooking fires, for example, or help construct renewable energy plants whose
power local consumers will actually use. (Those cooking fires, by the way,
typically produce great quantities of black carbon, which researchers
have recently found may be far more harmful than previously thought;
funding efforts to reduce that harm may thus be far more helpful than
we knew.133 ) Fortunately, others have done careful research on all these
concerns and have made the results available online, along with links to
those carbon offset companies whose efforts seem to be making the most
difference.134
If we travel only on occasion and purchase offsets when we do so, we
would go far toward reducing our overall carbon footprint and do much
to fulfill the demand for reparation. What’s more, by purchasing offsets
we would be contributing in our own small way to efforts that the international community could sponsor wholesale if it so chose; we would in
effect begin to bring about the ecological revolution we demand. By living in this way, we would declare our commitment to that revolution and
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thus begin to make good on our choice to take responsibility for the ecological disaster now unfolding around us.
One problem with offsets, however, is that they are so cheap and so
easy to purchase that they may become too convenient. If one can afford
that minimal cost, why not simply continue flying as much as one pleases
and offset it all? Such a strategy is certainly better than flying without offsets; at least it helps cancel out the harm of one’s travel. But the purpose
of offsets is to compensate for those emissions we cannot eliminate, not
to enable us to travel as much as we might wish. Otherwise, it becomes
a tactic to allow people to live in continued extravagance, as if they
can do all the harm they please as long as they buy the sense that they
are doing none.
Offsets are limited in this way because our eventual goal is both to
reduce emissions we might cause and help reduce emissions elsewhere,
for a total reduction much larger than offsets can make possible. While
it does much good to fund projects that decrease environmental harm,
our eventual purpose is to do so while also reducing the harm to which
we directly contribute. Our eventual goal, then, must be to eliminate all
of our contributions to climate change while also enabling those in other
regions of the world to do the same.
These considerations inspire some people to deplore offsets entirely. If
we can potentially abuse them to excuse doing harm to the biosphere, the
logic goes, then we should avoid them altogether. But those who make
this point almost inevitably still travel by air; the virtue they espouse by
excluding offsets is thus illusory. The only responsible way to avoid using
them is to eliminate one’s carbon footprint in the first place.
Nevertheless, we should take this hesitation to rely on offsets seriously. Ultimately, offsets will be of value to us only if we see them as tools
to help us as we construct new practices that will do no direct harm. If
we decide to use offsets, we must commit ourselves to doing so sparingly
over the course of a transition in our actions—so that eventually we would
reduce our air travel so much we would no longer need those offsets at all.
Thinking of offsets as a transitional strategy may be our best option.
This is only one example of how we might shift our habits in the era
of climate change. How well does it represent a transformation in all our
activities? How can we build on it to rethink the whole pattern?
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It shouldn’t be too difficult to apply many aspects of this example
to others. Setting a low threshold for a carbon footprint, sorting out
whether we should make any exceptions, and offsetting those exceptions
carefully—while regarding those offsets as a temporary measure—will
enable us to reduce our overall carbon footprint responsibly.
But in that case, this example teaches us that we should begin to offset
every aspect of our carbon footprint, in effect, to offset our lives entirely.
Since offsets are relatively inexpensive, most of us could afford to calculate all our greenhouse gas emissions annually and compensate for them.
Because most of us use energy in rough proportion to our income, it follows that most of us with more money could afford more offsets, and
those who need them the least would need to purchase the fewest. Even
then, of course, they might be too expensive for some. Nevertheless, if all
of us did our best, and all of us who could afford to do so offset our lives,
we would make a real difference for the biosphere even without government action. And because we would be linking this practice to a prior,
systematic attempt to reduce our carbon footprints as far as possible, we
would be going even further to eliminating the harm we do to the planet.
By taking these steps, we would be following through on our commitment to make reparation. Indeed, that reparation would be visible both
in the greatly reduced harm we cause in our own lives and in the active
transformation we would make possible here and elsewhere. As people
around the world shift to less harmful practices, as renewable energy
plants come online, some version, however limited, of undoing harm to
the Earth will take place.
But if that is the case, why stop there? We should also contribute to
organizations that restore ecosystems where we live, that actively protect
wild spaces, waterways, wetlands, and wildlife preserves, and that not
only protect but also dare to restore damaged landscapes. Even further,
if purchasing offsets can do so much good, why shouldn’t we contribute
money to those organizations quite apart from offsetting per se, enabling
them to go much further than they would otherwise? If our lives are truly
about reparation, we could commit ourselves to purchasing twice, or
even three times, what we would need to do to offset our carbon footprint, doing what we could to decrease the harm brought about by the
society in which we live.
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Making these compromises and accepting the cost of these offsets
may be no easy matter; at first, for people in many professions, taking these actions might pose a tough challenge. But it’s pretty clear that
our current crisis requires us to change our whole way of life. In these
specific ways, it may push us well beyond the comfort zone, demanding
what we do not really want to give. Yet we simply must make changes
of this kind if we want to tackle the challenges that face us. If we do not,
we are no different from those who proclaim against all the evidence that
there is no problem at all—or are even worse, since we become far more
inconsistent and hypocritical than they. We have no choice but to do all
that we can.
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Bear No Children
Let's say a person who is already unusually responsible in all the obvious
ways—who uses very little gasoline, expends very little energy to heat
or cool the home, recycles, and much more—decides to take the seemingly drastic step of no longer flying. Would that be enough? Wouldn't
dramatically reducing travel by air make a huge difference? Certainly it
would. But thinking about our challenge in these terms, however necessary, still relies on a fairly narrow assumption about the task before us.
For the most part, we tend to focus on how we as individuals can lower
our greenhouse gas footprint through various practical actions. But that
approach leaves out of view another key question—whether to bring more
individuals into the world in the first place, each of whom will, in turn, contribute a lifetime's worth of emissions to the atmosphere.
Insofar as bearing children is a personal choice, the decision to have
a child properly belongs within the domain of one's personal impact on
climate change. Yet because our culture regards that decision as in some
sense absolutely private, as the very essence of personal liberty, we have
so far seldom examined the ethics of reproduction as such. Typically,
even the toughest commentators on climate change keep silent on this
question or approach it with fear and trembling, as if examining the politics of reproduction would somehow violate a taboo. They have a point:
it does. But keeping silent on this question makes a mockery of the pretense to have considered the broader impact of our individual decisions
on climate change with any thoroughness. The decision about whether to
have children is so enormous in its implications it dwarfs virtually all others; if anything, it is the question individuals must face when considering
how to lead an ethical life today.
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As we consider the full range of what we as individuals can do, then, we
cannot remain content with the options I outlined in the previous chapter. We must examine the issue of bearing children as well, for it is central
to any serious look at the question of how best we can make reparation.
Even the briefest consideration would tell us what a huge impact bearing a child must have on an individual’s contribution to climate change.
If you have a child, you've added another entire lifetime's worth of greenhouse gas emissions to the biosphere. You can basically assume that
your child's impact on the environment will largely replicate your own,
or what yours hypothetically would be over the lifetime of that child. At
the very least, then, you will have increased your imprint by half (since
you will share the responsibility for conceiving the child with your partner). But because that child might well have further children, who may
have further children in turn, that imprint is likely to be much larger
still. Under what they call the constant scenario—the assumption that
individual greenhouse gas emission rates of the parents will continue
indefinitely for their children—Paul Murtaugh and Michael Schlax, in a
paper published in 2005, estimate that an American woman (on whom
they focus, rather than a man, for technically statistical reasons) who
drives a more fuel-efficient car, reduces the number of miles she drives
each week, installs energy-efficient windows, uses low-energy light bulbs,
installs an energy-efficient refrigerator, and recycles will over her lifetime,
using the emissions averages of that year, keep about 486 metric tons of
carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere, but a woman who reduces
her offspring by one child will over her lifetime save 9,441 tons. If emission rates rise or fall over the course of the child's life, the picture changes
dramatically. But this estimate fairly represents the ethical choice facing
a potential parent today. It's worth emphasizing what these researchers
have found: an American woman who has two children will add “nearly
40 times” as much carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as she might save
through her eco-friendly activities.135
All this follows from a fairly straightforward look at an individual's
environmental footprint. But if we consider as well the fact that humanity
as a whole now vastly exceeds this planet's carrying capacity, the case for
not reproducing becomes even stronger. As I argued in an earlier chapter,
if we manage to shift to renewable energy sources on a scale vast enough
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to make a difference, we will greatly expand the presence of our energy
infrastructure across the land and sea. As a result, that action will make
the sheer overabundance of human beings more visible to us than ever
before. Reproducing our current numbers into the foreseeable future—
even with zero population growth—simply hands this pattern of devastation down to future generations, who will have many fewer options to
solve it well. If we want the life forms of this planet to thrive, we have to
reduce our numbers as soon as we can. The only humane way to do so is
to reduce our birth rate.
The implications are unmistakable: a person who wishes to forestall
severe climate change should not bear children. No doubt saying so violates one of the strongest taboos in our culture. But for that very reason,
it is all the more necessary to speak the unspeakable, speak it repeatedly,
and speak it now. If we are to have the slightest chance to reduce the damage our culture causes the environment, we should begin with the activity that causes the most harm, and without question, this is the one.
I freely concede that simply thinking this thought is enormously painful to most of us. The idea that we should not bear and raise children cuts
against a host of assumptions we may have about “normal” life. Although
American society no longer so openly disapproves of people who remain
single or childless and is becoming increasingly tolerant of nontraditional
families of all kinds, including those headed by gay and lesbian couples,
people still speak about “getting married and starting a family,” as if the
people in question do not constitute a family in their own right but “start”
a family only when they bear or adopt a child. Our society also tends to
assume that starting a family in this sense is a sign of maturity, an indication that a participating adult is becoming responsible. Moreover, we also
take for granted that parents are somehow more nurturing and unselfish
than childless adults, more likely to care about the coming generations,
and thus more responsive to humanity's fate. All these assumptions are
reinforced by the desire many people feel to bear children. That desire
can feel so natural, so self-evident, that they might assume other people
feel it as well, and that people in general should have the right to satisfy
this desire. Needless to say, that desire is often so profound it can define
an entire life.
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The environmental consequences of childbearing, however, should
inspire us to reverse these assumptions, however difficult and nearly
unthinkable it may seem to do so. We need to define our notion of family
anew so that the very phrase “start a family” takes on a new meaning. We
should contemplate the possibility that not reproducing is more nurturing and responsible, more loving to others and to humanity, than bringing more people into the world. Clearly, we should not simply assume
that childless people are automatically responsible in these ways: leaping
to that conclusion is simply not justified. But we should not only respect
but admire the decision to remain childless if it is part of an individual's
broader effort to reduce harm to the environment. The corollary is true as
well: we should seriously consider the possibility that having children is
not responsible. No matter how strong a person's desire to have children
might be, we should not assume that it automatically overrides every
other concern.
The absence of any serious discussion about these matters permeates
our culture. The leading political and economic theories in the AngloAmerican tradition, for example, start from the notion of rational selfinterest, an assumption that takes for granted the adult status of all parties. But that sort of analysis does not explain what brings individuals
into the world in the first place. Apparently the principle of self-interest
includes one's decisions about reproduction, but that possibility is not
discussed explicitly in the theories of, say, John Locke or Adam Smith,
the people whose ideas shape the American traditions we adhere to even
today. Perhaps a child is simply an extension of oneself until coming of
age, when she presumably turns into a rational adult (but then Locke and
Smith also don't seriously consider the possibility that women are rational adults as well). Such theories never examine whether a rational adult
should have children in the first place, nor do they ponder how childbearing figures into the consequences of self-interest for society as a whole.
This question constitutes an immense blind spot throughout the modern
tradition of political and economic reflection.
The consequences are immediately clear in the rather muddled state
of our constitutional law. Since Roe v. Wade, Americans have typically
invoked the right of privacy to defend a woman's decision to have an
abortion or attacked that right in the name of the unborn child's right to
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life. Typically, then, we end up putting one version of individual rights
against another. Yet the terms of that debate mask a more honest discussion about whether the principle of equality between men and women
should override the woman's traditional role as the bearer of children—
whether the principles of modern individualism, now finally applied to
women, are more important than the ancient endorsement of reproduction. In this debate as it is currently conducted, the modern notion of
individual liberty confronts traditional norms, as it has so often over the
past three centuries.
But in our time, that debate is hopelessly outdated. Given the
immense pressure of climate change on us all, the abstract liberty of the
individual—male or female, born or unborn—cannot take precedence
over the basic question as to whether humanity as a whole has any further
right to use the Earth for its own purposes. The answer to that question is
simple: we do not. But if we as a species have no such right, neither do we
as individuals. In that case, the liberty we take for granted—to reproduce
or not, more or less as we please—no longer applies. It follows as well
that elevating the life of the unborn child over all other considerations is
utterly blind to its consequences for the life of the species, as well as the
life of the biosphere as a whole. For sexually active people, a “pro-life”
position is actually “pro-death,” for it favors human reproduction at the
expense of all other forms of life, and, in the end, at the expense of human
life as well. Neither the “pro-choice” nor the “pro-life” viewpoint can be
very persuasive today.
The same blind spot appears as well in discussions about the falling
birth rate in the developed world. Demographers, policymakers, and
journalists often ponder what it means that women in the industrialized
nations seldom bear children at a rate that would replace the current population. That fact leads to questions about how to support increasingly
elderly populations on the labor of a diminishing workforce, for example,
or how to provide new incentives for women to reproduce. But few participants in this discussion mention that a lower birth rate is a good thing
ecologically speaking, that it may be a sign that some people are awake to
the challenges facing us and are acting responsibly.136
This blind spot in our thinking shows up even in contexts that supposedly encourage environmental responsibility. Websites that help you
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calculate your carbon footprint, for example, include all kinds of details
about the gas mileage on your car, how much you travel by air, or how
much energy you use to heat your home, but they seldom ask whether or
not you have decided to bear children. That concern evidently just doesn't
figure into our thinking, even in eco-friendly circles. The neglect of this
question permeates our culture from start to finish, from top to bottom.
Either we're afraid to raise the question or it just doesn't occur to us.
What will happen when we break this silence is a good question.
Although it will no doubt be difficult to do so, we desperately need to
reexamine all of our attitudes and theories in this new light, to start thinking about our reproductive assumptions for a change. Here, as in so many
other areas, facing the consequences of climate change really does require
us to revise the most basic elements of our common culture. It's impossible to know in advance what new policies, theories, legal interpretations,
or actions that endeavor could lead to. The most fundamental working
hypothesis to guide us throughout that work, I would suggest, is that not
reproducing is the most ethical choice we can make today. The burden of
proof, the challenge of providing a clear and thorough justification, falls
on those who would take the opposite course of action.
Because this is an immense topic, one that requires an extended and
focused public debate, I can only touch on a few themes in this brief discussion. Perhaps the most useful thing I can do here is raise a number of
the most likely objections to this argument and reply to each in turn.
The first objection might well be the most basic of all. Let's say a loving
couple shares a strong desire to bear children; why should they not satisfy that desire? But can our desire on its own justify a decision that may
cause environmental harm? Suppose someone with excellent taste and a
large income wishes to build a huge, beautiful, and inspiring home—one
that will have an enormous carbon footprint. Do we think that's ethically
acceptable? No doubt the wish to bear children is more defensible. But in
the end, unless the potential parents have something more than desire to
go on, they still haven't explained why their plans are ethical.
Evangelical Christians and conservative Jews (among others) might
insist that God himself has commanded us to reproduce. According to the
book of Genesis, as soon as God created human beings, he told them, “Be
fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion
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over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living
thing that moves upon the earth.”137 In effect, God wanted human beings
to participate in the process of creation, to extend his founding act over
generations of procreation. So far, humanity has fulfilled this command
very well indeed: have we not filled the earth and subdued everything
that moves? In fact, haven't we already exceeded the earth's capacity to
sustain us? Aren't we in the process of subduing even the climate itself?
Should we go right ahead and help kill the Earth? Doing so would hardly
keep faith with a command that sees us as part of the creation, not the
agency of its destruction. To reproduce unthinkingly would hardly do
justice to the divine plan.
Some might object that if everyone chose not to reproduce, before
long the human race would come to an end. They have a good point. If
this practice became truly universal across all humanity and were sustained long enough, it would indeed result in the end of the species. If
the ideas outlined here became widespread enough to influence a good
part of the human race, we'd obviously need to collaborate intelligently
as a species to reduce our numbers while still guaranteeing our survival.
Anyone who feels responsibility for the fate of all life must greet the prospect of such a development with joy, not dismay; if we as the human race
proved ourselves capable of cooperating for such a purpose, we would
at last demonstrate that we had grasped our place within the network of
life and were capable of acting accordingly. Until then, individual actions
will have a very positive impact in their own right. The point is not to
end reproduction forever for the entire species, but to make a difference in humanity's impact on the biosphere now, at a moment when it
really counts.
Some people raise a much more mundane objection, arguing that
they would like to have kids who could take care of them in old age. One
problem with this idea, of course, is that parents cannot know whether
their children will live nearby or have the time or inclination to help
out. Moreover, having kids for personal convenience scarcely takes into
account the situation of other people, much less the good of the biosphere; it places one's own potential interest above the survival of all
others. Finally, and most crucially, it takes for granted that there will be
a future to worry about in the first place. If everybody reproduces in this
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way and continues to live this kind of life, the last thing to worry about
is how we'll do after we retire; at that rate, having kids will help destroy
our chances for a peaceful old age. These reflections apply as well to the
argument often cited in the United States that we need to raise children
so they can pay into Social Security and Medicare. But why would we
worry about one version of the future—the financial support for us after
we retire—if we will not trouble ourselves about another—the consequences of climate change? It would be far more ethical for us to put the
interest of all humanity above our own, not have children, and save up
enough money over our working years to support ourselves in old age. If
we're truly self-interested, let's do the work ourselves. And if we're looking for personal support as we age, we should build an active, loving community of friends and neighbors where we live.
Ecologically minded parents might insist that their kids will grow
up as good citizens of the Earth. They will use less energy than others,
recycle carefully, and do all they can to support the environmental cause.
All that may be true, but even responsible adults in the United States still
cause more damage to the climate than nearly anyone elsewhere in the
world, far more than the biosphere can sustain. Even when we are doing
our best, we do very badly indeed. Adding more people to the equation won't help.
But these parents have one more idea. What if one of their kids turns
out to be a genius who comes up with the technological invention that
will save the world? But this rationale falls apart almost immediately.
The very notion that we should wait for such an invention is part of the
problem in the first place; it encourages us to keep going with business as
usual while engineers come up with clever schemes to get us out of our
dilemma. That plan will get us nowhere fast. Moreover, any child born in
2015 won't be ready to reveal her invention until, say, 2040—far too late
to prevent serious harm to the planet.
Some potential parents might ask whether it would be ethical not
to reproduce but to adopt children. Wouldn't it be fine to raise children that others brought into the world? Judging by basic principles,
it might be. But because American couples are increasingly adopting
children from around the world, where the average carbon footprint is
relatively small, in effect they are greatly increasing the lifetime impact
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of those children on the environment. Whether we have given birth to
children is less crucial than whether we replicate our destructive habits in
another generation.
Parents who already have little ones might object that this argument
ultimately accuses them of doing wrong. But this argument does not
lead to such a conclusion at all. Most people in our society have never
given this viewpoint a moment's thought; accordingly, we can't assume
that parents have deliberately chosen to put their wishes above the future
good of humanity. People are not to be accused if they have transgressed
a principle of which they are unaware. Once they have heard this argument, however, we might wish to hold them accountable, at least to justify their eventual decision. But doing so is not the same as making parents feel guilty for loving children they already have.
Others might comment that choosing not to reproduce reveals a subtle hatred of humankind, a sneaky sort of misanthropy. In fact, the opposite is true: those who choose not to reproduce place the future interests
of humanity—as well as the Earth's living systems—above selfish considerations. Doesn’t that sound more like the love of humanity? But it's
worth pausing to take this objection literally. If we love dogs, for example,
does it follow that we'd like to see, say, eight billion dogs roaming the
planet? If not, does that make us dog haters? Not likely.
The same response goes for the idea that this ethical position somehow reflects a hatred of children. This objection is no more convincing
than the previous one, but it has the great merit of bringing a basic question to our attention. If we are quite sure that the biosphere will be in
worse shape over the coming decades, that our society will suffer enormously as a result, and that those in the next generation will face increasing difficulties as time goes by, is it more responsible to bring children
into the world to face all these challenges—or not to do so? Is it an act of
love to choose a difficult life for those who have no say in the matter? Is it better to give kids the gift of life, whatever difficulties they might face, or to
protect the unborn from the potential disaster to come? Needless to say,
we should bless the life of children who are already with us. We should do
everything we can to help our young descendants thrive. But choosing
a tough life for people before bringing them into the world is an entirely
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different matter. In fact, it is far more an act of true love for the unborn
not to force them to accept a difficult life.
What about those who love children but choose not to bear their
own? They have many opportunities they might pursue: they can work
in professions that allow them to care for infants, the young and growing, the curious and learning, training them to live and thrive responsibly.
These adults can heal kids when they are sick, coach them as they play,
and include them in a range of adult activities where doing so might be
fruitful for all.
No doubt people might object in further ways, but in the end nearly
all these replies boil down to the first one I discussed above. I'd like to
return to it and ponder a somewhat more aggressive version, one that
might reveal the stakes of this discussion even more clearly.
Very well, someone might say. Not reproducing may make sense for
most people, but my partner and I are well-educated, well-off, and capable of protecting our children from whatever happens down the road.
Why shouldn't we have children if we want to? (Or, conversely, someone
might say: My partner and I are quite poor, and the only profound joy in
our lives is the opportunity to have children and raise them. Why deny us
this joy if we have so little else?) The answer, as I have suggested above,
is that our lives do not simply belong to us; whatever we do contributes
to our common problem or its solution. To think we can do what we like
while the rest of the world collapses is to see ourselves as a sublime exception, figures of total privilege. This is at once naive—since no one is truly
such an exception—and hopelessly selfish.
Such a response ultimately reveals a willingness to sacrifice the wellbeing of others for the sake of one's children. That attitude is just beneath
the surface in much of American life. Occasionally American-produced
movies capitalize on this feeling, inviting audiences to adopt as their own
the belief that defending one's children justifies very threatening behavior. In Flightplan, starring Jodie Foster, a woman does everything she can
think of—including releasing the oxygen masks and turning off the lights
in the passenger section of the aircraft on which she is flying—to distract the crew while she looks for her lost child. John Q, starring Denzel
Washington, tells the story of an African American father who invades
a hospital demanding an operation for his son. Neither of these movies
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descends into celebrating aggression for its own sake, but each champions the notion that it is acceptable to frighten or threaten other people
for the purpose of caring for one's child.138
These movies deserve credit for telling a certain truth about American
culture. They cast light on the blind spot in our political thinking, showing that we don't give much credence to the notion that we all benefit
from arrangements of mutual self-interest. Self-interest turns into something much uglier when children are at stake: it turns out that the child is
so sacred that his or her well-being is more important than the interests
of others. In comparison to the child, social relations are so much chaff to
be tossed into the wind. In daily life, this attitude is expressed in the willingness of many of us to buy the biggest, baddest SUV we can find to protect our kids from harm. If we get in a crash, it's the other guy who will suffer, not us. We may even imagine that we show love for our kids precisely
through this willingness to make sure that other people will die first. But
because in doing so we are potentially harming others to protect those
we choose to bring into the world, our attitude reveals that we will give
up others for the sake of our own priorities. What's worse, the logic of
this sort of selfishness collapses very quickly. When the SUV's emissions
help destroy the biosphere, it's not just the other guy's biosphere that will
go. What then? We may think we're looking out for our own interests by
driving the biggest, safest vehicle on the roads, but in the long run we're
destroying our own lives and those of our children, too. Ultimately, this
sort of attitude reveals that strange paradox: a self-destructive selfishness.
When we insist on our abstract liberties, on our right to destroy, we are
also choosing to destroy ourselves and those we love.
This general attitude has taken on a kinder, gentler form in Cormac
McCarthy's novel The Road.139 This novel suggests that it is a praiseworthy
endeavor for a father to guide his son through a world bereft of any form
of life and devoid of any kind of food except for canned goods stored here
or there in ruined dwellings—or murdered human beings. Such a world
promises no future for any living thing, yet we are asked to admire the
effort of raising the son and passing him down to a nonexistent future.
Instead of suggesting that it might be acceptable to torch the world for
the sake of the son, as violent selfishness would have it, this story suggests
that even if the world has already been torched, we should still bear and
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raise children. But because the world of that novel could never exist—
for without other living things, human beings would have little oxygen
to breathe—it is finally a metaphor for our world, and thus encourages
us to think that even if the planet is dying, we should bear children just
as before. In the world of the novel, such a belief is delusional: it is truly
horrific to usher a child into a dead future. In our world, that belief is far
more harmful, for it allows us to comfort ourselves that even if we are
contributing to the planet's decline, we are still good people—because
we are bearing and caring for children. But in that case, having kids helps
us avoid facing the real ethics of our choices. In its gentler way, The Road
also reinforces a mode of ecocidal parenting.
Since we Americans now live in a society everywhere shaped by these
ideas, since our destructive impact on the planet's life continues to grow
apace even after we have become aware of that fact, we who wish to preserve a future must consider adopting the opposite point of view—one
that places the interest of the biosphere above our own wishes. Instead
of raising a beloved child in a ruined world, our better option is to raise
no children at all—on a thriving, beautiful, and beloved planet. It might
sound like the basis for that choice is a joyous selflessness, an utterly
altruistic commitment to the life of others. No doubt about it, this choice
is altruistic. But only this choice preserves a future for ourselves as well.
Only in a thriving biosphere can we live out our lives in the way we might
imagine. Choosing otherwise might be selfish, but it would also be suicidal—or at least would kill the future.
I admit that it is more than a little paradoxical not to have children at
the same time as choosing for the future. After all, children have always
served as the very emblems of the future, the embodiment of what is
coming next, the carrier of what will be. Nevertheless, a choice not to
have children today will make it possible for that understanding of children to return someday. Once we actually transform our culture so that
we do not eat the Earth as a matter of course, then we can restore the
ancient alignment between sustainability and reproduction. A choice not
to reproduce would make that eventual alignment possible.
What would be the cultural consequences if many Americans took
this ethics as their own? It goes without saying that it would transform
our basic assumptions and practices almost across the board. We'd end
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up living through a whole array of odd demographic realities that we
would need to consider carefully in advance. For many people, it would
be hard to explain what all the effort is for—all that hard work—if they
can't come home to their kids. The children are the whole point; they,
and the home of which they are a part, constitute a relief from professional stresses, a refuge from the rat race, a haven in a heartless world, and
a hope for something more. If that is the case, they already help us endure
what we see as unendurable or at least as not terribly delightful. But is it
really impossible to think otherwise, to stop splitting our lives between
the difficulty of labor and the joy of family? Can't we reimagine our working day so that it, too, can become a source of pleasure and joy? Must the
experience of family be private, enclosed, aloof? Or can it be found in
collaboration with other adults, in less private settings, and in common
endeavors that also speak of a hope for something more?
Similar questions arise around our attitudes toward the communities
in which we live. If you ask people why they live where they do, in many
cases they'll explain that their town isn't all that interesting or thriving,
but it's a nice place to raise kids. This answer says a lot: it suggests that
people are capable of putting up with the absence of urban pleasures they
might desire so they can raise their children in peace. But if they did not
have kids and thus had to face the reality of life in the town more squarely,
what might they ask it to become? What kinds of events and activities
might they create? How might the entire community be transformed?
Some of our basic attitudes suggest that we merely tolerate our workplaces and communities and give our real love to our partners and children. What would happen if we stopped segregating our lives in this way
and expanded the range of our affections? What if we treated all the arenas in which we live with love and care, seeing those domains as the carriers of our future, the embodiment of our hopes? What if we extended
this care to our local ecosystems, and beyond that to the biosphere itself?
Why don't we already do so today?
Taking the climate crisis seriously forces us to rethink our most fundamental attitudes. It asks us to contemplate what might seem impossible—to question the core loyalties by which we live. If we hesitate to
go that far, to question that deeply, we show that we finally do not care
all that much about the future of the biosphere or indeed about how
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our own lives may go a couple decades from now. We demonstrate that
we think our lives are really about us and are indifferent to the ruins of
the future. Most of us would not choose to live that way—but we may
not really wish to cast off that attitude entirely, either. Climate change
forces us to choose; its potential severity has the power to concentrate
our minds. When it does so, it may inspire us to rethink entire areas of
our culture, reexamine what family means, imagine a new relationship to
place, reinvent our jobs and communities, and sustain a new relation to
the biosphere. But how could it be otherwise? If the very context of our
lives is at stake, to do it justice demands that we consider reinventing it
all, from top to bottom. If we are to begin the task of owning the disaster
we are already causing and make reparation to the biosphere as a result,
we can do nothing less.
Notes
135. Paul A. Murtaugh and Michael G. Schlax, “Reproduction and the Carbon
Legacies of Individuals,” Global Environmental Change volume 19, issue 1
(February 2009): 14–20, available as a pdf document online. The quoted
statement appears on page 18. The authors argue that working through
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female lineages will allow them to “obtain an estimate of the total number of
person years, male and female, that are traceable to the ancestral female” (16).
136. A key exception is Bill McKibben, who discusses the ecological consequences
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1998). As the book's title suggests, McKibben gently suggests that parents
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of having none.
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Nelson & Sons, Old Testament portions copyright 1952).
138. Flightplan, directed by Robert Schwentke, 2005; John Q , directed by John
Cassavetes, 2002. John Q goes out of its way to play fair: the father removes
all bullets from his weapon in advance, ends up winning the support of all
his “hostages,” shows he is willing to kill himself if need be to supply the
heart for his child, becomes a heroic figure for the crowd—and television
audience—witnessing the ordeal, and is ultimately sentenced to serve time
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for what he did. The harm he has done seems to disappear under all these
considerations. Yet the fact remains he does resort to the apparent threat of
violence to save his son—and the movie assumes that almost everyone will
sympathize with him.
139. Cormac McCarthy, The Road (New York: Vintage, 2006).
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The God of the Whirlwind
Taking our current situation seriously requires us to reexamine our political and ethical understanding of our ordinary practices, our life decisions,
our relationship to others and to all earthly life. It asks us to reimagine
what we do and who we are across the entire range of our experience. As I
have suggested, it even requires us to own disaster—to put the enormous
environmental crisis to our own account, take responsibility for what is
unfolding, and to begin the endless task of making reparation.
But as I have suggested, in taking this last, most difficult step, we must
also affirm our place within the planetary and biological history that produced us. To assume responsibility for the disaster we are causing, we
must also affirm much else: the debt we owe to the forces that created us,
to the web of life of which we are a part.
As a result, the ethical stance I outlined above speaks also of an unreserved affirmation of those forces that ultimately reach far beyond ourselves—those aspects of the natural world that are so vast, wild, and
violent that we can only submit to them in genuine humility. That affirmation, however, stretches well beyond a discussion of ethics per se; it raises
questions that deserve their own treatment, challenging us with dilemmas we can understand only if we pause to consider them in their own
right. If we are to absorb the full impact of climate change on our humanity, then, we need to move beyond the framework of political and ethical
action and contemplate another set of questions, traditionally addressed
through mythology, theology, and philosophy: What forces ultimately
constitute our world, and how should we respond to them? Now that we
live in a world without guarantees, possibly without a future that is livable to us, what stories should we tell about our condition? What is our
place in the cosmos?
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In this domain, as in all others, the near inevitability of severe climate
change alters everything. The religious reassurances that once shaped
many of the world's cultures no longer hold true—or at least not in the
same way as before. In fact, the discoveries of climatology over the past
two or three decades only sharpen what had already become a strong
sense of the vulnerability of the world.
Over the course of the eighteenth century, geologists learned that
Earth's history was immensely vaster than they previously suspected, that
ordinary physical processes, extended over many millions of years, had
given the planet's surface its present shape. Confronted with this “dark
abyss of time,” they could hardly encourage their audience to sustain a
familiar sense of humanity's place within the history of life.140 Cataclysms
and mass extinctions, it turned out, were ordinary events; as I will discuss
below, the guarantees of the rainbow covenant, in which God promises
Noah never again to unleash a flood to destroy his creation, were put into
question. Furthermore, since so much of the geological record bore no
trace of humanity, it was no longer clear that the creation centered around
human beings. This sense of human vulnerability strengthened further
over the course of the nineteenth century, especially as Charles Darwin
and Alfred Russel Wallace found a core mechanism—natural selection—
that could drive the evolution of species and extended that mechanism to
human beings. The twentieth century added many new elements to this
emerging picture, notably when scientists proposed a theory of plate tectonics according to which the continents had broken away from a single
primordial landmass and drifted to their present positions. The ground
beneath our feet, it turned out, also moved, floating on the molten heat
within the Earth.
But that is not all: in more recent decades, scientists have learned
how regularly the Earth's climate has flipped back and forth between relative cold and heat, creating the conditions for ice ages and for temperate eras. At times, the Earth has been almost entirely covered in ice and
snow and at others has sustained warm temperatures from pole to pole.
The changes in the Earth's distance from the sun or in the tilt of its axis
have routinely generated alterations in the planet's dynamic systems, producing positive feedback loops that over time cause a general warming
or cooling of the atmosphere.141 As a result of all these waves of scientific
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inquiry, we now have a broad sense of how Earth's dynamic systems are in
constant transformation. The planet itself wobbles; the continents move;
cataclysms come and go; the species appear and disappear; and the ice
visits and departs. Everything ceaselessly changes.
The fact that some version of our species has lived on this planet
through so many changes may give us hope. After all, if we've survived
several previous big swings in the climate, it seems likely we will endure
the challenges to come in the next several centuries. An enormous resilience is our ancient inheritance; it may have arisen precisely so that we
could cope with very rapid, climate-driven shifts to our ecosystems.142
We may have evolved to handle challenges something like those we'll face
in the coming era. Because of our intelligence and extreme adaptability,
we're a tough species to eradicate. That thought, of course, can hardly
comfort us as individuals; the species will endure even if virtually all of
us are wiped out, even if most people—and most societies—disappear.
But even these reflections scarcely do justice to the full import of
what we face. Our evolutionary history is hardly the proper context for
interpreting the present moment, for this time, rather than merely adapting to the climate change we face, we will have caused it. As I suggested
earlier, that fact shows how little we respect the web of life from which
we arose. Neither God nor Darwin, neither creation nor evolution, put us
where we are today; we got here because we violated the limits imposed
on us by the divine command or by our place within living systems. Thus
it is entirely fitting that those who wish to honor the divine command,
including Jewish, Catholic, and evangelical Christian leaders, call on us
to do all we can not to contribute to climate change and to act with compassion for those who will be most harmed by it.143
Our actions to this point, however, have placed us in an unprecedented position. Over two decades ago, Bill McKibben rightly commented that because of climate change, we were no longer living in what
we could call nature, in a world in which some ecosystems could thrive
without a human imprint. Climate change shapes the conditions of life
for all creatures, which cease as a result to be fully wild. In effect, he suggested, we are witnessing the end of nature.144 Geologists designate this
fact in their own way: in their view, we are moving from the Holocene
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into the Anthropocene, the era in which human activities determine the
context of existence for all living things.
But if nature ends in one sense, it endures in another. Although we
may erase a nature free of human influence, nature nevertheless persists
in altered form. Our activities may ultimately force massive changes to
the planet's dynamic systems, but those systems, accepting the new conditions of the biosphere, will go on doing their work. In its new mode,
nature may no longer be “wild” in the sense that it is free of human interference. But because it is far outside our control, threatens the built environment in which we live, and indeed promises to shatter the cultural
continuity we take for granted, it may be even more “wild” in the rather
different sense that it is now excessively powerful and seemingly hostile
to human concerns. We may ultimately have given nature a new guise as
something even less hospitable to us than before, something far more
capable of reminding us of our weakness and vulnerability.
Most of the time our discussions of climate change ask how we might
endure in this new world by focusing on practical, technological, and ethical questions. But as I suggested a moment ago, we do not live only on
those levels. We cannot grasp our situation through a bare rendition of
the facts; we need stories, figures, parables—in short, myths—to make
our reality come fully alive to us, to make it possible for us to do justice
to our moment. The point, of course, would not be to replicate the stories by which we once lived; the myths we need today might well contest,
undercut, or even destroy those familiar tales, revealing why they are no
longer credible, no longer in some sense true. What stories might we tell
to interpret our place in this wild domain?
One story could be the history of a mind-boggling error whereby we
ruined the Earth's living systems for all creatures. This would be a fairly
implausible new story of a fall, in which we once again commit a great
crime and are cast out of Eden—this time, the garden of the planet's living systems over the last ten millennia.
Or we might prefer to tell the story as a tragedy. In one version, we
could narrate how the technologies that enabled us to liberate ourselves
from an ancient scarcity also proved to be our undoing. In a more sweeping rendition, we would see our actions as another episode in a much
longer history of human ineptitude, achieving a tragic knowledge of
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the self-defeating, obtuse, and pathological dimensions of humanity. In
either form, that story would allow us to affirm our history in the midst
of defeat, for rather than merely denouncing our actions, it would find
moral complexity in them, discerning a certain dignity even in our capacity to recognize that hubris.145
We could also move to a more visceral mode of affirmation; by telling
this story as dark comedy, we could put to test the power to laugh at our
radical folly. In doing so, we might learn how to endure the world we created through our great crime, to accept the unacceptable, to explode its
pain through a burst of laughter. Through these and other tales we could
carry out the gesture I mentioned near the end of chapter nine, daring to
affirm the nullity that we are.
Writing at an earlier but comparable moment in the wake of
Hiroshima and Auschwitz, Samuel Beckett explored a version of this
emotional terrain. In Waiting for Godot and Endgame, he gave us masterworks of bleak farce, of hopeless slapstick, where nearly every sign of life
has departed, divine promises are never to be fulfilled, and the routines
of everyday life expand to fill an utterly pointless passage of time.146 In
these plays, comedy verges on making the human condition tolerable
not by enabling us to affirm it outright, but far more subtly to make our
peace with it by affirming it as laughable. Our situation may be hopelessly
ridiculous, but it is one we can recognize, reenact, and through comedy,
accept as our own. In these plays, we can glimpse laughter's ability to reconcile us with nearly every sort of folly and degradation.
But these plays also go a step further, showing us characters who can
no longer laugh, who are no longer moved by their stories, who have
lost their pleasure in rehearsing their condition; they give us moments
when even comedy fails. If laughter in some sense affirms life and helps
us go on, the radical absence of a future (especially visible in Endgame)
threatens laughter itself, inspiring characters—and members of the audience—to ponder, in the midst of laughing, whether they should laugh at
all. These plays put us on the edge of a condition after comedy, one that
even its subtle stratagems cannot redeem.
What would a similar take on our present dilemma look like? Perhaps
the best attempt so far is T.C. Boyle's A Friend of the Earth, which features
a group of ecological activists whose attempts to save the world have
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gone astray and whose excessive love or anger wreaks havoc on their own
lives.147 Placed partly in the past, in the era of 1980's eco-terrorism, and
partly in the future, when severe climate change has set in for good, the
book acknowledges the attempt to bring about political transformation
more openly than Beckett does but renders it comically, as if even activism is ludicrous. We could object that treating activism in this way comes
close to authorizing passivity and indifference, but instead, as the novel
looks back on those efforts from a defeated future, it makes comedy the
antidote to a potentially overriding sense of political despair, treating
even failure as part of a ridiculous and ultimately comic condition. The
novel does not shrink from depicting that utter defeat, imagining a world
when most large nonhuman animals are extinct or greatly endangered,
fiercely intense storms are commonplace, and the forests of the American
West have fallen to the earth. Yet because the book is set in a world without ecological hope, it sharpens the perspective of comedy, daring us to
laugh precisely at what is irredeemable, to affirm our truly grotesque folly.
The novel focuses on the misadventures of a familiar comic type—an
aging, easily enraged, sexually manipulable, often drunk white man who
is well-meaning and truly loving but whose decisions almost always go
wrong. By centering on this character, Boyle invites us to view the world
of the novel through a position of radical error and ineptitude, using the
ancient comic strategy of regarding the world from below, from that irrepressibly impulsive, desiring, persistent dimension of us that, no matter
how much it might whine and complain, still endures. Here, as so often,
comedy might evade a full confrontation with disaster, indulging in a literary stylization of loss, but in doing so it makes loss livable. It demonstrates how human beings might adapt to an impossible world through an
entertaining performance that conquers defeat itself through the minor
powers of self-mockery and absurdist play. If activism cannot ward off the
ruins, laughter can convert them into the material of an art.
But even comedy has its limits. Boyle is less honest than Beckett,
for he does not directly stage the possibility that the shtick will get old,
that the laughter may ring a bit hollow, that the absurd life it celebrates
may not go on. If we are to live in the ruins, we need something more,
something beyond all the genres I have mentioned so far—a kind of
wild mythology, and perhaps even a mad theology, for the ruins. Tragedy
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and comedy, in particular, are preoccupied with the task of affirming in
retrospect the nullity of human being. But the challenge today is also to
acknowledge and in some sense affirm the more intimidating, threatening, even disastrous face of nature. Comprehending the latter theme will
no doubt require understanding its significance for us, to keep its impact
on human beings in focus as well. Nevertheless, doing so forces us to venture beyond ourselves, to take up once again the ancient myths regarding
the stability of the creation itself.
The best strategy to pursue in this regard might be to return to the
theme I explored above, the transformation of nature into a force even
more wild and implacable than before. What are the mythological overtones to such a shift? At first, the very attempt to interpret nature in these
terms might seem impossible; the realities of Earth's systems no longer
address us in an unequivocal voice. Thanks to climate change, nature no
longer seems mythic to us, anchored in primordial, archaic truths; it is
now historical, and like our built environment is a product of human
activity. Virtually nothing in our experience now falls outside the realm
of human history, thriving in a domain we cannot harm. Accordingly, we
might imagine that nature's voice has fallen silent, that the old gods are
dead. But as I suggested earlier, nature is not merely submissive to our
will; our intervention, in fact, has caused its dynamic forces to become
more powerful, less predictable, and thus more openly capable of defying
human expectation.
As a result, we find ourselves in unprecedented spiritual terrain. The
sacred is no longer what it used to be, but it has not simply disappeared.
We might say that, like the climate itself, it has transformed. But how
should we interpret that transformation? Should we imagine that divine
forces have taken on a new shape and will henceforth reveal themselves
to us with particularly terrifying features? No doubt those features will
indeed terrify us. But if they do so, these gods are not all that unfamiliar
after all. Encountering them, we may discern the return of the dark gods
once defeated by the relatively humane divinities that have ruled over
us for millennia. In forcing our way into a strange future, we may have
revived a forgotten stage of our past.
Let me here take up the language of the central tradition of the west,
the tradition that has informed all the Abrahamic religions—Judaism,
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Christianity, and Islam. While the mythologies of Greece and Rome told
how a given generation of the gods (the Titans, for example) were displaced by another (the Olympians), we seldom imagine that the God of
the Abrahamic religions arose within any such sequence. But the early
chapters of Genesis describe a sequence of another kind, a transformation in God's attitudes toward his creation. We may be used to the story
that God created the world in seven days and blessed his creation outright. But we might forget that before long, in later chapters of that story,
he became horrified at human sin and repented of creating humankind
at all—and accordingly chose to drown the Earth and nearly all living
beings beneath the waters of the flood (see Genesis, chapter 6). The God
of creation, it turns out, is also the God of the deluge—one who at times
utterly hates what he has created. Perhaps this deep ambivalence is intrinsic to omnipotent power: any power that can create can also destroy. But
in that case, we are not secure in our status as creatures, for at any time
God can blot us out as well. No theology can come to rest on the presence of the creation itself, for the God that brought it into being can annihilate it in a moment.
Thus the key moment in the Genesis story takes place neither at the
creation nor the flood but immediately after the floodwaters recede.148
After leaving the ark, Noah offers a burnt sacrifice to God; in response,
God promises never again to destroy the world, vowing that “[w]hile the
earth remains, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night, shall not cease” (8:22) and places a rainbow in the
cloud as a “sign of the covenant” between himself and “all flesh that is
upon the earth” (9:17).149 Here, the God who has the continual option
to destroy the world renounces doing so forever. Only because of this act
can his creatures finally have confidence that the creation they know will
endure. The most reassuring act is not the creation itself but the divine
vow never again to undo it. The core founding moment, in effect, is the
rainbow covenant.
What, then, are we to make of the fact that disasters and cataclysms
of many kinds have taken place again and again over the history of the
Earth? As I mentioned above, modern geological knowledge casts doubt
on the rainbow covenant. It suggests that we have always been abandoned
to history, living in a world without guarantees. In mythological terms,
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the world is under the sway of the God of creation and the God of the deluge—that ambivalent, dark figure who makes no promises. Nevertheless,
we could argue that our sense of this dark God has retreated into a distant
past, for it was once superseded by our trust in the kinder, gentler God of
the covenant, whose promises seem to have been realized in the relatively
stable biosphere of the Holocene. We could, in effect, match up the history of the covenant and of the Earth, construing God's promise as an
appropriate sign of the very livable world we have enjoyed over the past
ten millennia.
But in that case, our exit from the Holocene into the Anthropocene
raises new questions. Now that our own actions will almost inevitably
cause far more difficult living conditions, leading to drought, famine,
and natural disasters of many kinds, we threaten to carry out the material
equivalent of cancelling the covenant all by ourselves and of unleashing
again the God of the deluge. Such a possibility is quite relevant in our
moment because a countervailing belief in this covenant can inspire us
to deny that human beings have any such power and thus to negate the
reality of climate change itself. If we believe that God created the world
and made the rainbow covenant with all living beings, we have a strong
basis for repudiating climate change. Take as an example the statement of
John Shimkus, Republican member of Congress from the state of Illinois.
Speaking before the House Energy Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment in March 2009, Shimkus quoted Genesis 8:22, the verse I
cited a moment ago, and continued, “I believe that is the infallible word
of God, and that's the way it is going to be for his creation. The earth will
end only when God declares its time to be over. Man will not destroy this
earth. This earth will not be destroyed by a flood.”150
Although referring to the rainbow covenant in the midst of discussions of climate change may be unusual, we should take this gesture seriously. The passage on the covenant is a central statement on the viability
of creation within the religious and cultural traditions of the West. If we
are to understand the mythic resonances of climate change, we simply
must grapple with that covenant's implications. Doing so may make us
uncomfortable; after all, the rainbow covenant was not conditional on
human behavior, for it constituted an outright promise to all creation.
The possibility we could undermine the security of the creation, then,
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challenges divine power, as if we are in the midst of wrenching the ability
to destroy the Earth out of God's hands. In his own way, Mr. Shimkus has
accurately identified the aspect of climate change that threatens to undercut one version of traditional belief.
We could object that climate change does not undo that covenant; we
are merely changing the climate, not destroying it. But if we take the further details of the covenant seriously, we cannot sustain this position. In
fact, climate change will destroy “seedtime and harvest” in many places;
what we now recognize as winter is likely to retreat ever further toward
the poles, leaving more and more of us in a seasonal cycle quite unlike
what we knew before—in an oscillation not between “cold and heat,” but
between warmth and blistering heat. Furthermore, climate change will
increase the intensity of atmospheric systems, unleashing much more
powerful storms and making destructive floods far more likely. This is
not the world guaranteed by the covenant. However impossible it may
be to conceive, then, we have dispensed with the relatively kinder God of
the covenant and revived that earlier, dark God, opting for a less friendly,
more demented divinity—as if, in pagan terms, we have moved from the
Olympians back to the Titans. We have embraced a far more difficult fate.
Some might protest that climate change is merely a consequence of
human action, another example of how sin corrupts the creation, and
that it cannot alter God's power over us. But in the covenant, God takes
charge over the future health of the creation; he does not concede to us
any power to alter it through the sheer abundance of our sins. Others
may object that God is allowing global warming to happen as a judgment on our actions; he promised to sustain the seasons “[w]hile the
earth remains,” so the warping of the seasons might mean that the earth
will not remain, that we are witnessing a slow-motion end of the world,
a strange but legitimate version of God's judgment on humankind. But
the Bible always attributes the timing and substance of the final judgment
to God himself, never suggesting that human beings through their own
actions might force that judgment to take place. If God is allowing the
end of the world to unfold, he is a mere figurehead, for that judgment is
coming down upon us without his needing to do a thing.
These interpretations of the covenant, however, ultimately distract
us from how it is being used in the current debate. Mr. Shimkus quotes
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the key verse and insists on its infallible truth in order to argue against
any effort to ward off climate change. It won't happen, so we need do
nothing about it. Case closed. The irony is thus quite stark: the more we
believe that God guarantees the continuity of Earth's living systems, the
less responsibility we take for them and the more we destroy them. Here,
a reliance on biblical mythology is actually pernicious, justifying a great
transgression against the divine command that we exercise stewardship
over the creation.
But Representative Shimkus is not the only person caught in a contradiction. What about a position that does insist on stewardship—but
also admits that the covenant no longer holds? In that case, what divine
injunction are we carrying out if we hold firmly to the notion we must
be responsible to all life? We may end up in a dilemma opposite to that
of Mr. Shimkus, carrying out our role as stewards of the Earth in the
absence of a covenant. We would find ourselves complying with an ethics
that has no divine foundation and on an Earth that may not be subject to
our control.
How might we resolve this contradiction? We could argue that the
absence of that divine foundation actually makes our stewardship necessary; if God is totally in charge of the creation, what could we possibly do
to assist him? Our activity matters precisely because there is no transcendental guarantee that all will be well. Our ethical orientation would thus
arise not from a divine command but from our responsibility to the web
of life from which we arose. We could do without God—and without a
story of the creation—and still have a strong basis for doing justice to our
fellow creatures.
This is the kind of ethical position that arises from a secular and scientific interpretation of our moment. But it does not fully take the measure
of the mythic, theological challenge; because it tells no story, it leaves us
without a language in which to depict our most fundamental situation.
Would it be possible to resolve the contradiction in another way—one
that takes seriously the presence of more-than-human forces, whatever
they may be?
As it turns out, in looking at this split between the creation and a
workable ethics, we are thinking about questions already asked elsewhere
in the Bible, particularly in the book of Job. The book of Genesis need
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not be our only mythic reference in the Jewish and Christian scriptures,
for the latter includes many texts and places them all within a complex,
creative tension—within a spacious spiritual legacy no single statement, however sophisticated, could ever capture. That diversity of statement, which arises from within a long and varied history, makes available a range of spiritual resources for people who live within varying
historical moments of their own, so that the book of Job, for example,
might become more relevant to us today than Genesis as we face our
own unique challenges. We who are the heirs of this tradition, whether
religious or secular, may thus draw on this often neglected rendition of
God to understand the face the world may take in the coming decades
and in this way to sustain something more than a pragmatic relation to
the infinite.
The story of Job is very simple: he is a just man, yet disaster strikes his
family and property and he is stricken with boils. Why did God do these
things to him? If there is some link between God's rule over the creation
and his respect for just action, then Job should not suffer. Yet clearly he
does. His friends sit with him and talk to him endlessly, coming up with
one explanation or another for his condition, exposing the vanity of all
human chatter. In the end, God himself appears to Job in a whirlwind
and addresses him, asking who he is to challenge what God does. Was
Job present when God laid the foundations of the earth or set bounds
for the sea? Can he tame Behemoth or lead Leviathan with a fishhook?
Job responds, “I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my
eye sees thee; therefore I despise myself, and repent in dust and ashes”
(42:5-6). Struck with awe at divine might, he gives up any claim to being
rewarded for his right action, humbles himself, and repents.
Job is the great biblical text that splits apart the wildness and terror
of the creation from any notion of divine justice. God is so powerful, so
stunning in what he achieves, that he need not pay any attention to human
concerns. We could regard this God as a kind of divine bully, a character
very fond of throwing his weight around. Or we could adopt a humbler
version of this interpretation, deciding out of an excess of piety not to
contradict God in any respect whatsoever, even if we have no idea how to
understand him. This latter stance seems to be orthodox, of course, but
its hasty submission hides an unstated resentment against the bully and
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thus surreptitiously agrees with the first, defiant response. But there is a
third option: perhaps the creation is so stunning, the beast Leviathan so
spectacularly terrifying, that we are genuinely moved, truly transported
with awe, and no longer care about our petty concerns. The creation is so
splendid that we renounce our longing to live in an ethical universe in the first
place. At that point, our previous complaints look foolish, and we repent
of even raising them in dust and ashes.151
This, I think, is the reading of Job that makes most spiritual sense. If
we take it seriously, though, it leads us far beyond the story of the creation, flood, and rainbow covenant. For one thing, this God doesn't
affirm the beauty of a creation that might submit meekly to human control; on the contrary, he celebrates the fire-breathing, iron-hearted, invulnerable monster Leviathan. In the old myths and rituals from which the
creation story comes, the heroic divine being produces our world by
defeating chaos—or in the Genesis version, that state in which “[t]he
earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the
deep” (1:2). The creator God is a tamer of chaos, a dragon slayer, a victor
over monsters; what's more, the God of the covenant promises never to
release the waters of the deep again, as if to reaffirm the original achievement of his creation. But in Job, God celebrates the monstrous. Not only
does this God show utter contempt for any covenant with human beings,
he points to his creation's terrifying power as the utmost sign of his sovereignty, indicating that the very thing that would violate the covenant
is the most divine thing about him. It's not as if this God would unleash
the flood because he despises human sin; on the contrary, he is indifferent to human assertion, for in the presence of his transcendental power,
any human act has virtually no significance. It would not do, then, to
regard him as the God of the deluge; he is even more threatening than
that dark being.152
It's worth remembering that this God declaims from amidst the whirlwind, as if to make absolutely clear that he is embodied in whatever is
most formless, threatening, and terrifying. But this God is even more terrifying than chaos, for his ability to defeat chaos and give it organic form
in the monster Leviathan shows he is stronger than monstrosity itself.
Rather than being a slayer of the formless, this God takes the formless as
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his form, takes delight in its destructive qualities, and thrusts them in the
face of complaining human beings.
Anyone who has encountered this God might have a few choice words
for Representative Shimkus. This God makes no kind promises; if anything, he authorizes his creation to humble humanity at any time. Under
his sway, disasters might indeed be ordinary events, and mass extinctions—and the emergence of all kinds of Leviathan-like creatures—
might become a regular part of Earth's history. I would thus suggest that
we should take this God as the exact mythological counterpart of the
forces that in the view of science have operated over the history of the
biosphere; there is in fact little difference between the attitude the God
of the whirlwind displays and the implicit tone of those dynamic systems.
In our time, the gap between a mythic and a materialist sense of those
superhuman forces has virtually disappeared. Both do their work on time
scales and with a power far beyond human imagining; both manifest a
chaotic inventiveness and casual destructiveness that dwarf our own; and
both, having produced humankind, are indifferent to our well-being. This
God would worry no more than biodynamic systems about the devastating consequences of climate change; if anything, to speak in mythological terms, he would point them out as further demonstrations of
his wild power.
It might be tempting to repudiate this God as a being who takes delight
in humiliating us. But if we responded in that way, we would not be true
to an important and revelatory dimension of ourselves, a dimension realized in Job's response. We love wild creatures; the great predators—lions,
cheetahs, tigers, sharks—move us beyond words. We take an astonished
delight in the furious power unleashed in tornadoes and hurricanes—in
the very forms that the God of Job chooses to clothe himself. When we
see such things, we know we are in the presence of something infinitely
greater than us, something that does not mind our concerns whatsoever.
In such moments, we might even feel an immense relief, knowing that we
will never experience the severe boredom and alienation of living within
an entirely controlled environment. Our awe tells us that we seek transcendence, that we rebel against the prospect of absolute human control.
We are grateful in knowing that Earth's living systems and nonhuman
creatures do not follow any moral norms, certainly not our own.153

202

Chapter 12

To some degree, then, we share the awe that moved Job to give up
his moral claim. Furthermore, as we look forward to the coming decades,
we must also recognize that the extraordinary forces that climate change
will release around the biosphere will inspire awe in us as well. However
devastating such forces will be, however greatly they will harm our societies and our individual lives, we can still recognize in them the signs of a
supreme power.
Thus our foray in the domain of myth, which can seem to take us far
afield from our core concerns, can in fact sharply transform and perhaps
even reverse an initial assessment of our condition. Our awe in the presence of this demented God—or of the implacable, anonymous forces
that this figure of God personifies—can enable us to make peace with our
cosmic inconsequence, affirm the absence of any moral concern in the
universe, and thus embrace the very features of our condition that might
otherwise fill us with despair. In a few years, we may, like the characters
in Beckett's Endgame, be numbed by the apparent futility of our actions
and the blank hostility of the natural world. The book of Job teaches us to
respond with awe instead—to see Earth's living systems and creatures as
inhuman, even monstrous, and for that reason all the more splendid. If we
move deeper into despair, as it were, and come out the other side, as Job
does, we will at last be released into a space much vaster than our petty
concerns and be stunned by a great splendor.
This release inevitably alters our sense of nearly all the themes I have
discussed so far in this book. The reversal from anguish to awe, bafflement into astonished humility, can take place only if we give up our fierce
arrogance, cosmic or otherwise. That renunciation, of course, would
inevitably motivate us to give up our habit of subordinating the biosphere to ourselves—to carry out, on a collective and individual level,
a truly ecological revolution. A transformative politics is the immediate
consequence of that spiritual breakthrough, for it would put into practice
the equivalent of Job's repentance.
That awe would also change our response to the consequences of
severe climate change. If that change should come, we would know our
actions helped trigger it—but we would also recognize that we did not
create the forces that it would unleash, forces that would perpetually
humble us with their power. Its onset would remind us that the very
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attempt to slay the dragon, to use the immense resources of the Earth for
our convenience, eventually unleashes it, making the Earth less habitable.
Our story would thus be much like Job's: by demanding that an indifferent universe comply with our expectations, we would have provoked it to
respond with a stunning violence that revealed our true place.
Such a transformation would not put our ethical orientation into
doubt but would actually give it new strength and sophistication. We
who inevitably lead intentional lives, filled with a sense of responsibility,
would learn not to expect that our intentions will also be those of the
universe. Giving up our cosmic arrogance, we would also renounce the
idea that our moral purposes for the cosmos will come true. If we choose
to assume responsibility for the environmental crisis now taking place
around the Earth, to own disaster, we would realize that this ethical act
does not make us masters of the situation, but the reverse, for it asks us
to do justice even when we are powerless to bend natural forces to our
will. We would thus act with justice not because the universe will reward
us or because everything will work out well for us if we do, but simply
because such action is the right thing to do. This renunciation would have
a double benefit: it would allow us to give the wildness of the world its
due, to pursue a truly ecological ethics of humility in the face of nature, as
I argued above, and would also relieve us of the notion that this wildness
will necessarily operate in a manner we might expect.154 We would thus
finally live with genuine humility, affirming through our actions our due
place in the creation.
Once we learned to live in this way, we might also finally place the
great emphasis on the future in its proper sphere—in the world of ordinary prudence, beyond which lies an entirely different level of concern.
We can and should still remain attentive to the practical matters of life,
including how we emit greenhouse gases and the consequences of doing
so for all forms of life. But beyond prudence lie the ultimate questions of
who we are and why we are here. Our pragmatic concern for the future
cannot eclipse the presence of forces that have always superseded us, that
have perpetually revealed our cosmic vulnerability.
Accepting this gap between ethics and the universe, between pragmatic concerns and a sense of the sacred, between prudence and awe,
we would also relinquish any myth, any religious teaching, that would
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attempt to unite the two. The rainbow covenant, however beautiful,
can hardly serve as a resource of consolation in our time. But stepping
beyond it is no small matter. If we do so, our entire sense of what religion
might offer us also changes; in fact, as I have suggested above, the awe
that arises out of the book of Job accords almost exactly with a humility
in the presence of what a materialist science teaches us to see. It does so
not because it finally reconciles faith and reason but because it pushes
beyond them, cracking open both religious and secular interpretations of
our condition. The God of the whirlwind demands that we give up any
confidence that the universe will comply with our expectations. Awe in
his presence obliterates those religious institutions that would translate
his power into human terms, that would capture his voice in specific
doctrines, and that would assure us of our place in an eventual cosmic
triumph. By the same token, an encounter with such dark forces reveals
there can be no ultimate basis for secular hope, no guarantee that utopia
will come to pass, no prospect of historical closure, and no certainty that
any political promise will come true. The same awe that destroys our religious arrogance would also demolish our confidence that through reason
we will conquer those forces that challenge us. Through the experience
of that awe, we would thus give up our confidence that God is a larger
version of ourselves or that by speaking in his name we can subdue our
fellow creatures—or that with greater effort we might gain a rational and
systematic control over every aspect of our fate. We would be in the presence of what defeats us and for that reason takes us beyond ourselves.
By accepting our defeat, we would at last become capable of witnessing the unutterable wildness at the heart of things, the biological exuberance (as Bruce Bagemihl calls it) that proliferates in sheer crazy inventiveness and raucous excess without rhyme or reason, without hope of
explanation.155 That wildness is the sense of the sacred of our time—a
version of the sacred that supersedes and devastates nearly every prior
experience that went by its name. In this version of the sacred there is
no solace for human beings except for our astonishment at its limitless
beauty and fragility, the splendor of what arises without origin or end,
what flourishes in the dark abyss of time.
Dazzled by that splendor, we can endure nearly anything that may
transpire. If we act in time, as we must, we will have withdrawn what
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would otherwise have been a great crime—and will be blessed with the
opportunity to dwell with a beautiful chaos henceforth. If we do not, as
we almost inevitably will not, we can greet the coming horrors not only
with regret and grief, indignation and sorrow, but also with the sense that
what sweeps over us is an even more stunning revelation of the ultimate
strangeness of things. In that world, which is almost upon us now, we
would do well to endure the floods, embrace the ruins, and let the dragons roam—accepting our due place at last.
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Appendix

Climate Change Is Real
What is the fundamental situation with climate change? Is it actually happening? Are human beings causing it? How much of climate science is
truly reliable enough for us to accept?
This appendix is designed to help readers work through initial questions about climate science. It will rely in part on the background research
and in part on common sense. I will organize it in reply to various objections in the hope that it will respond to the kinds of misgivings readers
may have, or questions they have heard, about the basics of our situation.
The first objection is this: It isn’t real. A fully “skeptical” response
would suggest, right from the start, that global warming is not happening
and that in consequence there is no need for us to worry about the effects
of climate change; we can put the entire subject aside and get on with the
rest of our lives.
Right on the face of it, this position is wildly implausible. “Skeptics”
like to suggest that the science on climate change is unsettled, that there
are many grounds for doubt, that the current consensus among researchers is full of holes. But in fact, there is virtually no serious dissent from
this consensus among qualified specialists in the relevant fields, specialists who are doing good research recognized as such by their peers.
Because of the controversy about climate change, several scholars
have surveyed publications in the field to see how many scientists are
raising doubts about the basic consensus, and they repeatedly find that
the number of qualified dissidents is extremely small. One recent study
examined research by scholars who have published at least twenty articles
on the topic and ranked them by the number of articles they have published. They concluded that only one of the top fifty relevant scientists,
only three of the top one hundred, and only five of the top two hundred
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are “unconvinced by the evidence.” These findings closely match surveys
of expert scientists, 97 percent of whom state that they share the consensus view. Although there are dissidents from that view, they are primarily
scientists in other fields, scholars no longer doing active research, journalists, or laymen—in short, people who do not have as clear a knowledge of contemporary research as those centrally in the relevant fields.156
A series of similar reviews of the literature have taken place over many
years and inevitably point to the same result.157 Yet a significant portion of
the public continues to think that scientists are still in doubt about global
warming. Researchers on climate change are of course acutely aware of
public attitudes and are highly motivated to correct this false impression.
Accordingly, organizations of scientists in several dozen nations and in
specialties all across climate change science have issued clear, strong declarations on climate change.158
What’s more, given the urgency of this research for public policy analysis, the international community has organized the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to summarize contemporary science
every few years for public consumption. The scientific portions of each
IPCC report are written by scientists and the summary portions by others for the benefit of government officials around the world. Scientists
of various persuasions complain that the IPCC reports omit important aspects of their research, whether by ignoring important questions
about the consensus view or by refusing to endorse the most alarming
recent research.159 Such complaints are inevitable about any document
that strives to capture the most representative views within a vast field of
knowledge. It’s also inevitable that a document this immense and complex will contain at least minor errors. No human enterprise is infallible.
But it does not follow that the entire consensus is therefore incorrect.
“Skeptics” nevertheless insist that the consensus view is unconvincing
or false. Some of those who repudiate this view argue that most researchers act from venal motives, from the attempt to comply with the wishes
of power-hungry bureaucrats, well-funded public agencies, and other
parties offering money, power, and fame to scientists who endorse the
mainstream view. Perhaps the most vocal advocate for this argument is
the MIT atmospheric scientist Richard Lindzen, who scorns what he
calls the fraudulence and hysteria of the consensus.160 But the notion
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that researchers benefit from a conspiracy, that they collude with those
in power and with each other for mutual benefit, flies in the face of reality.
It can hardly explain why scientists in so many different nations around
the world, in such a wide variety of disciplines, and with so many contrasting relationships to funding agencies agree on the basic claims. The
world of climate change science is far too large and complex for such a
conspiracy to work.
This refusal to accept the validity of the overwhelming majority of
scientific findings is not really motivated by skepticism but by a distorting, self-flattering tale about the lone wolf who defies The Man, who goes
up against The Establishment and beats it at its own game. It calls out to
the contrarian streak in all of us, our love of the tiny, heroic minority that
exposes the foolishness of the mindless drones in power. This sensational
scenario is splashed across the title pages of countless books promising to
enlighten readers about the climate change conspiracy, the hysteria and
fraud of those supporting the consensus view, or the science “they” don’t
want you to know. Although ninety-seven of the top one hundred scientists accept the idea of human-caused climate change and only three scientists raise doubts, “skeptics” clearly want us to believe that these three
lonely researchers—and only these three—are correct. Doing so may be
especially foolish, for it’s not clear whether those three even agree with
each other or are assured that an alternative paradigm is necessarily correct. Their doubts about the dominant view may be motivated by hesitation rather than defiance. Nevertheless, “skeptics” capitalize on that hesitation, hoping that it can justify repudiating the reality of climate change
outright, as if the refusal to accept the consensus view is a sufficient
reason to commit to an alternative. It’s clear that the position of heroic
opposition hardly qualifies as a cautious, deliberative, and truly skeptical viewpoint: it is actually much more like a risky, defiant, and absolute
faith—a faith that simply knows that climate change cannot be real.
This idealization of the contrarian scientist collapses as soon as one
examines the science carefully. For one thing, researchers have been
examining climate change with special intensity for the last couple of
decades, and the ideas of the dissenters have of course received serious
attention during that time. The more carefully researchers look at dissenters’ objections and replicate earlier studies to correct for possible errors
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and flaws, the more accurate and persuasive their findings become and
the firmer the basis for the overall consensus. The drift in climate science over time has been toward greater, not lesser, conviction. Each succeeding IPCC report indicates as much, for the statements on the likelihood that climate change is caused by human activity have become
increasingly confident. The Third Assessment (2001) was still somewhat
hesitant: “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the warming
observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities.” The
Fourth Assessment (2007), however, was much stronger, stating, “Most
of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic
greenhouse gas concentrations,” with “very likely” elsewhere defined as a
likelihood of 90 through 99 percent.161
Nevertheless, some “skeptical” observers are unimpressed—or have
evolved new ways to contest the consensus. Recently, contrarians have
begun to concede that climate change is real and is caused by human
beings, but insist that it will do far less damage than is claimed—and
that with our current technology we can’t address the problem to any
serious extent anyway. In effect, they have changed their tactics, pretending to accept the basic science but finding yet another way to dispute its
significance. This new style of resistance may be found in a wide range
of “skeptical” writings, the best example of which—and one that I will
discuss here—may well be a book by Patrick J. Michaels and Robert C.
Balling, Jr.
Michaels and Balling hold that the virtual unanimity of the consensus
results from the institutional structure of science. The nature of publication in the sciences, they argue, tends to exclude negative findings (those
that find no correlation between variables or no statistically significant
results), creating an intrinsic bias in favor of any prevalent theory, including the consensus view. Moreover, in their interpretation of the operations of normal scientific research, scientists who adhere to a reigning
paradigm tend to exclude alternative views. Finally, following the tenets
of “public choice theory,” which holds that people tend to choose political and economic options that promise “more” rather than “less,” preferring big claims over small ones, they argue that a systematic bias pervades
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decisions about publication, public funding, and career advancement in
the field.162
These authors draw on credible ideas about how science operates, but
they do not apply those ideas to the climate change controversy with sufficient care. In the context of that controversy, research that undermines
the prevailing view would be a positive finding, for it would establish a statistically significant result. The IPCC incorporates many findings of this
kind, taking care to list many instances where research suggests that certain factors may not be causing climate change, or at least not through
any clearly demonstrated mechanism (for example, atmospheric aerosols), and that certain consequences one might expect, such as the thinning of ice over the East Antarctic landmass, are not taking place.
Furthermore, researchers do not operate as if they are so many sheep;
they take delight when they encounter convincing arguments to the contrary, when they see data that upsets the established view in the field.
Scientists are interested in examining the dominant research paradigm,
to be sure, but they also know that it can be more important and groundbreaking to create a new one. Most of the major reputations in science
are made when a researcher finds something genuinely different from
what has gone before, shifting the general orientation of the field in a
new direction.
Finally, the claim that the consensus view is not credible is itself an
example of “more” rather than “less,” for it inevitably gets an outsize
share of public attention. To suggest that people would prefer not to
hear a “skeptical” viewpoint simply ignores the public—and scientific—
response, since the public is just as interested in a contrary view as in
the consensus. The popularity of “skeptical” books—including the one
Michaels and Balling themselves wrote—exemplifies that pattern.
The relatively cogent ideas put forward by Michaels and Balling are
more apparently responsible—and thus ultimately more devious—than
Lindzen’s charge of a climate change conspiracy. But at least Lindzen
attempts to explain what might motivate a conspiracy at all: a wish to
corner the market on public funding for research. The problem with his
theory is that it’s difficult to see why scientists would conspire to give the
world such consistently bad news. If they might be tempted (according to
this theory) by the promise of more grant money, nearly everything else
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in their lives would tell them to disprove the consensus. Do any of us—
outside of hardcore disaster freaks—really have incentives to accept climate change? We enjoy our lives as they are, and typically we would like
to be more wealthy, consume more energy, travel greater distances more
often, and contribute to and benefit from steadily increasing economic
growth. Nearly everyone from the poorest to the most wealthy likes the
idea of an ever increasing abundance—an abundance, of course, that with
current technology also implies an increasing emission of greenhouse
gases. Who, exactly, wants to bother with rebooting the industrial capacity at the basis of all this abundance? For most of us, climate change is
the last thing we want to see happen. Our lives would be much easier and
more casual, far more relaxed and enjoyable, if we didn’t have to worry
about it at all. Nearly all the incentives are on the side of the contrarians.
Follow the money. If the entire global economic system is on one
side, and a handful of granting agencies is (hypothetically) on the other,
which one wins? In the face of such an immense tide of longing for more
wealth, the conspiracy of a handful of scientists for their own self-interest
would soon be swept away. But that’s assuming scientists would ever wish
to participate in this scheme in the first place. Scientists are people too:
their assumptions, training, laboratories, and institutions are fully bound
up with the technologies of an advanced industrial society and thus with
the very economic systems that are also causing climate change. What
they are discovering, in short, is inconvenient to them as people, too. In
fact, it is especially inconvenient to them, for a change in our industrial
economies would affect their technical labor quite directly. It’s ludicrous
to imagine that they are concocting the tale of climate change for personal benefit. On the contrary, they are laying out findings that the entire
international community would rather not accept. Instead of denouncing
them as conspirators, we should see them as reluctantly discovering and
investigating something that even they might prefer were not true.
Given the enormous incentives for all of us not to accept the science of
climate change, it would be much more plausible to ponder whether the
small group of dissenters is concocting their science for personal benefit.
Dissenters, after all, have the entire world potentially with them, especially business-oriented groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
which continually pressures the U.S. Congress to take as mild a course
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of action as possible, and corporate advocates for the fossil-fuel industry,
who of course dread the thought that the world might eventually wean
itself of oil. One might expect such groups—which ultimately represent
some aspect of consumer preference in which we are all implicated—to
put their weight behind denying or dismissing climate change science,
and indeed some of them have already done so. As James Hoggan demonstrates in his book, Climate Cover-Up, starting around 1991, businesses
such as the Western Fuels Association and the National Coal Association
funded a massive public relations campaign to distort the science, mislead the public, and delay the adoption of public policies meant to
address the problem. In a parallel effort, the Exxon corporation created
groups to funnel support to various conservative “think tanks” for similar purposes.163 This effort had significant results: one study showed that
over 92 percent of English-language books expressing skepticism about
climate change between 1972 and 2005 were “published by conservative think tanks, written by authors affiliated with those think tanks, or
both.”164 A good example is the aforementioned book by Michaels and
Balling, which was published by the Cato Institute, the well-known conservative think tank in Washington, D.C. Through these and associated
efforts, national business associations and major fossil-fuel corporations
successfully persuaded mainstream media outlets that there was a credible debate about climate change, with genuinely accomplished scientists
on “both sides” of the question.165
In doing so, these groups relied on a sophisticated strategy that they
and others had long used in postwar America. In this instance, as in others,
they relied on the gap between how scientists and the public see uncertainty. Scientists seek out areas where knowledge is not settled in order to
refine and deepen their understanding, whereas the public often confuses
that level of uncertainty with doubt on the basic facts themselves. As the
historians of science Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway show in their
devastating book, Merchants of Doubt, since World War II conservative
obstructionists have relied on a small number of scientists to exploit this
gap and create the perception of doubt again and again. Climate change is
only one of the most recent instances in a long sequence of public policy
questions in which doctrinaire opponents of action have set aside a solid
scientific consensus in the name of a supposed uncertainty. Over the
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decades, these “merchants of doubt” have suggested there really was no
strict link between smoking and a host of health problems, industrial air
pollution and the problem of acid rain, or CFCs and the growing ozone
hole over the Antarctic. They sought to undermine research showing
how an exchange of nuclear warheads could lead to nuclear winter, and
in recent years have even suggested that the ban on DDT was a mistake.
All these campaigns took roughly the same shape, and all were effective
in shaping public opinion: they show that once you suggest that a consensus position is “bad science,” prompting responsible scientists to reply
and defend research in the field, you create a public debate where there
is none to speak of within the scientific community itself, produce the
impression of uncertainty, and thus create the basis for inaction. The situation today around climate change is no different.166
At one point a few years ago, however, many of the “skeptics” behind
these efforts abandoned their intransigence. Frank Luntz, the Republican
pollster, spinmeister, and leading participant in a public relations campaign against action on climate change, recanted his “skeptical” views in
2006, and in 2008 or so Exxon stopped funding the group behind most of
that campaign’s activities.167 Around the same time, President George W.
Bush, who doubted whether human activities are contributing to global
warming and whose White House had often doctored statements about
climate change by scientists working for the federal government, spoke of
the urgent need to take steps to “confront the serious challenge of global
climate change” in his 2007 State of the Union message.168 By this point,
the increasing confidence of climate change science was beginning to
change even resistant minds.
Despite the tendency of even well-known public figures to recant or
soften their resistance to action, a portion of the public remains unconvinced and is likely to stick with that position, no matter what scientists
or policy professionals might say. This group, generally associated with
the Republican party, is now permanently committed to a “skeptical”
position, despite the partial change of heart by leaders as prominent as
former President Bush. Candidates for office as Republicans are now
virtually required to deny the human contributions to climate change if
they are to receive the support of voters in that party, whatever the evidence may show. Apparently, “conservatives” are not terribly interested
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in conserving the planet, even though the preservation of cherished traditions—the core of the conservative position—will be impossible if we
don’t also conserve the environments we live in.
By now, “skeptical” opinion has very little going for it: the scientific
research doesn’t support it, its leading spokespeople have been largely
discredited, many of its former leaders have recanted or altered their positions, and a vast majority subscribes to the consensus view. Nevertheless,
as a result many contrarians hold to their views with greater intransigence. No doubt a certain lazy style of media coverage—which continues
to speak of “both sides” of a so-called “debate”—helps sustain this degree
of public misperception. But media coverage alone cannot account for
that deep resistance. The ferocity of the rhetoric attacking climate change
scientists, the hostility to all the suggestions for how to address the problem, and the general intolerance for the concerns of environmental justice suggest that something else is at stake.
For some lay “skeptics,” the idea of climate change undermines the
belief that God protects and sustains his creation. Acknowledging the
consensus view would require giving up a particular version of the theology of creation. In another version of this resistance, Lindzen is reluctant
to give up his belief that nature is intrinsically capable of balancing out
its own systems.169 For other “skeptics,” the consensus poses a threat to
the notion of individual liberty guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, and
the prospect that the government might take action to decrease our emissions smacks to them of an unwarranted intrusion into our private lives.
This position amounts to a civil religion in which liberty trumps all other
concerns, including the “general welfare” of the Preamble to that very
Constitution. People committed to these fundamental positions have
ample motive to seize upon the least doubt regarding the consensus to
justify their “skepticism.” Clearly, what is at stake for them goes much further than a reading of the science. (I discuss these aspects of the debate in
depth in chapters four and twelve.)
Linked to these deep sources of resistance is another: a suspicion
of the political and cultural power of experts. For good reasons, common people around the world instinctively mistrust the power of highly
educated people, whatever their profession, to understand and govern
them. The inevitable failure of those in the governing class to reflect on
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the sources of their authority, as well as the willingness of those in that
class to intrude into long established ways, to scoff at folk wisdom and
received cultural values, and to demand compliance with the latest form
of social improvement, have always been more than a little offensive, even
if expert knowledge has often brought real benefits to common people.
Popular ambivalence over expertise is deep, for it is intrinsic to the vexed
relation between people of different social classes and different ways of
seeing the world. Yet this ambivalence is not a feature only of certain
social classes; it is present in nearly anyone who secretly defies doctor’s
orders, follows an unhealthy diet, or finds a purely scientific definition of
the world and the human mind limiting.
For all these reasons, the attempt to persuade “skeptics” through the
endless rehearsal of scientific findings does not get at their real concerns.
The conversation must take up questions about our bedrock values. In
the end, a person fully committed to the “skeptical” position may simply
resist the authority of science as such or acknowledge it only insofar as
it complies with more important loyalties. But those who dismiss such
“skepticism” too readily may also miss something essential, for none of
us is truly free of the impulse to resort to similarly intransigent, and often
unacknowledged, loyalties. We all have abundant reasons to evade the
implications of climate change; we all on some level feel a deep surprise
and resistance. In reflecting on the intransigence of the “skeptics,” then,
we would do well to consider our own convenient evasions, our own hesitation to take the transformation in the world seriously.
The outright denial that climate change is taking place is only the
most overt form of evading its claims. There is an entire series of increasingly subtle denials of what researchers have found, each of which is
instructive. Perhaps the next version of resistance arises in someone who
doesn’t wish to be so harsh in repudiating the science but doesn’t want
to accept it, either. Even if the “skeptics” are wrong to be so stubborn, a
person might think, they are right to point out how much we still don’t
know about the Earth’s climate. Accordingly, in this view there is simply
too much uncertainty in the science for us to act now.
Hesitation of this kind is ordinarily a good thing. In fact, the position
of so-called “skeptics” betrays the promise of a genuine skepticism. A truly
cautious dissent from the claim that human beings are causing climate
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change is beneficial to the public, for it forces researchers to account
for their way of gathering and analyzing data much more carefully and
to sharpen their research methods as well. Even the research—not the
rhetoric—of contrarian scientists such as Lindzen who cultivate the lone
wolf persona continues to benefit climate research today, for his challenge
to the consensus view helps it sharpen its own account of climate change
and prevent it from becoming too uncritical of its findings. Such contrarian viewpoints serve an important public function. Because the news is
so bad, and has such a huge potential impact on our lives, it’s only natural
that we’d resist it with everything we’ve got—and force the experts to listen to a wide range of objections and doubts. Making researchers defend
their findings is a good thing: there is no reason to let their work influence our lives until they make a case that is truly convincing. Skepticism
here, as in so many walks of life, can be a real boon.
But skepticism of this sort is non-dogmatic, open-minded, and curious; when it is true to itself, it hesitates to endorse any of the findings
outright, including the work of contrarian scientists. (Nor would it, like
Lindzen, describe those who accept the consensus as venal or hysterical.) This kind of skepticism, in fact, permeates the scientific community; it is the lifeblood of research, its motivating force. No self-respecting
researcher could get up in the morning without the perpetual suspicion
that earlier work in the field was incomplete, that there are huge gaps in
existing knowledge, and that another angle might reveal more. Because of
this attitude, the statements about climate change that scientists give to
the public even today are not declarations of absolute faith but carefully
phrased descriptions of a plausible scenario, descriptions that have probability and hesitation built into them as a matter of course.
Such doubts are not present merely out of habit, merely because scientists just can’t commit. On the contrary, it’s quite clear that there are, in
fact, vast gaps in our knowledge. Nobody really understands what causes
clouds to form, what effect climate change might have in creating more
or fewer of them, and whether the ability of clouds to reflect potentially
warming sunlight back into space may increase or decrease in the future
(and thus affect the planet’s warming in some manner).170 Furthermore,
the computer models that predict future warming are not yet capable of
describing the incredibly complex, dynamic systems of the planet with
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utter accuracy, and as a result there is no firm consensus on exactly how
much warming a certain level of atmospheric carbon dioxide would
cause. Specialists in each field related to climate change studies can easily
add to this list.
Yet those specialists have also declared their conviction that global
warming is happening and is being caused by human beings. We can only
conclude that for them this much is certain; the uncertainties arise in
how to describe some of the mechanisms by which warming takes place,
in how much warming might take place under certain circumstances, and
what exact consequences might emerge in the course of time.171 The limitations in our knowledge do not undercut the fundamental reality that
we are changing Earth’s climate in an unprecedented way. The consensus
position, in short, is now seen as so elementary, so difficult to dispute,
that it is taken for granted by scientists in the field, who have moved on to
examine other questions.
But the hesitation with regard to certainty nevertheless does reveal
something crucial about our current dilemma. After all, very few of us
have ever been asked to assess the state of scientific expertise before making up our minds about something central to our lives. We’re not used to
being in this position. What’s more, while scientists live with uncertainty
as part of their profession, we laymen typically think in a different way:
we want clear, concise answers and ask our politicians, journalists, and
leading figures to supply them as often as possible. We don’t like the mismatch between scientific caution and our everyday demand for clarity.
Our dissatisfaction with the scientific response to our demand for certainty comes out of this mismatch.
But it’s worth asking whether our defensiveness on climate makes
sense. Do we truly seek certainty in every area of our own lives? For
example, do we buy fire insurance only if we know for sure we’ll need it
down the line? When we go on a trip, do we take only those items we
can prove we’ll need? As a nation, do we demand military preparedness
only if we know precisely what other forces will threaten us—and when
they will do so?
When we think about our situation in this light, it’s pretty clear that
insisting on total certainty about climate change before we act gets everything backwards. What would you do if you were told that if you drove
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down a particular street at a certain hour, you’d face a 1 to 10 percent
chance you’d have a terrible accident? Very few of us would take that
chance. Those who insist on certainty, however, suggest that if there is
somewhere between a 90 and 99 percent chance of a crash, we should
still go down that road. After all, there is still a small chance we’d make it
through without injury.
Such a response is ludicrous. When faced with the possibility of major
harm, most sane adults would want to play it safe, to have an out, a Plan
B, or at least good insurance and excellent medical care. We aren’t simply
indifferent if there is a high likelihood something horrible will happen
to us. Yet in the climate change debate, we’ve managed to get the whole
thing upside down. A supposed uncertainty in the science has covered
up a far more frightening uncertainty about our futures: are we going to
make it through the next few decades in good shape? Do we actually have
a future? That’s the real uncertainty we should face, and if we think about
it in those terms, our answer gets obvious very fast.
The question is not whether scientists have absolute proof that human
beings are causing climate change. The core question is instead whether
we are sure we are not putting our own lives and futures into doubt by
how we live, especially by how we emit greenhouse gases. Even if you
think the science on this subject could be sharper, you have to admit it’s
already telling a pretty dire tale. Just hanging out until the consensus is
even stronger isn’t very smart.
But wait a minute, another person might object, global warming is real,
but we aren’t the cause. Earth’s climate has changed dramatically over its
history, thanks to any number of natural causes; our present moment is
no exception. For us to attribute climate change to ourselves is merely
a sign of our own arrogance. We live on an unstable planet, this person
might say; there’s nothing we can do about that fact. The cyclic changes
in distance between the Earth and sun, the changes in the tilt of the polar
axes, and variations in the brightness of the sun all change the amount
of sunlight entering the atmosphere, alter the planet’s warmth, and over
time lead to immense changes in climate.
This objection has a great deal behind it. Research has in fact demonstrated, for example, that the slight changes in solar intensity (due to
sunspots and changes in the sun’s brightness) have enormous effects
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on temperature and climate systems and that these variations are routine events over the vast stretches of the planet’s history. But because
those factors are relevant, scientists have worked hard to take them into
account. Looking into this very question, scientists found that an increase
in solar radiation caused the rise in temperatures up to the 1940s and that
a decrease in that intensity—possibly along with the release of aerosols
into the atmosphere, which may counteract warming—led to the global
cooling from the 1940s to the 1970s. But average sunspot activity has
not increased since then, while global temperatures have risen at a good
pace, suggesting that solar intensity is not in fact a primary factor in the
global warming of recent decades.172 The current change in temperature
is anomalous, is taking place far more quickly than in the past, and is primarily caused by human activities.
But this direct response to the objection may not do it justice.
Evidently, many people feel that if climate change has happened before,
we shouldn’t get too upset if it is happening again. This attitude may
motivate responses to charts showing how much temperatures have risen
since the late 1970s: for some observers, if current temperatures remain
within the zone of temperature variation familiar in the planet’s history,
what we see today is by definition not anomalous and thus not a source of
concern.173 As a result, if they can show that current temperatures really
aren’t higher today than they were at some point in the past, they feel
they have refuted the consensus view.
But this logic just doesn’t hold true. If we say for the sake of argument
that the planet may have been this warm or even warmer in the very distant past, that fact does not mean that the current warming is “natural,”
part of the ordinary course of things. Nonhuman causes may have led to
great warming in another era; it doesn’t follow that the current warming
is “natural,” too.
This answer is already a sufficient response. But it is interesting to try a
thought experiment as well—to take the contrarian objection at its word
and see what happens. Suppose that the current warming is “natural,” that
it is entirely the result of forces entirely outside our control. Does it really
follow that we have nothing to worry about? Rather than helping us dismiss climate change, this argument only reinforces the problem—and
makes it even harder for us to do anything about it.
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This position is ultimately quite puzzling. It’s just not plausible to
assume that if sometime in Earth’s history it was as warm as it is today,
we can relax. For hundreds of thousands of years, Earth’s average temperatures have varied widely, far more than most of us learned in science
classes. Until recently, in fact, the history of Earth’s climate had barely registered in the popular mind. A good look at charts of temperatures over
the past 70,000 years or so—not to mention the last 600,000 years—will
certainly get one’s attention: the lines on those charts bounce around
far more than one might initially have thought, slowing down into relative stability only in the very recent past, in the 10,000 years or so since
the most recent Ice Age—the period geologists call the Holocene.174
Civilization as we know it arose on a planet pretty much with its current
characteristics. In this rather brief, exceptional period, the Earth’s climate
has created conditions that are ideal for certain kinds of human activities
to flourish. “Nature” for us is highly specific, very recent, and quite vulnerable. Even for the first several thousand years after the Ice Age, we lived in
mobile hunter-gatherer communities and could adapt to new conditions
by changing our habitat. But with the rise and spread of the great sedentary, built civilizations, we are now rooted in specific places, much less
flexible, and deeply reliant on the endurance of our familiar landscapes.
The return of an Ice Age or the coming of a fully tropical planet, both
with ample precedent in Earth’s history, would be an immense danger to
our way of life. Nothing we are used to, and no aspect of contemporary
civilization, would be the same if Earth entered one of these scenarios.
Rather than allowing us to dismiss the danger of climate change, then,
this version of “skepticism” only makes clearer how fragile civilization is,
how recent and potentially temporary.
If we are merely caught in yet another climatic shift, we must still
imagine how to cope. For the most part, those who claim that climate
change is not caused by human activities fight against efforts to do anything substantial about our situation. Such a position is indeed consistent
with their sense that human action is not the cause of recent warming.
But if that warming is taking place and we can do nothing about it, then
how should we face the coming decades?
Anybody who actually believes that the current warming is entirely
natural should pause and think about the consequences of that claim. If it
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is true, then our attempts to reduce our contributions to climate change
will have no effect and our future is truly bleak. Such a person should also
be very interested in reflecting—at least in some fashion—on what it is
like to live in a world with a disappearing future. The thought experiment
in imagining this alternative rendition of our present dilemma ultimately
takes us right back to the central questions of this book.
Very well, one might say, climate change is real and is caused by human
beings, but the rise in temperatures isn’t that great—not enough for us to
worry about. Some observers argue that if we gather data about Earth’s
temperatures more carefully, for example by filtering out the “urban heat
effect” (the drift toward higher temperatures caused by urban encroachment into areas where weather data is collected), we’d find that the Earth
simply isn’t warming as much as we thought.175
At first, this sounds like an intriguing objection. What if the data
about warming is exaggerated? On this score, skeptical inquiry is justified: shouldn’t we be fairly certain that we measure global temperature shifts accurately if we are to have a clue in understanding the present biosphere?
Richard A. Muller of the University of California at Berkeley found
enough flaws in previous studies of global temperatures that he led a
research team in examining the entire question. As a result of this effort,
he published an opinion piece in July, 2012, that began, “Call me a converted skeptic.” Taking up a series of objections raised by climate change
skeptics (regarding the urban heat effect, faulty data selection, and
human bias) and subjecting them all to a comprehensive statistical analysis, that team ultimately found that none of these objections held true—
and that the emission of greenhouse gases has indeed forced an increase
in global temperatures of two and one half degrees Fahrenheit over the
past 250 years and of one and one half degrees over the past fifty.176 That
group further found that no explanation other than human activity better accounted for this rise in temperatures—not even a change in solar
intensity. Such a serious, apparently neutral, and thorough examination
of the question should remove most doubts on this score.
But it’s also important to recognize that objecting to the reality of climate change on this basis misses the point. It looks for certainty in how
we measure climate change rather than thinking about its results. The best
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response to this objection is to try out another thought experiment. Let’s
say this objection is correct: what follows?
The answer is immediate and quite damning. Evidently, the rise in
temperature, however high or low, is already having surprising effects. As
I mentioned in the first pages of this book, the sea ice in the Arctic—and
the methane clathrates on an Arctic continental shelf—are both melting
far more quickly than scientists predicted just a few years ago, suggesting
that the effect of the warming we’ve already experienced is more severe
than we recently suspected. If such massive Earth systems can transform
so greatly and so soon, the rise in the planet’s average temperature, whatever the precise numbers might be, are enough to get our attention. Is it
really wise to keep disputing how to gather temperature data for another
decade or so and let the world’s ecosystems just take care of themselves?
There is very little doubt that we have a serious problem on our hands.
Scientists have arrived at an overwhelming, nearly unanimous consensus
that we’re causing climate change and that it is already causing devastating changes to Earth’s living systems. The fact that our knowledge about
how it works is not yet absolute should not encourage us to ignore it for
the time being, since the very great uncertainty about whether we’ll have
a future dramatically outweighs the relatively technical uncertainties in
our knowledge. The fundamentals of climate change science, in short, tell
us that this problem is real.
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Broken Present argues that we have not yet undergone the ethical and
philosophical shifts necessary to cope with the temporal dissonance
associated with climate change. This is a deeply necessary book at a
time when many of us have already become numb to predictions of
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